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Abstract
Infectious disease epidemics present a di cult task for policymakers, requiring
the implementation of control strategies under significant time constraints and
uncertainty. Mathematical models can be used to predict the outcome of control
interventions, providing useful information to policymakers in the event of such an
epidemic. However, these models su↵er in the early stages of an outbreak from a
lack of accurate, relevant information regarding the dynamics of spread and the
e cacy of control. As such, recommendations provided by these models are often
incorporated in an ad hoc fashion, as and when more reliable information becomes
available.
We propose and motivate the use of adaptive management (AM) as a solution to
this problem. AM is an iterative, structured decision making framework, encouraging
the incorporation of real-time information, resolution of uncertainty and adaptation
of control as an outbreak progresses. We investigate in detail how the AM framework
can be applied to the management of epidemics. We clarify the e↵ects, benefits and
limitations of certain components, such as the di↵erence between active and passive
optimisation and the method used to predict uncertainty resolution. We cover a
range of scenarios, exhibiting the value of an AM approach in guiding decisions under
uncertainty and providing relevant, clear information to decision makers regarding
e cient allocation of control and monitoring resources. We believe the practical
implementation of such an approach could greatly improve the outcome of epidemics
in the future.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The management of infectious disease epidemics is a task beset by di culties.
It requires satisfying the complex, often conflicting, objectives of stakeholders,
without complete knowledge of how the disease will spread or the e↵ect that control
interventions may have. Mathematical models have become a useful tool to aid in
the decision making process, allowing the comparison of di↵erent strategies through
simulation. Since their advent in the influential work of Kermack and McKendrick [1],
mathematical models describing the spread of diseases through time and space have
become both increasingly commonplace and complex. The vast improvements in
both theoretical and computational techniques that have been achieved and utilised
in this field allow for models that can accurately represent and mimic what we see
in real-world systems and predict future outcomes.
However, whilst mathematical models are now well established in epidemiological
contexts [2, 3], incomplete knowledge of the system under question remains a
significant barrier to providing relevant policy recommendations during an epidemic
[4–7]. In the context of a novel outbreak, control strategies must be decided upon
and implemented quickly, leaving little time to gather accurate information about
the current outbreak, such as the transmissibility of the disease or the e cacy of
a vaccine. In the past, retrospective analyses of historic outbreaks have often been
used to estimate such parameters. Although such estimates are often accurate for
the outbreak on which they are based, there is no guarantee they will be the same for
another outbreak, even if it is the same disease and other conditions are comparable.
Furthermore, in such instances, real-time information has often been ignored or used
in an ad hoc fashion as the outbreak progresses, resulting in heavy reliance on possibly
inaccurate historical data. There is a growing body of literature highlighting the
significant e↵ect that uncertainty can have on the outcome of control policies and, as
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a result, the selection of optimal control (e.g. [8–11]). Such results demonstrate the
need for formal uncertainty estimation and inclusion in epidemiological forecasting
and decision making.
Real-time parameter estimation and epidemic forecasting has become a significant
area of focus in recent decades, with several large outbreaks catching the attention of
both the epidemiological community and general public. The 2001 Foot-and-Mouth
disease (FMD) outbreak in the UK [8, 12, 13] has since prompted significant research
into the process of real-time decision making and forecasting that continues to develop
[10, 14–17]. Soon after, outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in
2003 [18], pandemic H5N1 influenza in birds from 2005 [19] and a novel H1N1 human
influenza pandemic in 2009 [20] led to increased preparation for similar outbreaks in
the future through methods of estimating and forecasting disease potential [21–26]
and analysis of control and surveillance options [27, 28]. The role of dynamic policies
that can adapt to the real-time characteristics of such an outbreak has also seen
increased attention in this area [29–31].
In 2014, West Africa su↵ered an unprecedented Ebola epidemic [32], triggering an
impressive response from epidemiologists in estimating transmissibility, forecasting
burden and patterns of spread, predicting the e cacy of interventions and assessing
the possibility of vaccine trials (e.g. [33–35], see [32] for an extensive list). Forecasts
from such models aided in advocating for important international public health
response [36], crucial to the early control e↵ort. Since then it has resulted in
initiatives such as the RAPIDD Ebola forecasting challenge [37], providing insights
into modelling methods as well as better practices for future outbreaks such as
greater collaboration between groups and the need for quality data [32, 36].
At the time of writing this thesis, much of the world is enforcing strict social
distancing measures in response to the ongoing novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pan-
demic [38–40], which has currently been detected in over 3 million people worldwide
[41]. Epidemiological modellers have been providing significant support to the UK
government during this response, through the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on
Modelling (SPI-M), providing real-time estimates of the epidemic potential, forecasts
and predictions regarding interventions.
Overall, it is clear that the methods and analysis provided by mathematical
modelling and the wider epidemiological community serve as a vital tool for decision
makers to help with understanding the current state of the epidemic, the impact
of possible control interventions and the uncertainty surrounding both. However,
the formal integration of such information into management decisions in real-time
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remains a significant di culty [5, 6], both due to a disconnect between modellers and
decision makers and because modelling results can be highly uncertain, appearing to
change rapidly and unpredictably to untrained eyes.
We propose the adaptive management (AM) framework as a way to tackle this
problem, by providing a rigorous structure for estimating epidemiological parameters
and adapting control. AM is an iterative, structured approach to decision making
that provides dynamic, state-dependent decision recommendations, encouraging the
incorporation of real-time outbreak information to resolve uncertainty in system
parameters where necessary [42]. It is well-established in ecological fields, such as
conservation and resource management [43, 44], and has recently gained attention
in the literature surrounding epidemiological interventions (e.g. [11]). However,
widespread, interdisciplinary use has been hindered by a lack of consensus on the
definition of AM and a lack of understanding as to how AM di↵ers from current
methods of management, such as ad hoc, trial-and-error type approaches. In this
thesis, we introduce AM in a epidemiological setting, clarify how it di↵ers to current
management approaches and exhibit several ways in which it can help to improve
the outcome of management during an epidemic.
In Chapter 2, we start by introducing many of the important methods and ideas
that we will use throughout the thesis. These include a formal definition of the
AM framework and a review of its use in the literature, an overview of Value of
Information analysis and its use in conjunction with AM and an explanation of the
parameter inference techniques and software used throughout.
In Chapter 3, we begin our analysis of the AM framework and its use in the
management of epidemics. We introduce and compare three approaches to managing
a theoretical epidemic: a non-AM, passive AM and active AM approach, contrasted
by how they incorporate real-time information into decisions and plan to resolve
uncertainty in the system. Using vaccination as the only form of control, with an
unknown vaccine e cacy, we focus on how these approaches can lead to di↵erent
initial control decisions and thus a↵ect the outcome of the epidemic. We find that
using an active AM approach to management enables us to better satisfy management
objectives compared to using other, less complex approaches, as well as provide
relevant, useful information to decision makers that is not possible under other
approaches.
In Chapter 4, we focus on the use of active AM to optimise the timing and
allocation of resources for both control and monitoring, in the face of uncertain
epidemiological parameters such as the transmission rate. We introduce three
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methods of modelling uncertainty resolution: a ‘perfect information’ method, an
abstract method that does not depend on the state of the outbreak itself and a
fully mechanistic method that attempts to model the mechanism behind uncertainty
resolution exactly. We again focus on the initial decision and how these di↵erent
methods can change early recommendations regarding control and monitoring, such
as the timing of cross-sectional samples of the population or the targeting of one
uncertainty over another. When testing the performance of these methods on a
theoretical epidemic, we find that active AM, coupled with a mechanistic model of
uncertainty resolution, is able to provide the most accurate and relevant information
to decision makers, emphasising the need for a clearly defined monitoring plan before
the implementation of control.
In the final two chapters, we show how the techniques we have developed in
Chapters 3 and 4 can be used in a more realistic setting to provide important
information to decision makers and help to improve epidemic outcomes. We focus
on an Ebola-like disease model, introduced in Chapter 5, with both vaccination and
the establishment of healthcare centres as possible forms of control. In Chapter 5,
we show how an increase in ‘risky’ behaviour from vaccinated individuals can lead to
an increased number of deaths from a mass vaccination campaign if vaccine e cacy
is low. Hence, if vaccine e cacy is unknown, it is beneficial to gather information
regarding vaccine e cacy before implementing a mass vaccination campaign. We
assume that this information is gathered through a vaccine trial. We show how
active AM, coupled with a model used to simulate the vaccine trial, can be used to
provide time-dependent thresholds for the estimate of e cacy needed to ensure that
vaccination will improve the outcome of the epidemic. Finally, we incorporate an
unknown transmission rate and use active AM to develop time- and state-dependent
thresholds for the implementation of a mass vaccination campaign, dependent on
both the estimate of vaccine e cacy obtained from a trial and the probability
distribution of the transmission rate estimated from the state of the epidemic over
time. We demonstrate how the two uncertainties can interact with each other and
the importance of capturing such e↵ects within the model.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we use interventions targeted towards the healthcare-
seeking behaviour of the population to control the outbreak, in the same Ebola-like
disease model used in Chapter 5. We demonstrate that an increased probability
of seeking healthcare can lead to significantly improved outcomes. However, it
can also increase the burden on the healthcare system, an issue if it results in
overloading the healthcare system. We show that a multi-phase AM procedure, with
the choice to implement di↵erent levels of control during each phase, can improve
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outcomes compared to a static control policy. We also show how an active AM
perspective, anticipating the resolution of uncertainty at some point in the future, can
change initial recommendations, greatly improve outcomes and provide important
information to decision makers regarding the cost of delaying information gain (or,
conversely, the benefit of making it a priority) and which uncertainties are most
important to resolve.
Overall, in this thesis we present a significant body of evidence supporting
the use of the AM framework, especially active AM, to aid in the management
of epidemics. We show that the existence of uncertainty in both epidemiological
parameters and the e↵ects of control interventions can lead to unexpected and
undesirable outcomes from control. However, using the rigorous, structured approach
of AM, alongside an explicit, active treatment of uncertainty and its resolution,
allows for clear, state-dependent control and monitoring recommendations that can
help to significantly improve management outcomes through better decisions and
allocation of resources. Such results have not been demonstrated before in the
literature surrounding epidemiological interventions. We hope this work serves as a
proof of concept and encourages further theoretical and practical exploration of the
use of AM in this context.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Adaptive management
Adaptive management (AM) is a rigorous, structured approach to decision making
that encourages iterative phases of learning and adaptation of control to better meet
the objectives of management. First used implicitly by Beverton and Holt in 1957
[45] to improve the management of fisheries, adaptive management as an explicit
methodology was introduced in 1978 by Holling [44] in the area of environmental
resource management and soon thereafter applied by Hilborn and Walters [46]
to harvesting policies. Since then, it has been subject to significant threoretical
discussion, lead by Walters [43], often heralded as the best approach for managing
ecological systems under uncertainty [47]. AM has seen several applications in real
life [47, 48], for example in the planning of controlled floods along the Colorado
River [49], or elucidating the relationship between harvest and survival rates in
waterfowl populations [50] (we expand on these applications further at the end of this
section). However, it has never been utilised for epidemiological interventions, only
recently gaining attention in the literature [11, 51]. Here, we detail the structure
and implementation of the AM framework in an epidemiological setting.
AM consists of two phases (Figure 2.1): a set-up phase and an iterative learning
and implementation phase [42, 47, 48, 52]. Within the set-up phase, AM ensures the
explicit specification of quantifiable objectives, possible management and monitoring
actions and a model which accurately represents the behaviour of the system. These
components must be decided upon a priori, with significant input from stakeholders.
The set-up phase reflects ideas taken from structured decision making (SDM) meth-
odology [52–54]. During the iterative learning and implementation phase, the set-up
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components are used to forecast the possible e↵ects of control and the action which
best satisfies management objectives is implemented. As the outbreak progresses,
it is monitored according to the agreed plan, providing information regarding un-
certain parameters within the model. This real-time information is used to resolve
uncertainty, allowing for updated forecasts of control outcomes and adaptation where
necessary. The learning and implementation phase can be repeated many times
throughout the outbreak. It is this explicit structure and objective-driven optimisa-
tion that sets AM apart from trial-and-error type approaches [55]. We reiterate and
detail the individual components of the AM framework below and in Figure 2.1 (in
depth reviews of the AM framework found in [42, 47, 52, 54]).
2.1.1 Components of the AM framework
Management objectives
In order to decide upon the ‘best’ control action in the event of an epidemic, it
is necessary to agree upon the objective we wish to satisfy through management.
Examples include: minimising the duration of the epidemic, loss of life, economic
cost, or, more realistically, a combination of such factors. It is necessary that policy
makers, in cooperation with stakeholders, explicitly state these goals a priori, in a
quantifiable manner.
Control options
This component comprises a list of possible control actions that can be implemented
throughout the outbreak. These must also be decided upon by policy makers in
cooperation with stakeholders. We will use the AM framework to forecast and
evaluate the outcome of these controls, in di↵erent combinations throughout the
outbreak, to provide a structured, iterative control recommendation.
Monitoring plan
As the epidemic progresses, it is possible to gather information about its behaviour
from a number of sources, for example the number daily infections or deaths or
serological data describing the disease, as well as the e↵ect of control interventions, for
example the e cacy of vaccines. This component is essential for resolving uncertainty
in the system and improving control. It is necessary to decide on what information
to collect before choosing a control action, as this may restrict resources available
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Figure 2.1: Adaptive management procedure. Adaptive management (AM)
addresses the di culties of epidemic control through a structured, iterative frame-
work. The set-up phase (dark grey circles) provides a quantitative representation of
management objectives, possible actions, planned monitoring and system behaviour,
decided upon a priori with input from stakeholders. In the learning and imple-
mentation phase, the set-up components are used to forecast the possible e↵ects of
control. This allows a dynamic policy recommendation, outlining the actions that
will best satisfy the management objectives whilst predicting the possible e↵ect of
updated outbreak information on the e cacy of control. As the epidemic progresses,
predictions from competing models of system behaviour are compared to incoming
information, reducing uncertainty in the e↵ect of control. The recommendations
are adapted as necessary and the process repeats. Dotted, black arrows indicate
that new information may lead to changes in the set-up components. However, this
impedes the ability of AM to select optimal control actions and should be avoided if
possible through significant planning and discussion before control implementation.
Figure adapted from [42]
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for control and can a↵ect the utility of some actions. Elucidating the interactions
between control and monitoring and highlighting the benefit of a clearly defined
monitoring plan before the implementation of control is a significant focus of this
thesis.
Models of system behaviour
To predict how the disease may spread and how control actions will interact with this
spread, quantitative models of system behaviour must be developed. It is essential
that the models capture the key uncertainties within the system (that is, those that
a↵ect the recommended course of action [10, 11, 56]), as well as represent what is
known or agreed about the system as accurately as possible. Using the information
gained through monitoring, the models are evaluated for credibility in order to resolve
uncertainty. This component of the framework encompasses an impressive body of
literature from the epidemiological community.
In much of the literature, uncertainty is captured through the definition of multiple
discrete models (e.g. [57]), with a weight attached to each representing its likelihood
of being the true model. In this thesis, we focus on the treatment of continuous
uncertainties, which are often found in epidemiological models. As such, the ‘models’
of system behaviour are contained within a single model whose parameters can take
on a continuum of values. The weights are then defined by a continuous probability
distribution on the parameters, which may change over time in relation to new
information obtained from monitoring.
Optimisation
We use the models of system behaviour to forecast the outcome of control actions,
with a level of uncertainty. How these forecasts are used to choose the optimal control
action depends on the specific optimisation methods used; for example passive or
active, myopic or dynamic. These classifications are explained in detail in the next
section.
Implementation and adaptation
Once an optimal control action has been chosen, it is implemented alongside the
monitoring plan. Real-time information gained from monitoring during the outbreak
is then used to evaluate competing models of system behaviour, adjusting the weights
9
assigned to each model or, in the case of continuous uncertainties, the underlying
probability distributions of model parameters. This allows control actions to be
reassessed and adapted if necessary. In some cases (specifically active AM, defined
in the next section), the e↵ect of new information is anticipated before the initial
implementation of control and monitoring, thus control can be adapted immediately
according to new information without requiring optimisation to be repeated.
In light of new information, it is possible that components from the set-up phase
need to be changed, for example new control or monitoring options may become
available, or we gain a better understanding of the mechanics of spread. However,
such changes, if not planned for, will detract from the ability of AM to identify the
optimal course of action. This can lead to suboptimal and ine cient management,
requiring repeating the process of optimisation as new information becomes available.
Therefore, it is important that the set-up components account for as many such
eventualities as possible, before the process of control optimisation, implementation
and adaptation is started.
2.1.2 Optimisation methods
There are several methods for optimising the outcome of control actions within
the AM framework. Here, we clarify the di↵erence between some of the major
classifications and indicate the definitions we will use throughout this thesis.
Passive vs active
Possibly the most important distinction between di↵erent optimisation methods
within AM is that of ‘passive’ and ‘active’ adaptive strategies [57, 58].
Passive adaptive strategies represent a reactive method of adapting control,
allowing adaptation of control if and when new information becomes available, but
not anticipating future knowledge and the e↵ect it could have on current decisions.
Active adaptive strategies explicitly account for the e↵ect that new information
gained in the future may have on current control decisions, by projecting future
changes in uncertainty within the optimisation algorithms. This allows us to incor-
porate the e↵ect that di↵erent control actions may have on future system uncertainty
into current decisions. It also results in a multi-phase, state-dependent policy recom-
mendation, allowing immediate adaptation of control in light of new information,
without needing to recalculate optimal policies.
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In Chapter 3 we go into significant detail regarding examples of passive and active
AM and the di↵erence between them, demonstrating how the anticipation of future
learning can lead to di↵erent initial decisions when trying to control an epidemic.
Thereafter, in this thesis we focus on the use of active AM and its utility.
Myopic vs dynamic
The choice of using myopic or dynamic optimisation is often dictated by the context
[57]. Myopic optimisation focuses on the outcome one-step-ahead, choosing a control
policy now that leads to the best outcome after one time step. This is useful for long-
term management scenarios, often found in environmental and ecological contexts,
for which the reward from an action is not immediately apparent or easy to define.
In contrast, dynamic optimisation calculates the benefit of control actions across
the entire time frame. Clearly, this requires a well-defined time frame across which
to forecast the outcome of control, thus is better suited to short term management
scenarios with clear goals.
In the context of epidemic control, dynamic optimisation is appropriate since we
have clear goals, given by the management objectives outlined in the set-up phase,
and a finite period of time over which to forecast the e↵ect of control, that is, until
the outbreak is suppressed. Employing an active, dynamic optimisation process
also allows for learning to be prioritised, without explicitly attaching a reward to
learning itself, since we are able to predict when learning in the short term will
improve management in the long term. Throughout this thesis, we assume a dynamic
optimisation strategy.
Favourite model vs utility averaged
Finally, given the uncertainty in the system, there will be a range of possible outcomes
from each control action. Under a favourite model approach, we choose the control
action which is best under the most likely model [57], or equivalently for a model
with continuous parameter uncertainty, using the most likely values of parameters
(the mode of the joint parameter distribution). Under a utility averaged approach,
we choose the control action which is best on average (weighted), across all possible
models or values of parameters. Given the importance of incorporating uncertainty
in epidemic control, it would be unwise to use a favourite model approach, since it
ignores this uncertainty. This could easily lead to unexpected non-linear e↵ects when
parameters di↵er from their most likely values. Thus, throughout this thesis, we use
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utility averaged methods. In Chapter 5, we show how the objective of management
may be further incorporated into this process, taking into account and limiting the
probability of undesirable outcomes.
2.1.3 Implementation: methods, di culties and successes
Markov decision processes
A common way to represent the adaptive management decision making process
mathematically is using the theory of Markov decision processes (MDPs) [46, 51, 57,
59, 60]. MDPs are applied in contexts where we have a system that is observable
over time and under the control of a decision maker [61, 62]. They are Markovian
in nature, in the way that current decisions depend only on the current state of
the system, not previous states or actions taken. A MDP consists of the following
components:
Control phases: a set of control phases evolving through time t, determined by
the decisions made between each phase. In epidemiological contexts, this set is made
up of a finite number of discrete phases (finite-horizon, discrete time).
State space: the state space refers to the observable state of the system over time
{st}. In an epidemiological context, the exact state of the sytem (the number of
people in each compartment for example) is rarely observable. Instead, we use a
proxy such as reported cases, which provides a probabilistic idea of the current state.
This requires the use of partially observable markov decision processes (POMDPs),
explained in the next section.
Actions: a set of actions {a} that can be implemented during each control phase.
The action taken will a↵ect the state of the system.
Transition probabilities: a function that defines the transition of the system from
one state, st, to another, st+1. The probability will depend on the current state of
the system and the action that is implemented: p(st+1 | st, a).
Reward function: the immediate cost or value associated with implementing an
action whilst in a specific state: r(st, a). This can depend on the states and actions
that are realised in the future, taking the form of an expected cost or value.
Finally, we define the overall accumulated value (or cost) of an action a over
time (from now until the end of the decision process), assuming current state st, as
Va(st). The goal of the MDP is to maximise the accumulated value (or minimise
accumulated cost) through the selection of appropriate actions in each control phase.
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Dynamic programming
Dynamic programming, developed by Bellman [61], is a common way to find the
exact solution of a MDP. If the goal is to maximise the accumulated value Va(st),
we proceed recursively calculating:
maxa{Va(st)} = maxa
8<:X
st+1
p(st+1 | st, a) (r(st, a) + maxa⇤ {Va⇤(st+1)}))
9=; , (2.1)
where a represents the choice of current action to be taken and a⇤ future actions.
For a finite-horizon, discrete time MDP, this can be solved using backward
recursion: start at the final time point and calculate the value Va(st) for all st and a.
Then continue backwards, calculating Va(st 1), repeating until we obtain the value
function and corresponding optimal action for every possible state at each point in
time. The choice of initial action will then depend on the initial state of the system,
and subsequent actions in subsequent states. We present this process graphically in
Figure 2.2, assuming a MDP with three time points, two possible actions at each
step and a discrete state space.
Throughout this thesis we use a number of di↵erent objective functions, however,
in general, we aim to minimise some ‘cost’ that is defined by the overall outcome
of the epidemic and possibly the cost of implemented controls. As such, we will
use minimising functions as opposed to maximising functions. Furthermore, the
immediate reward r(st, a) from an action will be the cost of implementing that action,
plus, if it is the final decision point, the outcome of the epidemic that results.
Partially observable Markov decision processes
A limitation of the MDP definition we have described is the assumption that the
state of the system s is observable. In the context of epidemiology, this is rarely
the case. Instead, we rely on other observations such as reported cases as a proxy,
providing a probabilistic view of what the current state may be. Such a scenario can
be described as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) [63–65].
To describe and solve a POMDP, we need to introduce a belief state, b(st). This
can represent a discrete set of weights for a set of models capturing the uncertainty in
this system, or, as we use throughout this thesis, a continuous probability distribution
over unknown model parameters. The belief state depends on the observed state st
and changes over time. In the context of AM, we are aiming to resolve uncertainty
13
Figure 2.2: Dynamic programming. Dynamic programming is a recursive process
used to find the optimal solution to a MDP. We present a graphical example of
this process, described mathematically in Equation 2.1, for a MDP with three time
points, t = {0, 1, 2}. The decision involves a choice between actions a1 and a2 at
t = 0 and a⇤1 and a⇤2 at t = 1. The state space is represented by three discrete options.
Each subsequent state is reached with a probability depending on the previous state
and the action taken, p(st+1 | st, a). Each action and state pair results in a reward
r(st, a). The goal is to find the policy that maximises the accumulated value Va(s0),
subject to future decisions.
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over time, thus we would expect the belief state to become more precise as time
progresses.
The belief state gives us a new formulation for the accumulated value calculated
in Equation 2.1. Assuming an active, dynamic, utility averaged approach [57], we
aim to maximise the accumulated value Va(st, b(st)):
maxa{Va(st, b(st))} = maxa
Z
✓
b(✓ | st)X
st+1
p(st+1 | st, a, ✓) (r(st, a, ✓) + maxa⇤ {Va⇤(st+1, b(st+1))}) d✓.
(2.2)
We can find the solution to this in a similar way to the MDP, using stochastic
dynamic programming [61, 62], di↵erentiated by the fact that the state and reward
are not deterministic, but rather we must calculate an expectation. Again, for a
finite-horizon, discrete time POMDP we can solve this using backwards recursion.
The probability distribution representing the belief state is updated at each step using
Bayes’ theorem, with specific formulations introduced throughout when necessary.
Finally, note that the active component of Equation 2.2 is incorporated in the b(st+1)
term, representing that future value is calculated using updated belief states. For
passive AM, this would instead be b(st), as future value is calculated assuming that
the belief state remains constant throughout. This di↵erence is clarified in Chapter
3.
Barriers to implementation
Although AM has many proponents in the academic literature, there are a number
of barriers that continue to hinder widespread adoption in practice. First, it su↵ers
from a lack of clarity surrounding its definition and is often mistaken as equivalent to
trial-and-error type approaches [42, 66–68]. The latter is easily refuted; the explicit
structure of AM that requires the quantification of objectives and analysis of the
e↵ect of controls on system behaviour before any interventions are implemented
immediately sets it apart from a trial-and-error approach [55]. However, there is
still disagreement within the field as to the exact definition of AM. This, in part,
arises from two schools of thought [48]: the resilience-experimentalist school and
decision-theoretic school. The resilience-experimentalist school, rooted in the work
of Gunderson et al. [69], focuses on the analysis of system resilience (the ability
of a system to remain within its current state or return to an original state under
perturbations) through experimentation, or active learning. This school often results
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in highly complex models of system behaviour and requires significant input and
understanding from stakeholders at all stages. The decision-theoretic school, with
significant contributors including Possingham et al. [53] and Williams et al. [54],
focuses more on the decision problem itself, requiring stakeholder involvement mainly
for the formulation of objectives, relying on simpler models of system behaviour and
theoretical exploration of the decision problem rather than experimental management.
Both schools of thought encompass a significant body of supporting literature
(resilience-experimentalist examples include: [70–76], decision-theoretic examples
include: [54, 77–81]). Whilst they emphasise di↵erent components of the AM
process, at their heart they boil down to the same idea: a structured, iterative
process involving the concurrent implementation of control and monitoring that
acknowledges and reduces uncertainty and drives the system towards a measurable
objective.
In the context that we use AM throughout this thesis, we follow the decision-
theoretic school of thought. There are two main reasons for this: first, it is often
infeasible to have significant stakeholder involvement throughout the entire modelling
process in the event of an epidemic. Rather, stakeholders are likely to only be involved
in the definition of objectives. AM can then be used to provide decision makers with
important information regarding the consequences of control, benefits of monitoring
and possible adaptive interventions that can best meet the given objectives. Second,
it may not be appropriate to rely explicitly on the concurrent experimentation of
di↵erent control interventions to resolve uncertainty, given the moral issues that
may arise, especially in a human disease context. Rather, we focus on how di↵erent
sources of real-time information gathered during an outbreak may e↵ect the timing
and allocation of control resources. We show throughout this thesis that following an
active AM approach is still hugely beneficial in this context. In Chapter 3, we give an
example of how active AM can lead to di↵erent, more optimal, decisions compared
to passive AM or non-AM approaches when experimentation of a single control
is involved. In Chapter 4, we show that, even if experimentation is not explicitly
involved in the resolution of uncertainty, the active anticipation of uncertainty
resolution is still important, helping to more e↵ectively time and allocate both
control and monitoring resources. Both these ideas are supported and extended with
further, more realistic, examples in Chapters 5 and 6.
Another barrier to the use of AM in practice is that it needs to be applied in the
right context in order to see benefits from its use [42, 47, 66, 67]. That is, scenarios
in which both controllability and uncertainty are high [42, 67]. Furthermore, we
specifically require epistemic uncertainty, that within model parameters and the
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e↵ects of control which can be resolved, rather than aleatory uncertainty, the
inherent randomness that exists in the sytem, which can not. There are multiple
sources of epistemic uncertainty that need to be considered [42, 66], including partial
observability (our ability to observe the state of the system), partial controllability
(the unknown e↵ect of control) and structural uncertainty (relating to the unknown
dynamics of the system). Applying AM in inappropriate contexts detracts from
the benefits obtained when used correctly. Throughout this thesis, we show that
epidemiological interventions are an appropriate context in which to use AM, given
the high level of uncertainty during early stages of the outbreak, availability of
information collected throughout with which we can reduce uncertainty and the
sensitivity of epidemic outcomes to the control interventions implemented.
Although a high level of uncertainty allows AM to excel over other methods, it
also raises it own issues for implementation. Reducing such uncertainties requires
significant support and commitment from the top down, in order to fund and
facilitate the implementation of monitoring programs [47, 66, 77, 82]. In ecological
contexts, such programs can be of significant, possibly indefinite, length. This makes
them vulnerable to funding cuts and changes in policy or objective. However, these
issues are less prominent in the context of epidemiological interventions, especially
epidemics, for which there is generally a much shorter and well-defined time frame
for both monitoring and control.
Finally, even if the context is appropriate and the benefit of AM well understood,
implementation still remains a challenge [14, 83]. Most approaches involve the use
of stochastic dynamic programming and Markov decision processes, as described
above, with uncertainty updated using a Bayesian procedure. However, in the
context of epidemiological interventions, where the space of possible controls and
outcomes is incredibly large, such methods can become intractable. In this thesis, we
focus on simplified examples with reduced options for control and uncertainty and a
discretised state space. This helps to focus on what AM can be used to optimise
and the relevant information that it can provide to decision makers, without being
limited by computational capacities. We revisit the computational di culties of
implementation in detail in the discussion.
Applications
Despite the di culties surrounding the implementation of AM in practice, there have
been a small number of successful AM projects in a range of ecological scenarios.
Notably, the use of active AM has led to multiple large-scale flow experiments along
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the Glen Canyon Dam section of the Colorado River, allowing significant advances
in knowledge relating to the location of sediment deposits and interaction between
species within this ecosystem [49, 84, 85]. As a direct result of these experiments,
ecologists have been able to improve the management of this waterway, decreasing
variation in water availability and increasing biodiversity in the area. Another
well documented example of active AM in use is in the management of waterfowl
populations in the United States [50]. By experimenting with di↵erent rates of
harvesting in a rigorous, structured way, ecologists were able to better inform the
relationship between harvest and survival rates, allowing for greater optimisation of
harvesting practices without endangering this ecosystem.
Other examples include the control of animal populations [86–88], as well as
native animal reintroductions [89, 90] and pest and predator control [91, 92]. Also
the protection of environments such as wetlands [50, 77, 78, 93, 94], forests [95–99]
and woodlands [100], the use of dams and the restoration of mining sites [101] to
help restore and maintain local wildlife populations and biodiversity [102]. However,
compared to the theoretical applications that have been explored in the literature,
this is a very small percentage of possible projects [47, 48].
AM has yet to be applied in practice in the context of epidemiological interventions,
however it has recently gained attention in the literature [11, 51, 56, 103]. In
conjunction with Value of Information methods (next section), it has been shown to
improve control outcomes in a number of scenarios. Similar applications, though
not explicitly described as AM, have also shown the benefit of adaptive control and
uncertainty resolution in a structured way [6, 21, 31, 104–109].
This thesis provides a significant exploration of AM in the context of epidemic
control, not yet seen in the literature, with a range of generalisable examples common
to this field. We clearly demonstrate the di↵erence between a passive and active
approach to management in this context, motivating the use of the latter. We then
show that active AM can provide significant benefits over non-adaptive or passive
approaches, including improved management outcomes, more e cient monitoring and
providing state- and time-dependent policy recommendations, with the consequences
of di↵erent control policies and levels of uncertainty resolution clearly portrayed.
Overall, we show that epidemic control is an appropriate and worthwhile application
of the AM framework that warrants further exploration and practical implementation.
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2.2 Value of Information
Value of Information (VoI) analysis is a branch of decision theory that aims to
quantify the benefit of resolving uncertainty in a system on the outcome of decisions
made that a↵ect the state of the system. It has been in use since its introduction by
Rai↵er and Schlaifer in 1961 [110] and has received significant technical attention,
with notable contributions from Howard [111–113], Thompson and Graham [114],
Felli and Hazen [115, 116] and Yokota and Thompson [117]. It has been applied in
a wide range of fields, examples including public health [118–120], environmental
management [121, 122], conservation ecology [123–125] and recently in epidemiology
[11, 107, 126, 127]. In VoI analyses, information gain is not explicitly associated with
a reward, but can lead to improved decisions, thus adding value. This ideology is
mirrored in AM, especially active AM, hence, combining VoI with the AM framework
has also received attention in the literature [11, 124, 125]. We build upon this
idea throughout this thesis, using several ideas from the VoI field within the AM
framework. Here, we introduce three measures used in VoI analysis that will be
referred to throughout.
Expected value of perfect information (EVPI)
In general, VoI measures calculate the di↵erence between the expected outcome given
new information and the expected outcome under the current level of information.
The first measure we introduce, the expected value of perfect information (EVPI), is
the simplest to calculate and most widely used. It assumes that the new information
obtained results in complete resolution of all uncertainties in the system; that is, we
have perfect information. Mathematically, we calculate EVPI using Equation 2.3
[117]:
EVPI = Es[maxaU(a, s)] maxaEs[U(a, s)], (2.3)
where U() is a utility function which we want to maximise by implementing some
action a in the presence of system uncertainty s. The first half of the equation
represents the expected outcome with perfect information: for every possible value
of s, we choose a such that the utility is maximised. The second half of the equation
represents the expected outcome with the current level of information: we choose a
single a that maximises the expected utility across all values of s. The calculation
of expectations depends on the current level of information regarding s, such that
values of s that are deemed more probable contribute a greater weight.
In Chapter 4, we extend this measure to incorporate a notion of time (that is,
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when we obtain perfect information), enabling greater analysis of monitoring delays
and optimal monitoring strategies.
Expected value of perfect partial information (EVPXI)
The second measure, the expected value of perfect partial information (EVPXI)
[117], assumes that there is more than one source of uncertainty in the system. In
contrast to EVPI, in this measure we only gain perfect information for a subset of
these uncertainties. For example, if we assume that s is a set of parameters that are
uncertain, si a subset of these parameters for which we attain perfect information
and sci the complement, then:
EVPXIsi = Esi [maxaEsci [U(a, s)]] maxaEsi,sci [U(a, s)], (2.4)
where U() is a utility function which we wish to maximise by implementing some
action a, as before. The di↵erence between Equation 2.3 and Equation 2.4 is in
the first half of the equations, when calculating the expected outcome with new
information. For EVPXI, there still remains uncertainty in the parameters contained
in sic, therefore we choose an action a that maximises the expected utility over this
set of parameters, conditioned on a given value of the parameters in si.
Expected value of sample / imperfect information (EVSI / EVII)
A significant drawback of the EVPI and EVPXI measures is the assumption that the
uncertainty in at least a subset of the parameters will be completely resolved. This
is unrealistic in most contexts, especially in inherently stochastic systems such as
epidemiological models. This final measure, the expected value of sample / imperfect
information (EVSI / EVII; used interchangeably throughout the literature) [117],
takes this into account. Rather than assuming that new information results in
perfect information regarding system parameters, we instead construct a posterior
distribution for parameters that depends on both the prior information and some
data, or sample information, x, and choose the best action based on this posterior.
However, since x has not yet been observed, we must do so for all possible observations
of this data:
EVSI = EVII = Ex[maxaEs|x[U(a, s)]] maxaEs[U(a, s)]. (2.5)
Whilst this measure is more realistic, it is significantly more computationally and
theoretically intensive, requiring calculation across a large number of possible obser-
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vations x as well as a method of quantifiying the probability of such observations
occurring. However, in Chapter 4, we demonstrate the benefits of using this type of
method within the AM framework compared to the EVPI measure which is easier to
calculate but requires the significant assumption of perfect information.
2.3 Parameter inference
Parameter inference plays an important role in the AM framework, allowing us
to prescribe how incoming data from the outbreak may a↵ect the uncertainty
surrounding parameters within the system. Furthermore, in order to calculate the
expected outcomes of implementing an action using a utility averaged approach, it is
necessary that we define uncertainty probabilistically. As such, a Bayesian approach
to parameter inference is most appropriate, as opposed to Maximum Likelihood type
approaches that focus mainly on providing point estimates. In this section, we give
a brief overview of Bayesian inference, Markov chain and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
methods and implementation using the Stan software package.
2.3.1 Bayesian inference
Bayesian inference methods have become a powerful and ubiquitous tool for epi-
demiological modellers in the past two decades, especially in the area of real-time
forecasting and parameter estimation (e.g. [10, 17, 33]). The advantage of these
methods is the ability to estimate continuous probability distributions for model
parameters, dependent on both prior knowledge and observed data. Formally, given
uncertain parameters ✓, a prior distribution ⇡(✓) and observed data from the model
D, we are able to determine the posterior distribution f(✓ | D) using Bayes’ Theorem:
f(✓ | D) / L(D | ✓)⇡(✓), (2.6)
where L(D | ✓) represents the likelihood of observing such data D conditioned
on given parameters ✓. The prior distribution ⇡(✓) can be informative, based on
historical outbreaks or biological research, or uninformative, taking a non-specific
distribution with a high variance. In Chapter 3, we show how the definition of the
prior can a↵ect our ability to use real-time information to improve control.
Thus, using Equation 2.6, we are able to recalculate and resolve uncertainty
regarding system parameters in light of new information gathered from an outbreak.
However, depending on the form of the likelihood (L(D | ✓)) and prior (⇡(✓)), it may
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be di cult to solve Equation 2.6 analytically. In such instances, it is necessary to
rely on numerical methods to estimate the posterior, such as MCMC.
Markov chain Monte Carlo
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods have been used by epidemiologists since
their introduction in the late 1990s [128–133] to estimate the posterior f(✓ | D) when
Equation 2.6 can not be solved analytically, providing samples from an equivalent
target distribution. The fundamental idea underlying MCMC is to generate a Markov
chain whose stationary distribution is the target distribution f(✓ | D). Most MCMC
methods rely on the following basic steps:
1. Begin with an initial sample ✓
2. Propose a new sample, ✓0, using a proposal distribution q that depends on the
current sample
3. Accept the new sample with probability ↵ that depends on the current and
proposed sample, otherwise reject and keep current sample
4. Repeat from step 2, until a su cient number of samples have been generated
The proposal distribution q and acceptance probability ↵ depend on the exact method
used. One common method is the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, for which q is often
a Gaussian distribution with mean ✓ and arbitrary variance  , and ↵ is calculated
via:
↵ = min
⇢
1,
L(D | ✓0)⇡(✓0)q(✓ | ✓0)
L(D | ✓)⇡(✓)q(✓0 | ✓)
 
. (2.7)
In essence, we propose a new sample based on the current sample with some added
noise, then, if the observed data is more probable given the new sample compared to
the current sample, we definitely accept it, otherwise we accept it with a probability
less than 1. Accepting a new sample that is less probable than the current sample is
necessary to allow better exploration of the parameter space.
The main drawback of this type of sampling is that new samples are generally
close to the current sample. As a result, if the target distribution is distant from the
initial state, or if the target distribution has multiple modes or an unusual shape, it
can take a long time for such algorithms to converge to the stationary distribution
or properly explore the parameter space.
22
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
Hamiltonian, or Hybrid, Monte Carlo (HMC) methods [134] are similar to MCMC
methods, but do not implement a random walk to generate samples. Instead, they
rely on the ‘physical’ properties of the target distribution, which enables larger,
adaptive step sizes between samples. The HMC algorithm combines samples from the
parameter space with a ‘momentum’ variable (⇢), usually drawn from a multivariate
normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix ⌃. The joint density of
both the parameter sample and momentum variable, p(⇢, ✓), is used to define the
Hamiltonian function, H, as the negative logarithm of the joint density:
H(⇢, ✓) =  ln(p(⇢, ✓)) =  ln(p(⇢ | ✓))  ln(p(✓)) = T (⇢ | ✓) + V (✓).
The Hamiltonian can be interpreted, using intuition from physics, as the sum of
the kinetic energy T , from the momentum variables, and the potential energy V , or
location, of the current sample. Together, H is the total energy of the system. The
system then evolves according to Hamilton’s equations:
d✓
dt
=
@T
@⇢
,
d⇢
dt
=  @V
@✓
.
Note that the second equation is simplified using the assumption that the momentum
is independent of the sample. This system of equations is solved numerically, often
using a leapfrog algorithm. Such a method requires a number (L) of small, discrete
steps through time (✏), updating ✓ and ⇢ along the way. The parameters L and ✏
must be tuned and can have a significant e↵ect on the performance of HMC. If ✏ is
too small, it will take a long time to evolve the system from one sample to the next,
however if ✏ is too large, the leapfrog integration results are likely to be inaccurate.
Similarly, if L is too large, the algorithm will take a long time, but if L is too small,
it begins to behave in the same way as a random walk MCMC type method.
The final step is a Metropolis acceptance step, similar to that within MCMC
methods. Here, the new sample, (⇢⇤, ✓⇤), is accepted with a probability ↵ that
depends on the change in total energy in the system (i.e. the Hamiltonian). This
helps to bound errors that arise during the leapfrog numerical integration step:
↵ = min {1, exp(H(⇢, ✓) H(⇢⇤, ✓⇤)} .
Overall, HMC allows for larger steps between samples, therefore requiring fewer
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iterations to generate uncorrelated samples, allowing for faster exploration and
convergence to the target distribution than traditional MCMC methods (assuming
appropriately tuned parameters).
2.3.2 Stan
Stan is a modern software package aimed towards statistical modelling and computa-
tion [135]. It has a range of capabilities, though for this thesis we have only used
it to perform Bayesian inference with HMC sampling. Stan programs are written
in their own language, then translated into C++ and compiled, often resulting in
significantly faster computation compared to those written in Python or R. Stan is
easily interfaced with most popular computing languages, including Python (PyStan),
R (RStan), MATLAB (MatlabStan) and Julia (Stan.jl). We use PyStan to perform
sampling procedures from our Stan models and analyse the results.
Blocks
Every Stan program consists of a number of blocks, containing variable declarations
and in some cases statements. The simplest inference procedures will be made up of
at least three blocks:
data - declare all known variables and parameters, including observed data.
Anything declared in this block must be passed to the Stan program when called.
parameters - declare the unknown parameters. The program will aim to produce
posterior distributions for anything declared here.
model - state the prior distributions for unknown parameters and the log-likelihood
function for the observed data.
Other additional blocks can be added to the program to increase the complexity.
Of particular note to epidemiologists are:
functions - allowing for user-defined functions, such as a system of ODEs
describing the spread of a disease.
transformed parameters - allowing intermediate variables to be calculated from
data and parameters. Within this block, it is possible to use Stan’s inbuilt ODE
solvers to obtain a simulation of an epidemic based on a sample of the parameters.
generated quantities - can be used to generate quantities that depend on the
parameters, such as the total number of infections from an outbreak or the R0 at a
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specified point in time. This block does not a↵ect the inference.
Sampling
A combination of blocks constitutes a Stan model which, once compiled, can be used
to sample from the posterior. Stan uses HMC sampling, as described in the previous
section, resulting in a highly e cient sampling procedure. Specifically, it uses a
sampling algorithm known as the no-U-turn sampler (NUTS) [136]. This allows
automatic tuning of the parameters required for HMC: the number of leapfrog steps
L, the size of each step ✏ and the covariance matrix ⌃ used to generate momentum
variables. In simple terms, the NUTS algorithm will continue to make leapfrog
steps until either a maximum number of steps is reached, or the trajectory in the
parameter space begins to turn back on itself (hence, no-U-turns). This allows for
an adaptive number of steps L. The other two parameters, ✏ and ⌃, are estimated
during the warm-up phase in order to achieve a target acceptance rate.
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Chapter 3
A comparison of active and
passive adaptive management
Abstract
We introduce and compare three approaches to managing an epidemic: non-AM,
passive AM and active AM. These approaches di↵er in how they incorporate real-time
information from the outbreak to resolve uncertainty. A non-AM approach does not
use real-time information to resolve uncertainty, relying solely on prior information.
A passive AM approach will use real-time information in a reactive way, resolving
uncertainty if and when new information becomes available, but not anticipating
it. Finally, an active AM approach anticipates the resolution of uncertainty in the
future, explicitly incorporating it into current control decisions. Using a simplified,
theoretical epidemic, we find that decisions regarding vaccination as control can be
non-trivial if the vaccine e cacy is unknown. Furthermore, the three approaches we
compare can lead to di↵erent control decisions and thus epidemic outcomes. Overall,
we find that active AM is the most useful approach for providing e↵ective policy
recommendations to decision makers.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate how di↵erent methods of including real-time inform-
ation can a↵ect policy selection during an epidemic and, in turn, how this a↵ects
our ability to satisfy the objectives of management. We compare three approaches
to managing a theoretical epidemic: non-AM, passive AM and active AM. The
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epidemic is represented by a deterministic, non-spatial Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-
Recovered (SEIR) compartmental model, with control limited to vaccination of the
susceptible population at a fixed daily vaccination rate, restricted by a finite vaccine
pool. There is no uncertainty regarding the spread of the disease in the absence of
control, however a single source of uncertainty is introduced through an unknown
vaccine e cacy, defined as the probability that an administered vaccine will result in
immunity. Information regarding the vaccine e cacy can be collected throughout
the outbreak by monitoring a proportion of administered vaccines for success: a
successful vaccination results in complete, indefinite immunity that takes e↵ect, and
can be tested, immediately. Conversely, we assume that unsuccessful vaccinations
result in no immunity.
The non-AM approach represents a static control policy, in which real-time
information is not used to improve control. Under this approach, there is a single
decision opportunity at the start of the outbreak (day 0), for which we must decide
whether to implement a vaccination campaign or not. This approach represents a
standard SDM [53] approach and provides a baseline for the performance of control.
The passive and active AM approaches allow for adaptation of control on a single,
predetermined day during the outbreak (t⇤). For these approaches, there are two
decision opportunities: the initial decision on day 0 and a final decision on day
t⇤. The initial decision is whether or not to implement a vaccination campaign
immediately and continue it until at least day t⇤. The final decision is whether or
not to vaccinate from day t⇤ until the vaccine pool is depleted
For the initial decision, we have only the ‘prior information’ regarding vaccine
e cacy. On day t⇤, the results of monitored vaccinations, if any vaccinations have
been administered, are used to provide updated information regarding vaccine e cacy.
Hence, an initial decision to vaccinate allows for the resolution of uncertainty in
vaccine e cacy, whilst an initial decision not to vaccinate does not. Passive AM does
not incorporate the e↵ect of reducing uncertainty in the vaccine e cacy into the
initial decision, hence, whilst this information might be used for the final decision,
we do not plan to use it. As such, passive AM represents a reactive approach to
incorporating real-time information. Active AM explicitly incorporates the resolution
of uncertainty into its initial decision recommendation. Therefore, if choosing to
vaccinate, thereby allowing uncertainty in vaccine e cacy to be reduced, leads to
significantly improved future management, active AM will recognise this and choose
to vaccinate immediately.
For the basis of this analysis, we focus on two scenarios, contrasted primarily by
di↵erent management objectives. Scenario 1: we allocate a ‘cost’ to the epidemic,
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defined by a linear combination of the number of infections, vaccines administered
and a fixed cost associated with implementing a vaccination campaign. The objective
of management is to minimise the expected value of this cost. This scenario could be
likened to a non-fatal, human disease context, or livestock disease context, where the
cost of implementing a vaccination campaign must be weighed against the expected
benefits resulting from the campaign. In this scenario, we parametrise the epidemic
model using influenza-like transmission, incubation and recovery rates, with a basic
reproductive number (R0) of 1.6. The relative weights of infections and vaccinations
in the calculation of cost are fixed for the main result, however the e↵ect these have
on the result is explored in detail in the subsequent sensitivity sections.
Scenario 2: the objective of management is to minimise the expected duration of
the outbreak, regardless of the number of infections caused or vaccines used. This
scenario could be likened to a livestock disease context in which there are significant
daily costs to the economy caused by an ongoing outbreak, such as loss of exports or
tourism. In such a context, regaining a ‘disease-free’ status as quickly as possible
may be the primary concern. In this scenario we parametrise the epidemic model
with Foot-and-Mouth-like transmission, incubation and recovery rates, with an R0
of 2. For both scenarios, the e↵ect of changing the epidemiological parameters used
and the restrictions on control is explored in detail.
For both scenarios, we initially assume a large amount of uncertainty in the
vaccine e cacy at the start of the outbreak, or equivalently, a very low amount
of prior information. The e↵ect of having more prior information to inform our
decisions is also explored in detail.
We investigate the policy selection and performances of the three approaches
for the two specific scenarios, showing that the method of incorporating real-time
information can have a significant e↵ect. We also show how this changes under
di↵erent conditions, varying the amount of prior and real-time information available
from the outbreak, restrictions on control and epidemiological parameters. Our focus
on how passive approaches can lead to di↵erent control recommendations compared
to active approaches, specifically in the the context of infectious disease epidemics,
extends similar explorations in the ecological literature [58, 137]. Overall, we see that
even highly simplified systems can be di cult to control in the presence of uncertainty
and the method of incorporating real-time information into management decisions
can have a significant e↵ect on policy selection. We find that active AM is best
able to meet management objectives, whilst also providing more usable information
to decision-makers with regards to the collection of real-time information and the
timing and delivery of control.
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3.2 Adaptive management components
3.2.1 Model of system behaviour
We describe the spread of a directly transmitted disease throughout a population
via a non-spatial, homogeneously mixing, deterministic SEIR (Susceptible, Exposed,
Infected, Recovered/Removed) model, with constant transmission rate ( ), incubation
rate ( ) and recovery/removal rate ( ; this can include both recovery and death
from the disease). We ignore demography on the assumption that the dynamics
of the epidemic are significantly faster than the natural birth-death process of the
population. The transmission, incubation and recovery rates used in each scenario
are provided in Table 3.1. For both scenarios, the initial population is made up
of 5000 susceptible and 1 infected individual. We assume that the epidemic is not
detected until the number of infected individuals reaches 20. We denote t as the
number of days since the epidemic was detected, with t = 0 representing the day of
detection and initial management decision.
Control is limited to vaccination of the susceptible population. We assume that
vaccinations are perfectly targeted towards susceptible individuals, excluding the
exposed class from vaccination, to help clarify the link between uncertainty in vaccine
e cacy and the predicted outcome of control. Vaccinations can occur at a constant
daily rate (⌫r; number of vaccinations per day), restricted by a limit on the total
number of vaccines available (⌫pool). The vaccine is assumed to result in immediate
and indefinite immunity, with probability ⌫e. This probability, the ‘vaccine e cacy’,
is unknown and provides the only source of uncertainty in the system. If the
vaccine is successful, the vaccinated individual moves into compartment V1, where it
remains indefinitely. Else, if the vaccine is unsuccessful, the individual moves into
compartment V0, where it remains susceptible to infection but is not able to receive
a second dose of the vaccine.
The di↵erential equations for the system are stated in Equation 3.1 and a schematic
can be found in Figure 3.1:
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dS(t)
dt
=   S(t)I(t)
N(t)
  ⌫r(t),
dE(t)
dt
=  
(S(t) + V0(t))I(t)
N(t)
   E(t),
dI(t)
dt
=  E(t)   I(t),
dR(t)
dt
=  I(t),
dV0(t)
dt
= (1  ⌫e)⌫r(t)   V0(t)I(t)
N(t)
,
dV1(t)
dt
= ⌫e⌫r(t),
(3.1)
where ⌫r(t) depends on the current vaccination campaign. We denote the vaccination
campaign Vti,tj , representing a campaign that starts on day ti and ends on day tj . If
ti  t  tj , the campaign is ongoing and
⌫r(t) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
⌫r, if S(t)   ⌫r,
S(t), if 0  S(t) < ⌫r,
⌫pool  
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds, if ⌫pool  
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds < ⌫r,
0, if
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds > ⌫pool.
(3.2)
If t < ti or t > tj , the campaign is not currently ongoing and ⌫r(t) = 0. If no
vaccination occurs throughout the epidemic, we denote this by V0,0. Note that ⌫r(t)
may also depend on the vaccine e cacy ⌫e, through the depletion of S; we emphasise
this with the notation ⌫r(t, ⌫e) where necessary.
Finally, tend represents the day on which the outbreak ends and hence the
duration of the outbreak (relative to the time of detection). This also depends on the
vaccination campaign chosen and vaccine e cacy. Given the continuous nature of
the di↵erential equations (Equation 3.1), we define this to be the point at which the
number of Exposed and Infectious individuals together falls below 1 (E(t)+I(t) < 1).
A description of the parameters and their default values throughout this chapter
(unless otherwise specified) can be found in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Model of system behaviour. We use a non-spatial, homogeneously
mixing, deterministic Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) model with
vaccination as control. The transmission ( ), incubation ( ) and recovery ( ) rates
are constant throughout the epidemic. If a vaccination campaign is active, vaccination
will occur at a constant daily rate ⌫r (number of individuals per day), subject to
the conditions outlined in Equation 3.2. The vaccine is perfectly targeted towards
only Susceptible individuals. If a Susceptible individual is vaccinated, it will be
e↵ective with probability ⌫e and they will gain full, indefinite immunity immediately,
moving to compartment V1. If ine↵ective, they move to compartment V0, where
they remain fully susceptible to the disease but can not be vaccinated again. Blue
shaded compartments identify vaccinated individuals and red shaded compartments
infectious individuals.
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Table 3.1: Summary of parameters and notation used. Scenario specific values
apply throughout unless otherwise stated in the sensitivity sections. Values left
blank depend on the vaccination campaign and are calculated as required during the
optimisation process.
Notation Description Sc. 1 Sc. 2
  Transmission rate of disease 0.23 0.2
  Incubation rate of disease 0.5 0.2
  Recovery/removal rate from disease 0.14 0.1
⌫r Daily vaccination rate (number of individuals) 100 100
⌫e Vaccine e cacy [0, 1] [0, 1]
⌫pool Total number of vaccines available 2500 4500
t⇤ Time of final decision point 7 7
tend Day on which outbreak ends (duration of the outbreak) - -
Vti,tj Denotes a vaccination campaign that starts on day ti
and ends on day tj . We require 0  ti  tj  tend
- -
C(X |
a0, a1, ⌫e)
Cost of an outbreak, conditioned on the initial and
final decisions (leading to vaccination campaign Vti,tj )
and vaccine e cacy. Dependence on epidemiological
parameters is excluded for brevity.
- -
!1 Weight assigned to the length of the outbreak (per
day) in calculation of cost
0 1
!2 Weight assigned to each infection caused by the out-
break in calculation of cost
1 0
!3 Weight assigned to each vaccination administered in
calculation of cost
0.6 0
!4 Weight associated with a fixed cost of implementing a
vaccination campaign in calculation of cost
350 0
x0 Number of successful vaccinations that form prior in-
formation regarding vaccine e cacy
0.1 0.1
y0 Number of unsuccessful vaccinations that form prior
information regarding vaccine e cacy
0.1 0.1
⇢ Proportion of administered vaccines monitored for
success
5% 5%
Mt Number of vaccines monitored for success until time t - -
xt Number of successful, monitored vaccinations up to
time t
- -
yt Number of unsuccessful, monitored vaccinations up to
time t
- -
N Total population size 5000 5000
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3.2.2 Objectives of management
The objective of management di↵ers between the two scenarios, however can be
summarised in general terms by defining a flexible cost function that incorporates
multiple factors: the duration of the outbreak, the number of vaccines administered,
a fixed cost associated with implementing a vaccination campaign and the number
of infections caused by the epidemic. The cost of the outbreak is calculated using a
weighted, linear combination of these factors. Given initial and final decisions a0 and
a1, resulting in a campaign Vti,tj with e cacy ⌫e (and epidemiological parameters;
excluded from notation for brevity), the cost of an outbreak X is:
C(X | a0, a1, ⌫e) = !1 tend(⌫e) + !2
 Z tend(⌫e)
0
I(s, ⌫e)ds
!
+ !3
✓Z tj
ti
⌫r(s, ⌫e)ds
◆
+ !4  V .
(3.3)
where
 V =
8><>:1, if a vaccination campaign is implemented,0, otherwise. (3.4)
The cost in scenario 1 is defined by using non-zero weights for !2, !3 and !4
and setting !1 = 0 (that is, a combination of vaccine and infection costs). For
scenario 2, we let !2 = !3 = !4 = 0 and !1 = 1 (duration only). The weights, !i,
can either be unitless, representing the relative importance of each, or take a unit
such as currency. For example, !1 may be the daily loss of income to the economy
from reduced tourism or exports during the epidemic, !2 the total cost of care of
an infected human or loss of profit from having livestock infected, !3 the average
monetary cost of transporting and administering each vaccine and !4 the cost of
developing a new vaccine and marketing the campaign. The default weights used for
the basis of each scenario are given in Table 3.1, selected to make the initial decision
non-trivial. However, our flexible definition of the cost allows us to easily explore
the ramifications of having di↵erent objectives in later sensitivity sections.
In both scenarios, the objective of management is to minimise the expected cost
of the outbreak. This expectation is calculated by integrating over the probability
distribution around vaccine e cacy (Equation 3.5). This distribution, f(⌫e), is
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defined in the next section.
E[C(X | a0, a1)] =
Z 1
0
C(X | a0, a1, ⌫e) · f(⌫e) d⌫e. (3.5)
We approximate the integral in Equation 3.5 by binning vaccine e cacy into 1%
intervals.
3.2.3 Prior information and monitoring
Prior and real-time information focuses on resolving the uncertainty in the system
introduced by an unknown vaccine e cacy (⌫e). We define this information in a
quantitative manner.
We define the prior information regarding vaccine e cacy using a Beta(x0+1, y0+
1) distribution, where x0, y0   0. Hence, the probability density function is:
f(⌫e;x0, y0) =
 (x0 + y0 + 2)
 (x0 + 1) (y0 + 1)
⌫x0e (1  ⌫e)y0 , (3.6)
where  (·) is the Gamma function. The mode of the distribution, x0x0+y0 , corresponds
to the estimate of vaccine e cacy. The sum x0+ y0, also known as the concentration
[59], relates to the amount of information that is supporting the estimate and is
inversely related to the variance. For example, if the prior information is from a
historical vaccine trial, x0 could be the number of successful vaccinations and y0
the number of unsuccessful vaccinations from the trial. However, to allow non-
integer values of x0 and y0 in our analysis, we define the sum x0 + y0 to be the
relative strength of the prior information compared to a single monitored vaccination
(introduced below). If there is no prior information (x0 = y0 = 0), the distribution
is uniform between 0 and 1 and hence the mode is undefined. For the majority of
this analysis, except when explicitly investigating the e↵ect of prior information on
our management decisions, we set x0 = y0 = 0.1 (Table 3.1) when defining our prior
distribution around vaccine e cacy. This results in a distribution centred around
50% e cacy with a large variance, representing a situation where we do not have a
strong idea of what the e cacy is, but are aware that it is less likely to be completely
e↵ective (100% e cacy) or completely ine↵ective (0% e cacy).
Real-time information is collected throughout the outbreak by monitoring a
proportion (⇢) of administered vaccinations for success. We assume that the success
or failure of a vaccine can be tested immediately after it is administered and this
test will always give the true result. Whilst this is an unrealistic assumption, it
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allows us to clearly identify the relationship between monitored vaccinations and
the resolution of uncertainty in vaccine e cacy. We denote Mt as the total number
of vaccinations monitored up to time t, with xt and yt the number of successful
and unsuccessful vaccinations respectively (hence Mt = xt + yt). This real-time
information is combined with the prior information (using Bayes’ formula and the
conjugacy of the prior and likelihood) to give a posterior distribution around the
vaccine e cacy, defined by a Beta(x0+xt+1, y0+yt+1) distribution with probability
density function:
f(⌫e;x0, y0, xt, yt) =
 (x0 + xt + y0 + yt + 2)
 (x0 + xt + 1) (y0 + yt + 1)
⌫x0+xte (1  ⌫e)y0+yt . (3.7)
3.2.4 Optimisation approaches
In this chapter, we compare three approaches to decision making during the outbreak:
non-AM, passive AM and active AM. These approaches are contrasted by how they
incorporate real-time outbreak information, in this case the results of monitored
vaccinations. Under any of the three approaches, at each decision point we must
choose to vaccinate until the next decision point or not. If there are no future
decision points, this equates to vaccinating until the vaccine pool is depleted, or
forgoing vaccination for the remainder of the epidemic. We allow a maximum of two
decision points (one for the non-AM approach): an initial decision is made when the
outbreak is detected (a0 at t = 0) and a final decision is made on a predetermined
day during the outbreak (a1 at t = t⇤). We denote the choice to vaccinate or not
vaccinate vac and ¬vac respectively.
Under the non-AM approach we allow only the initial decision. Under the adaptive
approaches, a proportion of the vaccines administered between the initial and final
decision points, if any, are monitored for success and this information is used to
inform the final decision. The adaptive approaches di↵er in how they make the
initial decision, with passive AM ignoring the e↵ect that updated vaccine e cacy
information may have on future decisions, whilst active AM explicitly accounts for
this. The method of decision making at both decision points, under each management
approach, is formalised below.
Non-AM
Initial decision (t = 0) Under the non-AM approach, we are unable to change our
decision at t⇤. Hence, we assume that a1 = a0: a choice to vaccinate now (a0 = vac)
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implies vaccination until vaccine pool depletion and a choice not to vaccinate now
(a0 = ¬vac) implies forgoing vaccination until the epidemic is over. We compare the
two choices of initial decision by the expected cost of the outbreak resulting from
each (Equation 3.8), choosing that which produces the lowest expected cost over the
prior distribution around vaccine e cacy (f(⌫e;x0, y0)):
E[C(a0)] = E[C(X | a0, a1 = a0)] =
Z 1
0
C(X | a0, a1 = a0, ⌫e) · f(⌫e;x0, y0) d⌫e,
(3.8)
where a0 = a1 = vac leads to campaign V0,t⇤ and a0 = a1 = ¬vac leads to campaign
V0,0.
Passive AM
Initial decision (t = 0) Since there is a single future decision point at t = t⇤, a
choice to vaccinate initially (a0 = vac) implies vaccination until at least t⇤, followed
by either vaccination (a1 = vac, leading to the campaign V0,tend) or no vaccination
(a1 = ¬vac, leading to the campaign V0,t⇤). Note that we assume the ratio between
the number of vaccines available and the daily vaccination rate is such that the
vaccine pool will not be depleted before day t⇤. Similarly, a choice not to vaccinate
initially (a0 = ¬vac) can result in forgoing vaccination completely (a1 = ¬vac; V0,0)
or a delayed campaign starting on day t⇤ (a1 = vac; Vt⇤,tend). When calculating the
expected cost of each initial action (Equation 3.9), we assume that future decisions
will be made optimally, given the information we have. Under passive AM, we do
not plan for monitoring, hence we do not incorporate the anticipation of future
monitored vaccinations into our initial decision. Instead, we assume that future
decisions will be made based on the current level of information, in this case the
prior information. Hence, the expected cost of an initial action under passive AM
is the minimum of the expected cost of the two campaigns that can result from it,
calculated over the prior distribution around vaccine e cacy (Equation 3.9):
E[C(a0)] = min
a1={vac,¬vac}
(E[C(X | a0, a1)]) ,
= min
a1={vac,¬vac}
✓Z 1
0
C(X | a0, a1, ⌫e) · f(⌫e;x0, y0) d⌫e
◆
, (3.9)
Final decision (t = t⇤) We make the final decision based on both the prior
information and monitored vaccinations, if there are any. Since there are no more
future decision points, this is a simple expectation over two choices: a1 = vac or
a1 = ¬vac (Equation 3.10). We choose the option that produces the lowest expected
36
cost over the posterior distribution around vaccine e cacy (f(⌫e;x0, y0, xt⇤ , yt⇤)).
Note that, if the initial decision was not to vaccinate (a0 = ¬vac), there will be no
monitored vaccinations, hence xt⇤ = yt⇤ = 0 and the posterior distribution of vaccine
e cacy is equal to the prior.
E[C(a1 | a0, xt⇤ , yt⇤)] = min
a1={vac,¬vac}
(E[C(X | a0, a1, xt⇤ , yt⇤)]) ,
=
Z 1
0
C(X | a0, a1, ⌫e) · f(⌫e;x0, y0, xt⇤ , yt⇤) d⌫e.
(3.10)
Active AM
Initial decision (t = 0) As under passive AM, a choice to vaccinate initially (a0 =
vac) implies vaccination until at least t⇤, followed by either continued vaccination
(a1 = vac; V0,tend) or no vaccination (a1 = ¬vac; V0,t⇤), and a choice not to vaccinate
initially (a0 = ¬vac) can result in forgoing vaccination completely (a1 = ¬vac; V0,0)
or a delayed campaign starting on day t⇤ (a1 = vac; Vt⇤,tend). When calculating
the expected cost of each initial decision (Equation 3.11), we assume that future
decisions will be made optimally, given the information we have. In contrast to
passive AM, under active AM we explicitly incorporate the anticipation of results of
future monitored vaccinations into our initial decision. Hence, we assume that future
decisions will be made based on not only the prior information, but also the results
of monitored vaccinations. Since we do not know what the results of monitored
vaccinations will be, we take an expectation over all possible results, weighted by
the likelihood of observing these results given the prior information we have. For
each set of results, we assume that the future decision is made optimally based on
the information those results provide. This is known as preposterior analysis [117].
Therefore, the expected cost of an initial action under active AM is the weighted
sum of the minimum expected cost of the two campaigns that can result from it,
calculated over the posterior distribution around vaccine e cacy for all possible
outcomes from monitored vaccinations (Equation 3.11):
E[C(a0)] =
Mt⇤X
xt⇤=0
✓
min
a1={vac,¬vac}
(E[C(X | a0, a1, xt⇤ , yt⇤)])
◆
· f (xt⇤ ;Mt⇤ , x0, y0) ,
=
Mt⇤X
xt⇤=0
✓
min
a1={vac,¬vac}
✓Z 1
0
C(X | a0, a1, ⌫e) · f(⌫e;x0, y0, xt⇤ , yt⇤) d⌫e
◆◆
· f (xt⇤ ;Mt⇤ , x0, y0) , (3.11)
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where yt⇤ = Mt⇤   xt⇤ and f (xt⇤ ;Mt⇤ , x0, y0) is the probability density function
of a Beta-Binomial distribution with parameters Mt⇤ , x0 and y0. Note that with
Mt⇤ = 0, as would be the case if the initial decision was not to vaccinate, this reduces
to Equation 3.9. Hence, in the absence of any monitored vaccinations, passive and
active AM are identical.
Note that Equations 3.9 and 3.11 follow directly from our general definition of
an MDP in Equation 2.2: assuming two discrete time points t = {0, t⇤}, a reward
function r(st, a, ✓) = 0 if t = 0 or C(X | a0, a1, ⌫e) if t = t⇤, a belief state b(✓ | s0) =
f(⌫e;x0, y0) if t = 0 or f(⌫e;x0, y0, xt⇤ , yt⇤) if t = t⇤ and a transition probability
between states p(st⇤ | s0, a0, ✓) = f(xt⇤ ;Mt⇤ , ⌫e). For passive AM (Equation 3.9),
we assume that xt⇤ = yt⇤ = 0, thus we require only a single integration over the
prior distribution for ⌫e. For active AM (Equation 3.11), the Beta prior for ⌫e and
Binomial likelihood of observations xt⇤ , given ⌫e, combine into a single weighted
sum using a Beta-Binomal distribution. Using these substitutions, the accumulated
value Va(st, b(st)) at t = 0 is equivalent to E[C(a0)].
Final decision (t = t⇤) Since there are no future decision points, and hence no
more opportunities to gather information and adapt control, the final decision under
active AM follows the exact same methodology as under passive AM (Equation 3.10),
conditional on the initial decision made. Note that, under active AM, we have already
performed all the necessary calculations to make this decision. If the initial decision
was to vaccinate, we will have monitored Mt⇤ vaccinations by day t⇤ and observed a
given number of successes and failures, xt⇤ and yt⇤ , leading to a posterior distribution
around vaccine e cacy. The expected costs of continuing or ceasing vaccination
based on this posterior distribution (E[C(X | a0, a1, xt⇤ , yt⇤)]) have already been
calculated and compared within the calculation of the expected cost of the initial
decision (Equation 3.11). Thus, rather than recalculating these expected costs, we
are able to make the final decision immediately given the number of successful
vaccinations on day t⇤. This shows active AM’s ability to provide state-dependent
recommendations, not possible under passive AM.
If the initial decision was not to vaccinate, no new information has been gained
and hence, as under passive AM, the campaign that produced the lowest expected
cost under the prior distribution (Equation 3.9) would be chosen, without need for
recalculation and comparison of these expected costs.
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3.3 Scenario 1
In the first scenario, we test our ability to minimise the ‘cost’ of a theoretical
epidemic. Cost is defined as a linear combination of the number of infections caused
by the outbreak, number of vaccines administered and a fixed cost associated with
implementing a vaccination campaign (if one is implemented). The weight of each
contributing factor is defined relative to that of a single infection, hence !2 = 1
(Methods: Objectives of management). For the majority of the analyses undertaken
under this scenario we set !3 = 0.6 and !4 = 350 and assume that the epidemiological
parameters are representative of a flu-like disease such that the transmission rate
  = 0.23, the incubation rate   = 0.5 and the removal/recovery rate   = 0.14, with
R0 = 1.6. Vaccination is limited to 100 individuals per day, with a total pool of
2500 vaccines (out of a total population of 5000 individuals). These parameters are
summarised in Table 3.1. Sensitivity to all these parameters is explored in detail in
later sections.
With a maximum of two decision points (t = {0, t⇤}), there are a maximum
of four possible campaigns that may be implemented by the end of the outbreak
(Figure 3.2): 1) V0,tend , vaccination is implemented immediately and continued until
the vaccine pool is depleted, 2) V0,t⇤ , vaccination is implemented immediately and
stopped on day t⇤, 3) Vt⇤,tend , vaccination is delayed until day t⇤, then performed
until the vaccine pool is depleted, and 4) V0,0, no vaccines are administered during
the outbreak. Under active and passive AM, all four of these campaigns are taken
into consideration, whilst under the non-AM approach only campaigns (1) and (4)
are considered.
Under the non-AM approach to management, the initial decision to vaccinate
or not can not be adapted. Hence, an initial decision to vaccinate is equivalent to
committing to a full vaccination campaign (V0,tend ; Figure 3.3 red line) and an initial
decision not to vaccinate is equivalent to foregoing vaccination for the duration of
the outbreak (V0,0; Figure 3.3 blue line). Thus, under this approach, the optimal
policy is to not vaccinate initially, and throughout, since it provides a lower expected
cost over the prior distribution around vaccine e cacy than a full campaign. There
is no opportunity to adapt this, hence we would forego vaccination for the duration
of the outbreak under this approach.
Under passive AM, we recognise that an initial decision to vaccinate or not can
be adapted on day t⇤. Passive AM plans for this adaptation based on the prior
information regarding vaccine e cacy. Hence, an initial decision to vaccinate is
assumed to lead to a final decision to also vaccinate, since, over the prior distribution,
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Figure 3.2: Scenario 1: Predicted outbreak cost resulting from possible two-
phase campaigns. For the passive and active AM methods, the two decision points
(t = {0, t⇤}) result in four possible two-phase campaigns that may be implemented by
the end of the outbreak: 1) vaccination is started immediately and continued until
the vaccine pool is depleted, 2) vaccination is started immediately but stopped on day
t⇤, 3) vaccination is delayed until t⇤, then continued until the vaccine pool is depleted,
or 4) no vaccination is employed during the outbreak. The non-AM approach has
only one decision point (t = 0), hence can only result in either campaign (1) or (4).
Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 1.
Expected cost is calculated over a Beta(1.1, 1.1) prior distribution around vaccine
e cacy.
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Figure 3.3: Scenario 1: Expected outbreak cost resulting from an initial
decision to vaccinate or not. Expected outbreak cost from an initial decision to
vaccinate (red) or not (blue), as viewed under non-AM (A), passive AM (B) and
active AM (C) methods, conditional on the true value of e cacy. Dashed lines
represent the expected cost calculated over a Beta(1.1, 1.1) prior distribution around
vaccine e cacy. Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are set to those in
Table 3.1: Scenario 1.
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stopping the campaign on day t⇤ would lead to a higher expected cost than continuing
it (Figure 3.2). Thus, the expected cost of an initial decision to vaccinate is equivalent
to the expected cost of an immediate, full campaign (V0,tend) under passive AM
(Figure 3.3 red line). Similarly, an initial decision not to vaccinate is assumed to always
result in no vaccination throughout the outbreak, since a delayed, full campaign
(Vt⇤,tend) results in a higher expected cost than no vaccination throughout (V0,0) over
the prior distribution (Figure 3.2). Hence, under passive AM, the expected cost of
an initial decision not to vaccinate is equivalent to the expected cost of foregoing
vaccination completely (Figure 3.3 blue line). Therefore, the optimal policy for
passive AM is an initial decision not to vaccinate, since the expected cost of not
vaccinating throughout is less than the expected cost of an immediate, full campaign.
Since we do not have any vaccinations to monitor, no new information is available
on day t⇤ and thus the final decision will also be to not vaccinate.
Under active AM, we again recognise that an initial decision to vaccinate or
not can be adapted on day t⇤, but also that this will depend on the results of
monitored vaccinations. Hence, an initial decision to vaccinate is assumed to lead to
continued vaccination if the success rate from monitored vaccinations is su ciently
high (larger than approximately 40%, based on the parameters we have chosen),
otherwise vaccination will be stopped on day t⇤. Thus, the expected cost of an
initial decision to vaccinate is derived from a combination of campaigns 1 and 2
(Figure 3.3 red line): if the true vaccine e cacy is low, we are likely to get a low
success rate from monitored vaccinations and stop the campaign, whereas if true
e cacy is high the opposite will occur. Close to the value of vaccine e cacy where
the cost of stopping and continuing the campaign cross over (approximately 40%),
there is still uncertainty as to which choice is optimal even with the results from
monitored vaccinations, hence the expected cost is increased slightly by the possibility
of making the wrong final decision. In contrast, an initial decision not to vaccinate
results in there being no vaccinations to monitor. Hence, as under passive AM, the
expected cost of such an initial decision is equivalent to the expected cost of foregoing
vaccination for the entire outbreak (V0,0; Figure 3.3 blue line). The optimal policy
for active AM is to vaccinate initially, since the benefit from learning, and the ability
to stop the campaign if vaccine e cacy is proving to be low, outweighs the perceived
benefit of not vaccinating at all. In this scenario, if we were to implement this policy,
it would result in 35 monitored vaccinations by day t⇤. If at least 14 of these result
in immunity, we would continue vaccination on day t⇤, otherwise we would stop the
campaign.
In summary, we observe that the three methods of incorporating the information
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from monitored vaccinations result in di↵erent management decisions. The optimal
policy for both a non-AM and passive AM approach is to forego vaccination for the
entirety of the outbreak, since, under the prior distribution, the expected benefit of a
full vaccination campaign is not su cient to o↵set the cost of the vaccines. However,
under active AM, we recognise that an ine↵ective campaign can be stopped on day t⇤,
saving the cost of administering the remaining vaccines and thus lowering the overall
expected cost of immediate vaccination. Hence, the optimal policy for active AM
is to start vaccination immediately and continue until the vaccine pool is depleted
if monitored vaccinations are successful (in this scenario, if at least 14 of the 35
monitored vaccinations are successful), otherwise cease vaccination on day t⇤. In
this scenario, by incorporating the possible future results of monitored vaccinations
into our initial decision, following active AM would reduce the expected cost of the
outbreak by over 100 units (approximately 3%) compared to following a passive or
non-AM approach. Hence, only active AM truly satisfies our management objective
of minimising expected outbreak cost.
3.4 Scenario 2
In the second scenario we focus on our ability to minimise the duration of a theoretical
epidemic (!1 = 1,!2 = !3 = !4 = 0; Section 3.2.2). Such an objective may be
suitable for some livestock disease epidemics, for which eradicating the disease as
quickly as possible is the primary concern, in order to minimise the impact on
the economy through exports and tourism. We parameterise the epidemiological
model using FMD-like parameters; transmission:   = 0.2, incubation:   = 0.2 and
removal/recovery:   = 0.1, with R0 = 2. Vaccination is limited to 100 individuals
per day, with a total pool of 4500 vaccines. These are summarised in Table 3.1.
Sensitivity to all these parameters is explored in detail in later sections.
As in scenario 1, there are a maximum of four possible campaigns that may be
implemented by the end of the outbreak (Figure 3.4). Compared to scenario 1, the
behaviour of the objective over the range of vaccine e cacy in this scenario is less
intuitive. Here, if vaccine e cacy is low or too few vaccines are administered, we may
see an increase in outbreak duration compared to taking no action. This occurs if the
vaccination campaign is not su cient to reduce the e↵ective R0 of the epidemic below
1 before it is stopped, leading to a longer, albeit much smaller, outbreak. Another
consequence of this is that a delayed campaign (3: Vt⇤,tend) can be more e↵ective at
shortening duration than an immediate campaign, since a delayed campaign allows
the disease to spread unhindered for 7 days before vaccination is implemented, hence
42
1 2 3 4
Campaign
220
240
260
Expected duration over prior
0 20 40 60 80 100
Vaccine e cacy (%)
100
150
200
250
300
350
D
ur
at
io
n
(d
ay
s)
Predicted duration under possible two-
phase campaigns:
1. Immediate, full: V0,tend
2. Immediate, stopped: V0,t 
3. Delayed, full: Vt ,tend
4. No vaccination: V0,0
Figure 3.4: Scenario 2: Predicted outbreak duration resulting from pos-
sible two-phase campaigns. For the passive and active AM methods, the two
decision points (t = {0, t⇤}) result in four possible two-phase campaigns that may be
implemented by the end of the outbreak: 1) vaccination is started immediately and
continued until the vaccine pool is depleted, 2) vaccination is started immediately
but stopped on day t⇤, 3) vaccination is delayed until t⇤, then continued until the
vaccine pool is depleted, or 4) no vaccination is employed during the outbreak. The
non-AM approach has only one decision point (t = 0), hence can only result in either
campaign (1) or (4). Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are set to those in
Table 3.1: Scenario 2. Expected duration is calculated over a Beta(1.1, 1.1) prior
distribution around vaccine e cacy.
the outbreak burns through the population faster. In scenario 1, when the number
of infections was important not duration, a delayed campaign was never considered
more e↵ective than an immediate one.
Under the non-AM approach, we only compare campaigns (1: V0,tend) and (4:
V0,0): immediate, full vaccination or no vaccination respectively. The expected
duration over the prior distribution around vaccine e cacy is lower for the former,
hence the optimal policy for this approach is to vaccinate immediately and continue
vaccination until the vaccine pool is depleted.
Under passive AM, an initial decision to vaccinate is assumed to always result in
continued vaccination after day t⇤, since stopping the campaign results in a higher
expected duration over the prior distribution (Figure 3.4). Hence, the expected
duration from an initial decision to vaccinate is equivalent to the expected duration
from an immediate, full campaign (Figure 3.5 red line). In contrast to scenario 1,
an initial decision not to vaccinate is assumed to result in vaccination from day t⇤,
43
0 25 50 75 100
100
150
200
250
300
350
E
xp
ec
te
d
du
ra
ti
on
(d
ay
s)
Initial decision
Vaccination
No vaccination
0 25 50 75 100
Vaccine e cacy (%)
0 25 50 75 100
A) Non-AM B) Passive AM C) Active AM
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AM (B) and active AM (C) methods, conditional on the true value of e cacy.
Dashed lines represent the expected duration calculated over a Beta(1.1, 1.1) prior
distribution around vaccine e cacy. Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are
set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 2.
hence leading to a delayed campaign (Vt⇤,tend), since this provides a lower expected
duration over the prior distribution than not vaccinating throughout the outbreak
(Figure 3.4). Thus, in making the initial decision under passive AM, we compare
the expected duration of an immediate, full campaign and a delayed campaign. In
this case, the latter provides the lowest expected duration, as previously explained,
hence the optimal policy for passive AM is to not vaccinate initially. Since our initial
decision is not to vaccinate, no new information would be available on day t⇤, hence
the final decision would be to vaccinate from this day based on the prior distribution,
leading to a delayed campaign.
Under active AM, we again recognise that an initial decision to vaccinate can
lead to a final decision to continue vaccination, leading to campaign 1: V0,tend , if
the success rate of monitored vaccinations is su ciently high, or stop vaccination,
leading to campaign 2: V0,t⇤ , if the success rate is low. In this case, at e cacies
below approximately 60%, it is more e↵ective to stop vaccination on day t⇤ than
continue it. Formally, in this scenario, an initial decision to vaccinate would lead
to continued vaccination if there are at least 21 successes from the 35 monitored
vaccinations, as this results in a posterior distribution around vaccine e cacy that
assigns a lower expected duration to continuing than stopping. If there are less than
21 successful monitored vaccinations, we would stop vaccination on day t⇤. Hence,
the expected cost of an initial decision to vaccinate is a combination of campaigns
(1) and (2) (Figure 3.5 red line). An initial decision not to vaccinate means there
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are no monitored vaccinations to provide updated information regarding the vaccine
e cacy, hence, as under the passive AM approach, the expected duration of such
an initial decision is equivalent to that of a delayed campaign (Figure 3.5 blue line).
For active AM, the optimal policy is to vaccinate initially, since it provides a lower
expected duration over the prior distribution, again arising from the recognition that
an ine↵ective campaign can be stopped on day t⇤, reducing the negative e↵ects of
such a campaign.
Overall, as in scenario 1, we observe that the three methods of incorporating the
information from monitored vaccinations result in di↵erent management decisions.
Following a non-AM approach, the optimal policy is to vaccinate immediately and
continue this until the vaccine pool is depleted. The optimal policy for passive AM
is to not vaccinate immediately, but start vaccination on day t⇤ and continue until
the vaccine pool is depleted. Finally, the optimal policy for active AM is to start
vaccination immediately and continue until the vaccine pool is depleted if at least 21
of the 35 monitored vaccinations are successful, otherwise cease vaccination on day
t⇤. By incorporating the possible future results of monitored vaccinations into our
initial decision, following an active AM approach leads to an expected duration that
is almost 30 days shorter than if we followed a passive AM approach, a decrease
of approximately 12%. Again, active AM is therefore the only approach that truly
meets our objective to minimise the expected outbreak duration.
3.5 Sensitivity
In the following sections, we perform sensitivity analyses on the parameters within
the model that we have fixed. These include the definition of prior information,
amount of real-time information gathered through monitoring, restrictions on control,
relative costs and the value of epidemiological parameters.
3.5.1 Prior information
Thus far, in both scenarios, we have assumed a very low level of prior information
regarding the e cacy of the vaccine, defined by a Beta(1.1, 1.1) distribution (Section
3.2.3). If we increase the amount of prior information available, in either scenario, it
becomes more likely that the approaches will make the same initial decision, since the
information gained from monitored vaccinations has relatively less impact. Which
choice is made, to vaccinate initially or not, depends on the estimate of e cacy that
is suggested by the prior information (the mode of the distribution x0x0+y0 ) and the
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Figure 3.6: Example e↵ect of prior information on the expected duration
of the outbreak under each campaign. The expected duration of the outbreak
under each campaign is calculated over the prior distribution around vaccine e c-
acy, defined by a Beta(x0 + 1, y0 + 1) distribution (Methods: Prior and real-time
information). We set x0 + y0 = 4 and vary the estimate of vaccine e cacy (the
mode of the distribution x0x0+y0 ) across columns. Row 1: visual representation of how
the prior distribution changes with estimated e cacy. Row 2: expected duration
of the outbreak under each campaign for di↵erent estimates of vaccine e cacy.
Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 2.
amount of information supporting this estimate, or concentration, (x0 + y0). In this
section, we focus on the e↵ect of changing the prior information under scenario 2
(Figures 3.6 - 3.9), however similar conclusions can be drawn from scenario 1, for
which the results are provided in Appendix A (Figures A.1 - A.3).
Changing the prior distribution a↵ects the expected duration of all vaccination
campaigns, except the ‘no vaccination’ campaign (Figure 3.6). This in turn a↵ects
the expected outcome of both an initial decision to vaccinate and an initial decision
to not vaccinate, for all approaches (Figure 3.7).
If the estimate of e cacy provided by the prior information (columns in Figures 3.6
and 3.7, x-axis in Figure 3.8) is low, more weight is given to the predicted duration
at low e cacies, hence foregoing vaccination entirely becomes the optimal campaign.
If there is enough information supporting this estimate, an initial decision not to
vaccinate is chosen by all approaches and, since there are no vaccinations to monitor,
the choice not to vaccinate will continue throughout the outbreak. The amount of
information required for this to occur depends on the approach used (Figure 3.8).
Under passive AM, even with no prior information (a flat prior distribution over
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the outbreak given an initial decision to vaccinate or not. We set x0+y0 = 4
and vary the estimate of vaccine e cacy (the mode of the distribution x0x0+y0 ) across
columns. Rows 1-3: predicted outbreak duration over vaccine e cacy, given an initial
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are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 2.
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Figure 3.8: Scenario 2: Initial decision made under each approach given
di↵erent prior information. We define prior information using a Beta(x0+1, y0+1)
distribution and vary the estimated e cacy (the mode of the distribution; x0x0+y0 ) and
the amount of information supporting this estimate (x0+ y0). Top row: di↵erence in
expected duration between vaccinating initially or not, as viewed under each approach.
Bottom row: initial decision made under each approach: vaccinate (red) or not (blue).
Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 2.
vaccine e cacy) we would choose not to vaccinate. Under a non-AM approach, we
require only a very small amount of prior information suggesting e cacy is low to
switch from vaccinating to not vaccinating. Finally, under active AM we require
slightly more information supporting a low estimate of e cacy (x0+ y0 > 2) to make
the same switch, since it recognises the possibility that monitored vaccinations may
reveal the vaccine e cacy to be higher than estimated.
As the prior estimate of vaccine e cacy increases, more weight is given to the
predicted duration of the campaigns at higher e cacies, hence both the immediate,
full (1: V0,tend) and delayed (3: Vt⇤,tend) campaigns become more e↵ective under
the prior distribution (Figure 3.6). As a result, the expected duration from an
initial decision not to vaccinate switches from being based on no vaccination to
delayed vaccination for both passive and active AM (Figure 3.7). Since an immediate,
full vaccination campaign only results in a shorter outbreak for very high vaccine
e cacies (>⇠ 80%), compared to a delayed campaign, under passive AM we require a
significant amount of prior information supporting an estimate this high to change our
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initial decision (Figure 3.8). Under active AM, however, at low e cacies the shorter
predicted duration resulting from vaccinating until day t⇤ and stopping if monitored
vaccinations are unsuccessful (campaign 2: V0,t⇤), compared to a delayed campaign
that must continue until all vaccines are used, allows the expected duration of an
initial decision to vaccinate remain lower than not vaccinating. If vaccine e cacy
is very high (>⇠ 80%) an immediate, full campaign is optimal, hence estimates in
this range also result in an initial decision to vaccinate. Only if there is strong prior
information supporting an estimate of e cacy between approximately 55% and 75%
will we opt not to vaccinate initially under active AM, since between these values a
delayed campaign is optimal (Figure 3.4).
The degree of agreement between passive and active AM depends heavily on the
prior estimate of e cacy and the strength of information supporting this estimate
(right-hand panel; Figure 3.9). For any estimate of e cacy, we require at least
x0 + y0 > 2 for the approaches to agree. This equates to having the amount of
information that two monitored vaccinations would provide, prior to the outbreak
beginning. For some estimates, such as around 55% and 80%, we require a very large
amount of prior information (x0 + y0 > 20) for the approaches to agree, since, at
these points, the rank of the campaigns cross over causing uncertainty as to which
choice is truly optimal. This can result in significantly di↵erent expected durations
between the two approaches, especially for estimates around 55% where there is
still a relatively high possibility that e cacy is low enough to extend the outbreak
duration (left-hand panel; Figure 3.9). However, for estimates around 80%, whilst
the approaches may di↵er in initial decision, the expected durations under both are
similar, since if vaccine e cacy is high there is only a small di↵erence implementing
an immediate, full campaign (1: V0,tend) under active AM and a delayed campaign
(3: Vt⇤,tend) under passive AM. Hence, a di↵erent initial decision does not necessarily
lead to a significantly di↵erent outcome in terms of the management objective.
Finally, we note that our definition of prior information and requirement that
x0, y0   0, allows for at most one mode (or none, in the case of a uniform prior).
This excludes distributions with two modes, at 0 and 1, that would result if we
allowed  1  x0, y0  0. Whilst a polarised belief around vaccine e cacy would be
uncommon, it could easily be incorporated into this framework. In this scenario,
where ⌫e = 0 results in the outcome of all campaigns converging, the mode at ⌫e = 1
would dominate and immediate, full vaccination would be the obvious choice under
all management approaches. In scenario 1 (Figures A.1 - A.3), the campaigns diverge
at both extreme values of vaccine e cacy, vary almost linearly between and switch
rank at close to 50% e cacy. Hence, our decisions would be very similar to those we
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Figure 3.9: Scenario 2: Comparison of initial decision made between active
and passive AM given di↵erent prior information. We define prior informa-
tion using a Beta(x0 + 1, y0 + 1) distribution and vary the estimated e cacy (the
mode of the distribution; x0x0+y0 ) and the concentration (x0 + y0). Left panel: di↵er-
ence in expected duration under active AM compared to passive AM. Right panel:
agreement in initial decision between passive AM and active AM. Epidemiological
and vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 2.
obtain under a unimodal distribution, following whichever mode carries the most
weight.
Overall, we find that as long as there is still significant uncertainty as to which
choice of initial action is best, even with prior information, active AM will result in
a lower expected cost than passive AM and is hence the only approach that truly
minimises the expected duration of the outbreak given the information and resources
available.
3.5.2 Monitoring
For active AM, the initial control decision depends on the number of vaccinations
that are monitored for success. This occurs through the expected outcome given an
initial decision to vaccinate (E[C(a0 = vac)]; Equation 3.11), which will depend on
how the outcomes of monitored vaccinations a↵ect the posterior distribution around
vaccine e cacy (the expected outcome given an initial decision not to vaccinate
does not depend on the number of monitored vaccinations since it does not allow
monitoring). We explain in detail this e↵ect for scenario 2 (Figure 3.10); however
analogous statements can easily be made for scenario 1 (Figure A.4).
First, if no monitoring is planned, active AM views an initial decision to vaccinate
50
100
200
300
E
xp
ec
te
d
du
ra
ti
on
(d
ay
s)
0/0
Monitoring
proportion: 0.0% (0)
1/1
0.15% (1)
1/2
0.3% (2)
Initial decision
Vaccination
No vaccination
0 50 100
100
200
300
3/4
0.5% (4)
0 50 100
Vaccine e cacy (%)
4/7
1.0% (7)
0 50 100
9/14
2.0% (14)
0 50 100
Perfect information
Figure 3.10: Scenario 2: e↵ect of monitoring proportion on the predicted
outbreak duration given an initial decision to vaccinate or not. Predicted
outbreak duration over vaccine e cacy, given an initial decision to vaccinate (red)
or not (blue), for di↵erent monitoring proportions (⇢; Table 3.1). The number of
monitored vaccinations is given in brackets beside the proportion. The required
number of successful vaccinations from the total number monitored in order to make
a decision to vaccinate is shown in the lower left corner of each panel. The far right
panel assumes perfect information is obtained after day t⇤, that is, we will know the
true vaccine e cacy exactly when making the final decision. Epidemiological and
vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 2.
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in the same way as passive AM, hence assumes that the campaign will always be
continued until all vaccines are used since this produces a lower expected duration
than stopping the campaign on day t⇤ over the prior distribution around vaccine
e cacy. Thus, the expected duration from an initial decision to vaccinate converges
to that of an immediate, full campaign at low monitoring proportions (top-left;
Figure 3.10). In this case, we would make an initial decision not to vaccinate, with
the intention of vaccinating from day t⇤ instead, as under passive AM.
As the amount of monitoring increases, the expected duration from an initial
decision to vaccinate diverges from that of an immediate, full campaign, becoming a
weighted combination of both an immediate, full campaign (V0,tend) and a campaign
that is stopped on day t⇤ (V0,t⇤ ; Figure 3.10). This is the result of having monitored
vaccinations to inform the final decision: if successes are low, stop the campaign,
otherwise continue it. If we have only one monitored trial, we require it to be
successful to continue the campaign. Even at low values of vaccine e cacy, there is
still a chance that the monitored vaccination will be successful, hence the campaign
may be continued when it should not be. The opposite is true at high values of
e cacy. As a result, the predicted duration does not coincide exactly to either of the
two campaigns that we can choose from, but rather a weighted average of the two.
With two monitored vaccinations, we require only one of the two to be successful
to continue the campaign. As the number of monitored vaccinations continues to
increase, the required number of successes approaches 60% of the total, as this is
the value of e cacy at which continuing the campaign becomes more e↵ective than
stopping it.
With more trials, the probability of making an incorrect final decision falls. That
is, there is less chance of achieving higher than 60% successes if the true vaccine
e cacy is actually below this, and vice versa. As a result, the predicted duration
from an initial decision to vaccinate more closely approximates a stopped campaign
(V0,t⇤) at low e cacies and a full campaign (V0,tend) at high e cacies. Only at e cacy
values close to 60% do we still see a significant divergence from both. If we were to
assume that monitoring provided perfect information (as in the calculation of EVPI;
Section 2.2), we assume that we always make the correct final decision. This is
equivalent to the posterior distribution of vaccine e cacy being a single point at the
true value and results in a predicted duration from an initial decision to vaccinate
coinciding exactly with either the immediate, full campaign or stopped campaign,
with no divergence even when close to the true e cacy (bottom-right; Figure 3.10).
We explore this idea further in the next chapter.
Overall, the e↵ect of having more monitoring information reduces the probability
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of making an incorrect final decision. For both scenarios, this will lower the expected
cost or duration from an initial decision to vaccinate towards that provided by perfect
information (Figure 3.11). We require only one monitored vaccination for learning
about vaccine e cacy to make an initial decision to vaccinate the optimal decision.
We also see that, whilst we can always allocate more resources to monitoring to
lower the expected outcome towards that provided by perfect information, the e↵ect
of doing so decreases and becomes negligible after approximately 70 monitored
vaccinations (⇢ = 10%). If we were to assign a cost to monitoring itself, there would
be a point at which adding more monitoring would cost more than it was worth,
leading to a single minima which active AM can be used to find (right-hand column;
Figure 3.11). For scenario 1, a cost per monitored vaccination equivalent to 25% of
the cost of an infection results in an optimal monitoring proportion of 5%. Similarly,
for scenario 2, a cost per monitored vaccination equivalent to 10% of the daily cost
of the outbreak results in an optimal monitoring proportion of 5%. As the cost of
monitoring increases, the optimal monitoring proportion will clearly fall and the
best attainable outcome (expected cost or duration) will rise (Figure 3.12). If the
monitoring cost is high enough, an initial decision to vaccinate may no longer be
optimal.
3.5.3 Restrictions on control
The vaccination campaigns are defined by a fixed daily vaccination rate (⌫r), finite
vaccine pool (⌫pool) and a single day on which real-time information can be used
to adapt control (t⇤). In both scenarios, these conditions have so far been fixed
(Table 3.1); however they have a significant e↵ect on the decisions made by our
approaches, causing the outcomes to be trivial in some cases and complex in others
(Figures 3.13 and 3.14).
First, we vary the vaccine pool and keep the other two control restrictions constant
(1st column; Figures 3.13 and 3.14). In both scenarios, if the vaccine pool is too small,
we will choose to forego vaccination for the entirety of the outbreak. In scenario 1,
this is due to the cost of implementing the vaccination campaign outweighing the
number of infections avoided, and in scenario 2, because administering such a small
number of vaccines is likely to increase the duration of the outbreak even with a
highly e↵ective vaccine (Figure A.5). In scenario 1, we see that a very large vaccine
pool (⌫pool > 3200) will also cause us to forego vaccination, since the relative e↵ect
of each vaccine, in terms of the reduction in the number of infections each causes,
is diminished so much that the campaign is no longer cost e↵ective (Figure A.5).
However, if the vaccine pool is neither too small nor too large to make the initial
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Figure 3.11: E↵ect of monitoring proportion on the expected cost/duration
given an initial decision to vaccinate or not. Top row: expected cost (scenario
1) given an initial decision to vaccinate (red) or not (blue) for a range of monitoring
proportions, with and without a cost associated with monitoring (right and left panel
respectively). ‘25% of infection cost’ refers to the cost assigned to monitoring a
single vaccination, relative to the cost of a single infection. Bottom row: same as top
row for scenario 2. The dotted red line represents the expected cost/duration given
an initial decision to vaccinate, assuming monitored vaccinations provide perfect
information after day t⇤.
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Figure 3.12: E↵ect of cost associated with monitoring on the optimal mon-
itoring proportion and optimal expected cost/duration given an initial
decision to vaccinate. Top row: optimal monitoring proportion given an initial
decision to vaccinate for a range of monitoring costs, for scenario 1 (left) and scenario
2 (right). Bottom row: optimal expected outcome (cost or duration) given an initial
decision to vaccinate for a range of monitoring costs.
decision obvious, our approaches will lead to di↵erent decisions. Furthermore, we
note that, if we were not to fix the vaccine pool, but rather try to optimise its size,
only active AM could be relied on to do so. This is clear in the case of scenario 1:
active AM can clearly identify that a vaccine pool size of 2500 leads to the lowest
expected cost from the outbreak, since it minimises the expected cost of an initial
decision to vaccinate (1st column; Figure 3.13). However, both passive and non-AM
would suggest that 2000 vaccines is the optimal pool size, if they were to vaccinate,
since they are biased by the high cost of an ine↵ective campaign, which is avoided
under active AM since we recognise that an ine↵ective campaign can be stopped
before the vaccine pool is depleted.
Next, we vary the daily vaccination rate, keeping the vaccine pool size and t⇤
constant (2nd column; Figures 3.13 and 3.14). For both scenarios, a high daily
rate highlights no vaccination as the obvious choice, although for slightly di↵erent
reasons. In scenario 1, a high daily rate improves the e↵ectiveness of all vaccination
campaigns, however the benefit of being able to stop a campaign that is ine↵ective
is removed, hence we can no longer exploit this through active AM (Figure A.6). In
contrast, in scenario 2, a higher daily rate worsens our campaigns, since the negative
e↵ects of vaccination (increased duration at low vaccine e cacy) are exaggerated.
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Figure 3.13: Sensitivity of scenario 1 results to restrictions on control.
Varying the vaccine pool (⌫pool), daily vaccination rate (⌫r) and length of the
monitoring period (t⇤), we display the change in expected cost given both the
campaigns (row A) and initial decision under each approach (row B). Row C displays
the initial decision made under each approach for di↵erent values of these parameters.
Parameters a varied one at a time, keeping all others constant at the values provided in
Table 3.1. Vertical dotted lines identify the default parameter values used throughout.
Areas of the parameter space for which passive and active AM agree in their initial
decisions are shaded grey.
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Figure 3.14: Sensitivity of scenario 2 results to restrictions on control.
Varying the vaccine pool (⌫pool), daily vaccination rate (⌫r) and length of the
monitoring period (t⇤), we display the change in expected duration given both
the campaigns (row A) and initial decision under each approach (row B). Row C
displays the initial decision made under each approach for di↵erent values of these
parameters. Parameters a varied one at a time, keeping all others constant at the
values provided in Table 3.1. Vertical dotted lines identify the default parameter
values used throughout. Areas of the parameter space for which passive and active
AM agree in their initial decisions are shaded grey.
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Alongside this, the benefit of stopping an ine↵ective campaign under active AM is
again reduced, hence the obvious decision becomes to not vaccinate (Figure A.6).
However, if the daily vaccination rate is not too large (scenario 1: < 400, scenario 2:
< 500), the approaches will lead to di↵erent initial decisions. Again, we note that if
we wanted to optimise the daily rate rather than assume it fixed, active AM is the
only approach that can do so. This is highlighted in scenario 1: under active AM
we identify a daily rate of approximately 100 per day as the optimal (2nd column;
Figure 3.13), allowing learning about vaccine e cacy without committing too many
vaccines early on. However, under a non-AM or passive AM approach we would opt
to vaccinate as quickly as possible.
Finally, we vary the day on which we use the results from monitored vaccinations
to adapt control (t⇤), keeping the vaccine pool size and daily rate constant (3rd
column; Figures 3.13 and 3.14). For both scenarios, if this day is too far in the
future, an initial decision not to vaccinate becomes the obvious optimal choice. For
scenario 1, this will lead to a final decision also not to vaccinate, caused by the fact
that the benefit of stopping an ine↵ective campaign is removed (as with a highly
daily vaccination rate), since most of the vaccine pool will have already been used.
In scenario 2, the benefit of stopping an ine↵ective campaign is also removed, but the
e↵ectiveness of a delayed campaign is also increased due to a longer delay (Figure A).
As a result, in this scenario high values of t⇤ lead to the implementation of a delayed
campaign under both adaptive approaches, and an immediate, full campaign under
a non-AM approach. If we wished to optimise the length of this delay in scenario 2,
under a passive AM approach we would choose to make it as long as possible, to
optimise a delayed campaign, whereas under active AM we could identify a better
optimal for values of t⇤ around 5 days (3rd column; Figure 3.14).
3.5.4 Management objective
It is clear from the contrast between scenarios 1 and 2 that the management objective
has a significant impact on the decisions made under any of the three approaches.
Furthermore, in scenario 1, the relative costs of infections compared to vaccinations
will also have such an influence. If the costs of vaccination (both per vaccine costs,
!3, and a fixed cost associated with implementing a vaccination campaign, !4) are
su ciently high, an initial decision to vaccinate will not be deemed optimal under
any approach. Similarly, if these vaccination costs are su ciently low, vaccination
becomes the obvious choice and we will choose to vaccinate under all approaches.
However, there is a region in which the choice is not so obvious, where the costs
of vaccination may be outweighed by the reduction in infections if the vaccine is
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Figure 3.15: Scenario 1: initial decisions given di↵erent relative costs as-
sociated with vaccinations and infections. We vary the cost per vaccination
(!3) and fixed cost associated with implementing a campaign (!4), relative to the
cost per infection (!2 = 1). Top row: di↵erence in expected cost between an initial
decision to vaccinate or not, as viewed under each approach. Bottom row: initial
decision made under each approach. Black crosses represent the default values used
in scenario 1 (Table 3.1).
e↵ective, but may not if it is ine↵ective. It is in this region that the initial decision
di↵ers between approaches: under active AM we choose to vaccinate and thereby
learn about the vaccine e cacy, allowing greater reduction in infections if vaccine
e cacy is high, but under the non-AM or passive AM approaches we are unable to
foresee the greater worth of doing this and therefore choose not to vaccinate at all.
The di↵erence in cost resulting from these decisions depends on the specific definition
of relative costs (Figure 3.16), however is most pronounced for lower vaccine costs,
where the benefit of vaccinating is emphasised.
3.5.5 Epidemiological parameters
The dynamics of the epidemic itself can also render the decision making problem
trivial or highly complex. For example, in scenario 1, if R0 is less than 1, the epidemic
will die out very quickly by itself and hence it is clearly not worth incurring the cost
of implementing a vaccination campaign, so under all approaches we would choose
not to vaccinate. However, if R0 > 1, we see that only under active AM do we choose
to vaccinate (Figure A.7).
59
0 300 600 900
Fixed cost  4
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
os
t
p
er
va
cc
in
at
io
n
 
3
0 300 600 900
 250
 200
 150
 100
 50
0
E
xp
ected
cost
d
i 
eren
ce
(active
-
p
assive)
Di
sa
g.
Ag
re
e
A
greem
ent
in
in
itial
d
ecision
(p
assive
/
active)
Figure 3.16: Scenario 1: initial decisions given di↵erent relative costs as-
sociated with vaccinations and infections. We vary the cost per vaccination
(!3) and fixed cost associated with implementing a campaign (!4), relative to the
cost per infection (!2 = 1). Left panel: di↵erence in expected cost under active AM
compared to passive AM. Right panel: agreement in initial decision between passive
AM and active AM. Black crosses represent the default values used in scenario 2
(Table 3.1).
We see a similar, but more complex, relationship in scenario 2. If R0 is very low
(R0 < 1) or high (R0 > 8), the negative e↵ects of vaccination (increased duration at
low vaccine e cacy) are diminished and hence we would choose to vaccinate under
any approach (Figures 3.17 and 3.18). However, between these values, our decision
depends on the approach we take. This is most pronounced for 1 < R0 < 4, with
slow recovery rates from infection (long infectious periods). In such circumstances,
under passive AM the apparent benefit of a delayed vaccination campaign (under the
prior distribution) causes us to make an initial decision not to vaccinate, however
this removes our ability to learn. The long infectious period results in an exaggerated
negative impact if vaccine e cacy is in fact low. Under active AM however, we
recognise this and make an initial decision to vaccinate and learn about e cacy,
allowing us to avoid the significant negative impacts of an ine↵ective vaccine. For
epidemics with higher transmission rates and shorter infectious periods, the benefit of
a delayed campaign may outweigh the benefit of learning and stopping an ine↵ective
campaign (Figure A.9).
In reality we will often be dealing with epidemics with an R0 in this range, for
example Ebola, flu, cholera, plague, Zika, to name a few. Only rarely will a disease
have an R0 value significantly higher than this, such as measles, and if the R0 is
below 1 then it is unlikely to cause a significant outbreak requiring complex control
recommendations.
60
0.05
1.0
T
ra
ns
m
is
si
on
ra
te
( 
)
Non-AM Passive AM Active AM
1 20
0.05
1.0
1 20
Infection length (1 )
1 20
R0 = 1 R0 = 4 R0 = 8
 20
 15
 10
 5
0
5
10 E
xp
ected
d
u
ration
d
i 
eren
ce
(vacc.
-
n
o
vacc.)
No
vacc.
Vacc. In
itial
d
ecision
Figure 3.17: Scenario 2: Initial decision made under each approach, varying
epidemiological parameters. We vary the epidemiological parameters describing
transmission ( ) and recovery/removal ( ). Top row: di↵erence in expected duration
between vaccinating initially or not, as viewed under each approach. Bottom row:
initial decision made under each approach: vaccinate (red) or not (blue). Black
crosses represent the default values used in scenario 2 (Table 3.1). Lines of constant
R0 are identified with black lines.
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Figure 3.18: Scenario 2: Comparison of initial decision made between
active and passive AM given di↵erent epidemiological parameters. We
vary the epidemiological parameters describing transmission ( ) and recovery/removal
( ). Left panel: di↵erence in expected duration under active AM compared to passive
AM. Right panel: agreement in initial decision between passive AM and active AM.
Black crosses represent the default values used in scenario 2 (Table 3.1). Lines of
constant R0 are identified with black lines.
3.6 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter we have developed a model to investigate the e↵ectiveness of adaptive
management strategies to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, following di↵erent
approaches to incorporating real-time information regarding the unknown e cacy of
a vaccine. Such approaches may be necessary in the context of infectious disease
outbreaks, in which resources are limited, so must be used strategically (e.g. [29, 30,
104]), and the e↵ectiveness of any vaccination campaign at the start of an outbreak
may be uncertain (e.g. [138]).
We have found that, not only the ability to adapt control in light of new inform-
ation, but also the ability to foresee such adaptation, can have a significant e↵ect
on the recommendations made and the outcome of the epidemic. Both passive and
active AM can improve on a non-AM approach by more appropriately timing the
introduction of control or stopping an ine↵ective campaign when necessary. In a
two-phase control set-up such as this, should passive and active AM make the same
initial decision, they will result in the same outcome. However, because of the way
in which they view an immediate campaign under uncertainty, their initial decisions
may di↵er. In both scenarios we analysed, under active AM, the ability to foresee
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the option of stopping an ine↵ective campaign if monitored vaccinations are proving
unsuccessful significantly lowered the expected cost (or duration) that would result
from an initial decision to vaccinate, when compared with passive AM. This led to
an initial decision to vaccinate under active AM, whilst under passive AM we would
opt not to vaccinate from the start of the outbreak, removing our ability to learn
about vaccine e cacy and ultimately increasing the expected cost (duration) of the
outbreak. Therefore, under active AM we are better able to meet the objectives of
management. This remained the case across all sensitivity analyses, in which active
AM was always at least as good, often better, at meeting management objectives as
the other two approaches. We emphasise here that active AM does not necessarily
enforce experimentation of control, but provides a mechanism to assess the benefit
of such an approach and implement it if it will lead to better outcomes in the future.
Although the main result in both scenarios led to contrasting recommendations
between passive and active AM, this is highly dependent on the parameters used.
Under certain conditions, the uncertainty around vaccine e cacy does not translate
into uncertainty regarding control preference. If taking no action becomes the obvious
choice, then all approaches will make the same decision not to vaccinate. This is
found to occur if the vaccine pool is too small for a campaign to have a significantly
positive e↵ect, or similarly if the daily vaccination rate is too high, monitoring period
too long, or vaccines too expensive. Conversely, immediate, full vaccination may
also become the obvious choice if the cost of vaccines is very low compared to the
cost of an infection (for scenario 1), or if the R0 of the outbreak is very low or
high (for scenario 2). It is plausible that, from a public relations point of view, the
cost of appearing not to be taking every possible action to curb an outbreak would
be considered high enough that not vaccinating initially would never be an option.
However, this highlights another of the benefits of active AM: it provides a complete,
evidence based plan of action for all stages of the outbreak, clearly outlining control
recommendations conditional on di↵erent monitoring outcomes and the e↵ect each
will have on our ability to satisfy management objectives. Access to this information
makes it easier to justify tough, and possibly unintuitive, decisions at early stages of
the outbreak, if those decisions are shown to significantly improve the outcome of
control in the future. Such scenarios are often not obvious from the outset, hence,
whilst an active AM approach may not result in a di↵erent recommendation to less
complex approaches, this cannot be known a priori. Therefore, active AM is useful
even if just to confirm and provide evidence supporting the obvious choice of action.
The prior information regarding vaccine e cacy also has a significant e↵ect on
the recommendations made by each approach and the di↵erence between them.
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As the amount of prior information increases, the relative importance of real-time
information is reduced, hence we expect the di↵erence between passive and active
AM to be less. Intuitively, if prior information suggests e cacy is low, the approaches
are more likely to choose not to vaccinate, whereas if the estimate of e cacy is
high, the approaches are more likely to choose to vaccinate. However, if the prior
information still leaves uncertainty as to which campaign is optimal, due to a lack of
information or the estimate of e cacy being close to where campaigns switch rank,
we are likely to see a di↵erence in recommendations between the approaches.
Care should be taken when using prior information alongside real-time inform-
ation, since, if given too much weight (i.e. the variance of the prior distribution
is disproportionately low), it can render the latter redundant. If prior information
has been taken from previous outbreaks, it may be inaccurate and hence lead to
suboptimal management. For example, in scenario 2, if prior information suggests
that vaccine e cacy is between 60-80%, but it is actually significantly lower, relying
heavily on this information may lead to opting for a delayed campaign under both
active and passive AM, when not vaccinating is truly optimal. This would cause a
significant increase in the duration of the outbreak. However, if we reduce the weight
we place on prior information, active AM is able to recognise that the true e cacy
may still be low and hence chooses to vaccinate immediately, reduce uncertainty and
stop the campaign if vaccine e cacy is proving to be lower than expected, thereby
avoiding much of the negative impact of an ine↵ective campaign. Thus, active AM
allows us to lessen our reliance on prior information.
Under active AM, it is also possible to provide more relevant information to
decision-makers regarding the amount of monitoring required and the timing and
delivery of the vaccines. If there is a cost associated with monitoring, as we would
expect in reality, active AM is able to identify the point at which monitoring no
longer provides enough information regarding vaccine e cacy to o↵set the cost of
that monitoring. This helps to avoid wasting resources on monitoring that will not
a↵ect the control recommendations, possibly allowing more resources to be allocated
to control itself. Similarly, under active AM we can optimise the delivery of control
through the vaccine pool size, daily vaccination rate and length of the monitoring
period, with state-dependent recommendations providing a plan for control from
start to finish. This is not possible under the other approaches. The use of active
AM to optimise the delivery of control and monitoring resources is explored further
in the next chapter.
In this chapter we have focused upon a relatively simple non-spatial model, with
non-specific parameters chosen to mirror common non-fatal, human and livestock
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diseases. We have additionally only focused upon a single uncertainty upon vaccine
e cacy to highlight the interaction between control and learning and demonstrate
the utility of active AM. In reality, epidemics are much more complex and there
are likely to be multiple interacting uncertainties. For novel outbreaks, we may be
unaware of the transmission characteristics in the early stages and therefore would
not be able to fix the disease parameters as we have in this work. However, it
may still be necessary to introduce a control policy rapidly despite the underlying
uncertainty. In such circumstances, we are able to treat these parameters as we
have vaccine e cacy, defining a prior distribution, possibly using historical data, and
using active AM to implement an optimal multi-phase control policy that explicitly
considers resolution of uncertainty as data are accrued during an outbreak. We
would expect the potential of active AM to be even greater in such a scenario, when
uncertainty is more prominent and therefore the correct course of action based on
prior information alone is less clear. We attempt to address such scenarios in the
coming chapters.
It is certainly true that following an active AM approach to management will
never result in a worse outcome compared to following a passive or non-AM approach.
However, in order to implement and benefit from such an approach in the real world,
greater emphasis must be placed on ensuring the components of the AM framework
are in place before making management decisions. That is, policy makers must have
a clear idea of the objectives we wish to satisfy, the control options available and
the data that is going to be collected throughout the outbreak, before making an
initial control decision. This helps to avoid scenarios in which initial control hinders
the resolution of uncertainty and our ability to make optimal control decisions
in the future. Although, even if all components are clearly and quantitatively
defined, the computational complexity of performing active AM can be a barrier
to its implementation in real time [14], leading to the use of sub-optimal passive or
non-AM approaches instead.
Whilst analyses of similar systems exist in the literature (e.g. [11, 58, 137]), this
chapter has extended on such work in two main areas. First, we have applied the
adaptive management methodology specifically to an infectious disease epidemiology
context and explored in depth how passive and active AM methods can lead to
contrasting recommendations at the start of an outbreak. Also, we have not relied
upon metrics that assume the complete resolution of uncertainty, such as EVPI
(Section 2.2; Equation 2.3), but rather defined a hypothetical, Bayesian method
of uncertainty resolution that allows time-dependent, partial resolution of the un-
certainty in vaccine e cacy. The methodology we have introduced in this paper
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allows for the investigation of relatively unexplored areas in the epidemiological
literature, for example the balance of resources between uncertainty resolution and
control actions, an area that has received significant attention in the conservation
and resource management literature [139–143] but less so for epidemiological inter-
ventions. It also allows us to clearly examine the e↵ect that control actions can have
on our ability to resolve uncertainty. In the context we have used, the resolution of
uncertainty is directly linked to the control action available, as in similar applications
in the literature (e.g. [59]), since we are not able to monitor vaccinations without
administering them. This reinforces the idea of experimentation, which is a core part
of the resilience-experimentalist side of AM [48]. However, in the next chapter, we
show how active AM applies in a context where uncertainty is not directly linked to
the control measures themselves, but rather the epidemiology of the disease. In such
a context, we find that an active AM approach is still vital when making control
decisions, over a passive or non-AM approach.
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Chapter 4
Methods to anticipate
uncertainty resolution
Abstract
We focus on the use of active AM in managing a theoretical epidemic with unknown
transmission rate. Decisions centre around whether or not it is cost e↵ective to
implement a vaccination campaign. We compare three methods of anticipating the
resolution of uncertainty in the future, an integral component of the active AM
procedure: 1) a ‘perfect information’ method, which assumes that uncertainty in
the transmission rate will be completely resolved, 2) an abstract method, which
recognises that uncertainty will not be completely resolved, but the degree to which
it is resolved is not linked to the state of the epidemic, and 3) a mechanistic method,
which aims to explicitly model the mechanism behind uncertainty resolution, allowing
partial resolution of uncertainty that depends on the state of the epidemic. We find
that a mechanistic model of uncertainty resolution, used in conjunction with an
active AM approach to management, is able to provide the most useful information
to decision makers regarding the implementation and timing of both control and
monitoring, significantly reducing the expected cost of the epidemic.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we showed the importance of incorporating the uncertainty
in the e cacy of control, and the future resolution of such uncertainty, into decisions
made during the early stages of an outbreak. Using an active AM approach to
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management, we are able to do so in a rigorous, structured way, improving outcomes
and providing useful insights into the optimal delivery of control when compared to
a non-AM or passive AM approach. This also exhibited the use of experimentation:
implementing a control with uncertain e↵ects, in order to gain a better understanding
of these e↵ects and ultimately improve management in the future.
However, in the event of a disease outbreak, not only the e cacy of control, but
also the spread of the disease itself, is likely to be uncertain, especially during the early
stages. Whilst it may not be a novel disease, the rate of transmission and recovery,
among other parameters, is highly dependent upon the population and environment in
which the outbreak is occurring. As such, it is necessary for management approaches
to incorporate this uncertainty into decisions. In this chapter, address a scenario in
which only the epidemiological parameters are unknown. We focus on a single source
of uncertainty in the transmission rate, however also cover how these methods can
be extended to multiple unknown disease parameters. In later chapters, we explore
the e↵ect of having uncertainty in both disease and control parameters.
Using a similar set-up as in the previous chapter, we explore our ability to make an
optimal initial decision at the start of a disease outbreak, when the transmission rate
is unknown. We focus on the use of an active AM approach, explicitly incorporating
future uncertainty resolution into our initial decision. We emphasise again that
such an approach can lead to di↵erent, preferable management recommendations
compared to a non-AM or passive AM approach.
We extend our analysis of active AM significantly by investigating the method
used to model and predict the resolution of uncertainty from real-time outbreak
information. We define and analyse three methods: 1) a ‘perfect information’ method,
assuming that uncertainty will be completely resolved by the time we make our final
decision, 2) an abstract method, that allows partial resolution of uncertainty but
does not depend directly on the state of the epidemic, and 3) a mechanistic method,
which aims to model the monitoring process directly and link this to the uncertainty
in parameters. We show that the first two methods, whilst able to provide some
useful information, are highly limited in their utility. As such, we mainly use these
as null models to highlight the importance of using the more complex, mechanistic
method where possible.
We find that, using an active AM approach to management and aniticipating
the e↵ect of real-time information via a mechanistic model of uncertainty resolution
can result in significantly improved management recommendations, reducing the
expected cost of the outbreak when compared to non-AM and passive AM approaches.
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Furthermore, by incorporating a mechanistic model of uncertainty resolution into
the AM framework, we are able to optimise many aspects of both control and
monitoring. These include: the timing of decision points and control implementation,
the minimum requirements for monitoring e↵ort, the optimal timing of samples used
for monitoring and the optimal allocation of monitoring resources. In our example,
using this information to optimise control and monitoring could reduce the expected
cost of the outbreak by over 7%, compared to relying solely on prior information
to make the initial decision. Over half of this reduction is gained from optimising
the timing and allocation of monitoring resources during the early stages of the
epidemic, something not possible without the combination of a mechanistic model of
uncertainty resolution with the active AM framework.
Overall, we provide further motivation for the use of an active AM approach to
epidemic management over passive or non-AM approaches, in the context of unknown
epidemiological parameters. We demonstrate that anticipating the resolution of
uncertainty, although not directly linked to the experimentation of control, has a
significant e↵ect on the recommended policy. Furthermore, using a mechanistic model
for the resolution of uncertainty enables significant improvements to the timing and
allocation of control and monitoring resources, greatly reducing the expected cost of
the outbreak.
4.2 Adaptive management components
4.2.1 Model of system behaviour
We use the same basic epidemiological model as in the previous chapter to represent
the spread of a directly transmitted disease. That is, a non-spatial, homogeneously
mixing, deterministic SEIR model with constant transmission ( ), incubation ( )
and recovery/removal rates ( ). Demography is ignored on the assumption that the
dynamics of the epidemic are significantly faster that the natural birth-death process
of the population. At the start of the outbreak, a single infected (I) individual is
introduced into a population of 100,000 susceptible (S) individuals. We assume the
outbreak is detected after a fixed amount of time (t0), after which control can begin.
Vaccination of the population is the only form of control, implemented at a
constant daily rate (⌫r), restricted by a finite vaccine pool (⌫pool) and e↵ective with
a fixed probability (⌫e). In contrast to the previous chapter, the vaccine e cacy is
known. However, the vaccine is imperfectly targeted, being administered to both
exposed (E) and susceptible (S) individuals proportional to their contribution to the
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total population size. If an exposed individual is vaccinated, it will be ine↵ective and
a↵ord no immunity (represented by the VE compartment). A vaccinated susceptible
individual may gain complete, indefinite immunity, after a fixed delay, with probability
⌫e (an ‘e↵ective’ vaccination; moves to the V1 compartment), or receive no immunity
(an ‘ine↵ective’ vaccination; moves to the V0 compartment). Each individual can
only be vaccinated once. Further details of the system can be found in Figure 4.1.
The di↵erential equations for the system are stated in Equation 4.1:
dS(t)
dt
=   S(t)I(t)
N(t)
  ⌫r(t) S(t)
S(t) + E(t)
,
dE(t)
dt
=  
S(t)I(t)
N(t)
   E(t)  ⌫r(t) E(t)
S(t) + E(t)
,
dI(t)
dt
=  (E(t) + VE(t))   I(t),
dR(t)
dt
=  I(t) +
V1(t)
⌫d
,
dV0(t)
dt
= (1  ⌫e)⌫r(t) S(t)
S(t) + E(t)
   V0(t)I(t)
N(t)
,
dV1(t)
dt
= ⌫e⌫r(t)
S(t)
S(t) + E(t)
   V1(t)I(t)
N(t)
  V1(t)
⌫d
,
dVE(t)
dt
=  
(V0(t) + V1(t))I(t)
N(t)
+ ⌫r(t)
E(t)
S(t) + E(t)
   VE(t).
(4.1)
We define a vaccination campaign in the same way as in the previous chapter:
Vti,tj representing a campaign that starts on day ti and ends on day tj . If ti  t  tj ,
the campaign is ongoing and
⌫r(t) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
⌫r, if S(t) + E(t)   ⌫r,
S(t) + E(t), if 0  S(t) + E(t) < ⌫r,
⌫pool  
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds, if ⌫pool  
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds < ⌫r,
0, if
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds > ⌫pool.
(4.2)
If t < ti or t > tj , the campaign is not currently ongoing and ⌫r(t) = 0. If no
vaccination occurs throughout the epidemic, we denote this by V0,0.
Finally, tend represents the day on which the outbreak ends and hence the duration
of the outbreak (relative to the time of detection). Given the continuous nature of
the di↵erential equations (Equation 4.1), we define this to be the point at which the
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Figure 4.1: Model of system behaviour. We use a non-spatial, homogeneously
mixing, deterministic Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model with
vaccination as control. The transmission ( ), incubation ( ) and recovery ( ) rates
are constant throughout the epidemic. If a vaccination campaign is active, vaccination
will occur at a constant daily rate ⌫r (number of individuals per day), subject to
the conditions outlined in Equation 4.2. The vaccine is imperfectly targeted towards
both susceptible (S) and exposed (E) individuals. If a susceptible individual is
vaccinated, it will be e↵ective with probability ⌫e and they will move into the
V1 compartment. At a rate of 1/⌫d per day (⌫d representing the delay between
vaccination and immunity), they will gain full, indefinite immunity, moving to the
removed (R) compartment. Otherwise, if the vaccine is ine↵ective, they will move
to the V0 compartment where they remain completely susceptible to the disease.
If an exposed individual is vaccinated, it will be completely ine↵ective and move
to the VE compartment, where it remains in the incubation stage before becoming
infectious to others. Individuals that have been vaccinated but subsequently become
infected (either due to an ine↵ective vaccine or not having yet developed immunity)
also move to the VE compartment. Blue shaded compartments identify vaccinated
individuals and red shaded compartments infectious individuals.
number of Exposed (both vaccinated and unvaccinated) and Infectious individuals
together falls below 1 (E(t) + VE(t) + I(t) < 1). We use highly generic values to
parametrise the model, however are similar to those of an influenza-like disease, for
example. A description of the parameters and their default values throughout this
chapter (unless otherwise specified) can be found in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Summary of parameters and notation used. Default values apply
throughout unless otherwise stated. Values left blank depend on the vaccination
campaign and are calculated as required during the optimisation process.
Notation Description Default
value
  Transmission rate of disease Unknown
  Incubation rate of disease 0.5
  Recovery/removal rate from disease 0.2
⌫r Daily vaccination rate (number of individuals) 1000
⌫e Vaccine e cacy 100%
⌫pool Total number of vaccines available 30000
⌫d Delay between vaccination and immunity (days) 2
t0 Detection and initial decision point (days after initial
infection)
21
t⇤ Final decision point (days after detection) 21
tend Day on which outbreak ends (duration of the outbreak) -
Vti,tj Denotes a vaccination campaign that starts on day ti
and ends on day tj . We require t0  ti  tj  tend
-
C(X |
a0, a1)
Cost of an outbreak X, conditioned on the initial and
final decisions (defining the vaccination campaign) and
the epidemiological parameters (excluded from notation
for brevity).
-
!1 Weight assigned to the length of the outbreak (per day)
in calculation of cost
0
!2 Weight assigned to each infection caused by the outbreak
in calculation of cost
2.5
!3 Weight assigned to each vaccination administered in
calculation of cost
1
!4 Weight associated with a fixed cost of implementing a
vaccination campaign in calculation of cost
25000
k, ✓ Parameters of the Gamma prior distribution around  ,
fixed by a specified mode and variance
Mode: 0.2
Var: 0.1
x, y Parameters of the Beta prior distribution around  , fixed
by a specified mode and variance
Mode: 0.2
Var: 0.01
N Total population size 100000
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4.2.2 Objectives of management
We use the same flexible cost function introduced in the previous chapter to define
the management objective, allowing the incorporation of the duration of the outbreak,
number of infections caused by the outbreak, number of vaccinations administered
and a fixed cost associated with implementing a vaccination campaign. Given initial
and final decisions a0 and a1 (and epidemiological parameters; excluded from notation
for brevity), the cost of an outbreak X is:
C(X | a0, a1) = !1 tend + !2
✓Z tend
0
I(s)ds
◆
+ !3
✓Z t1
t0
⌫r(s)ds
◆
+ !4  V . (4.3)
The goal of management is to minimise the expected cost of the outbreak,
calculated by integrating the cost C over any uncertain parameters. Integrals are
approximated using Monte Carlo integration.
The default weights used in the cost function (!i) throughout this chapter can
be found in Table 4.1.
4.2.3 Optimisation approach
We continue with a two-step decision process: 1) an initial decision a0 when the
outbreak is detected on day t0, and 2) a final decision a1 on day t⇤. At each decision
point, we have a choice between vaccinating until the next decision point, or not (for
the final decision, this equates to vaccinating until the vaccine pool is depleted, or
not vaccinating until the end of the outbreak). These decisions are informed by prior
information, available at the start of the outbreak, and real-time information that is
collected between t0 and t⇤.
In this chapter, as in the previous chapter, we focus on the initial decision. We
show how an active AM approach, aniticipating future learning, can be used to
optimise di↵erent aspects of control and monitoring, minimising the expected cost
of the outbreak. To do so, we will often refer to the expected cost of an initial
decision, denoted C(a0), and the expected cost of an initial decision conditioned on
the true parameters, C(a0 |  ). The method of calculating both these values is given
in Algorithm 1.
Note that Algorithm 1 describes the process of solving a MDP with two discrete
time points (t = {0, t⇤}) via SDP using backwards recursion (Equation 2.2). In this
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case, the expected cost of an initial decision C(a0) is equivalent to the accumulated
value of a decision Va(st, b(st)), with t = 0. The expected cost of an initial decision
conditioned on the true parameters, C(a0 |  ), is equivalent to everything contained
in the second line of Equation 2.2.
This is incorporated into the full active AM procedure as outlined in Algorithm 2.
The four two-phase campaigns that can result from this decision making procedure
are shown in Figure 4.2.
Algorithm 1 Calculate the expected cost of an initial decision
1: procedure ExpectedCost(a0)
2: repeat
3: Draw unknown parameters ( 0) from prior distributions
4: Simulate epidemic (X) using Equation 4.1 and  0
5: repeat
6: Given epidemic X and/or  0, simulate an observation of real-time inform-
ation (yi)
7: Given yi, calculate posterior distribution ⇡(  | yi)
8: for final decision a1 2 {do not vaccinate, vaccinate} do
9: Calculate expected cost of final decision over posterior:
10: E[C(X⇤ | a0, a1)] =
R
 C(X
⇤ |  , a0, a1)⇡(  | yi)d 
11: end for
12: Choose final decision that minimises the expected cost:
13: Ai = argmina1{E[C(X⇤ | a0, a1)]}
14: Calculate the true cost of the final decision, conditioned on  0:
15: C(Ai) = C(X | a0, Ai, 0)
16: until a su cient number of observations have been drawn
17: Calculate the expected cost of this initial decision, conditioned on  0:
18: C(a0 |  0) =
R
iC(Ai)f(yi |  0)dyi
19: until a su cient number of draws of parameters have been made
20: Calculate the expected cost of this initial decision:
21: C(a0) =
R
 0
C(a0 |  0)⇡( 0)d 0
22: end procedure
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Algorithm 2 Active AM procedure
1: for initial decision a0 2 {do not vaccinate, vaccinate} do
2: Calculate expected cost of initial decision via Algorithm 1
3: end for
4: Choose initial decision with the lowest expected cost
5: Implement decision until t⇤
6: On day t⇤, use real-time information y to update probability distributions around
unknown parameters
7: for final decision a1 2 {do not vaccinate, vaccinate} do
8: Calculate expected cost of final decision
9: E[C(X⇤ | a0, a1)] =
R
 C(X
⇤ |  , a0, a1)⇡(  | y)d 
10: end for
11: Choose the final decision that minimises the expected cost
12: Implement the final decision until the end of the epidemic, or the vaccine pool is
depleted
4.2.4 Prior information and monitoring
For the majority of this chapter, we focus on a single source of uncertainty introduced
by an unknown transmission rate  . We define our prior information regarding the
transmission rate in a quantitative manner, using a Gamma(k, ✓) distribution, where
k and ✓ represent the shape and scale respectively. The probability density function
for such a distribution is given by:
f( ; k, ✓) =
 k 1e 
x
✓
✓k (k)
,  , k, ✓ > 0, (4.4)
where  (·) is the Gamma function.
For clarity, we choose to define this distribution by its mode and variance:
Mode = (k   1)✓, k   1,
Var = k✓2.
(4.5)
Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise specified, we define the prior inform-
ation around   using a Gamma distribution with mode = 0.2 and variance = 0.1
(see Figure 4.2). These values were chosen so that    1 (or equivalently R0  5)
approximately 95% of the time.
In later sections, we will also explore the e↵ect of an unknown recovery/removal
75
rate ( ). We define our prior information regarding this rate using a Beta(x, y)
distribution with probability density function:
f( ;x, y) =
 (x+ y)
 (x) (y)
 x(1   )y, x, y > 0,   2 [0, 1]. (4.6)
Again, we choose to define this distribution by its mode and variance:
Mode =
x  1
x+ y   2 , x, y > 1,
Var =
xy
(x+ y)2(x+ y + 1)
,
(4.7)
setting them equal to 0.2 and 0.01 respectively.
Finally, we assume that real-time information is collected from the outbreak
between the time of detection (and initial decision; t0) and the final decision point
(t⇤). This information is combined with the prior information and used to reduce
uncertainty in the epidemiological parameters. In this chapter, we compare three
di↵erent methods of predicting how real-time information will a↵ect the uncertainty
in our parameters, detailed in the next section.
4.3 Modelling uncertainty resolution
A main focus of this chapter is the relationship between the real-time information
being gathered during an outbreak and how it leads to uncertainty resolution,
emphasising the need for a clearly defined, state-dependent model linking the two.
We introduce three methods of modelling uncertainty resolution, with di↵erent
levels of realism, and implement them within the AM framework. The two simpler
methods act as null models, providing some useful information but largely serving
as an example of why the third, more complex, model is preferred. We detail these
methods here.
4.3.1 Perfect information
The simplest method of defining uncertainty resolution in the disease parameters is
to assume that all uncertainty is resolved by the time we make our final decision at
t⇤. That is, we have ‘perfect information’. This equates to having a posterior for  
that is a single point, located at the true value, with every possible observation of
real-time information leading to this result (Algorithm 1; steps 6 and 7). Whilst this
76
1 2 3 4
Campaign
130
135
140
145
Expected cost over prior (000s)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Transmission rate ( )
0
50
100
150
200
250
C
os
t
(0
00
s)
1. Immediate, full campaign (Vt0,tend)
2. Immediate, stopped campaign (Vt0,t )
3. Delayed, full campaign (Vt ,tend)
4. No vaccination (V0,0)
Prior PDF
0 1 2 3 4 5
R0
Figure 4.2: Outbreak cost resulting from possible two-phase campaigns,
assuming   is unknown but all other parameters are known and fixed.
Given our set-up with two decision points, an initial decision at t0 = 21 and a
final decision at t⇤ = 42, there are four possible two-phase campaigns that may be
implemented by the end of the outbreak: 1) vaccination is started immediately (at t0)
and continued until the vaccine pool is depleted (Vt0,tend ; blue line), 2) vaccination
is started immediately but stopped on day t⇤ (Vt0,t⇤ ; green line), 3) vaccination is
delayed until t⇤, then implemented until the vaccine pool is depleted (Vt⇤,tend ; brown
line), and 4) no vaccination throughout the outbreak (V0,0; black line). The main
plot shows the predicted cost of the outbreak under each campaign calculated over a
range of true transmission rates   using Equation 4.1. The smaller box plot shows
the expected cost of each campaign, integrated over the prior distribution of   shown
in the main plot in red. The values of other epidemiological parameters used and
definition of the prior are given in Table 4.1.
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method is unrealistic and has many limitations, it is useful for providing an upper
bound for the benefit that can be gained from resolving uncertainty.
This method is similar to the EVPI measure (Section 2.2; Equation 2.3) used
in VoI analysis. Whilst such a measure usually assumes perfect information at
the current time, under this method of uncertainty resolution we assume perfect
information in the future (on day t⇤). We clarify this di↵erence by defining a new
measure, which we name the Expected Value of Future Perfect Information (EVFPI).
Both measures in this context are detailed in Box 1.
Box 1: Quantifying the value of perfect information
In this box, we define and clarify the di↵erence between the EVPI and EVFPI
measures. We assume a scenario in which we have two decision points: an
initial decision to vaccinate or not (a0) and a final decision to vaccinate or not
(a1). The transmission parameter   is unknown, with prior distribution ⇡( ).
The objective of management is to make decisions a0 and a1 that minimise
the expected cost of the outbreak, where the cost of the outbreak, conditional
on a given  , a0 and a1 is denoted C(X | a0, a1, ).
Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI)
When calculating the EVPI, we assume that both decisions are made using
perfect information:
EVPI =
Z
 
opta0,a1 (C(X | a0, a1, ))⇡( )d 
  opta0,a1
✓Z
 
C(X | a0, a1, )⇡( )d 
◆ (4.8)
Expected Value of Future Perfect Information (EVFPI)
In contrast, we define the EVFPI to emphasise the fact that we will have
perfect information for the final decision, but not for the initial decision:
EVFPI = opta0
✓Z
 
opta1 (C(X | a0, a1, ))⇡( )d 
◆
  opta0,a1
✓Z
 
C(X | a0, a1, )⇡( )d 
◆ (4.9)
For both measures (Equations 4.8 and 4.9), the calculation is the di↵erence
between two expected outcomes: the expected outcome given perfect information
minus the expected outcome given only prior information. For EVPI (Equation 4.8),
the first involves fixing  , then calculating the cost of the outbreak given all initial
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and final decisions and choosing the optimal two-phase campaign. This is then
integrated over all   according to the prior. Hence, given each value of  , we select
the best two-phase campaign. This represents perfect information. The second
expected outcome assumes prior information only: we calculate the cost of each
campaign for all  , then integrate over the prior and choose the campaign which has
the lowest expected cost across all  .
For EVFPI (Equation 4.9), the expected outcome under perfect information is
di↵erent. For each value of  , we can only assume that the final decision will be made
optimally, since, by the time we have perfect information, the initial decision will
already have been made. Hence, for a given initial decision, we choose the optimal
final decision at all values of  . We then choose the initial decision that gives the
lowest expected cost after integrating over all final decisions according to the prior
distribution of  . This will result in an outcome that is, at best, the same as in
the calculation EVPI, but generally slightly worse (higher cost) given the delay in
obtaining perfect information.
4.3.2 Abstract resolution
If we assume that uncertainty is not completely resolved before we make our final
decision at t⇤, and hence we do not have perfect information, we need to be able to
define the uncertainty at t⇤ probabilistically. Such methods relate to the calculation
of the EVSI (Section 2.2; Equation 2.5), in which we must predict what the posterior
distribution of parameters will be, using the possible observations of data gathered
in the future and the prior distribution of parameters.
The first method we use to do so is via an abstract definition of uncertainty
resolution, summarised in Box 2. In this method, we assume that monitoring provides
some number of abstract ‘observations’ of a process occurring at a constant rate  
throughout the outbreak, providing a convenient definition of the posterior for  .
This is incorporated into steps 6 and 7 of Algorithm 1. Whilst these observations
are not grounded in reality, they allow us to partially resolve uncertainty, with the
amount of resolution depending on the number of observations of the process. Since
the process has a constant rate parameter  , this method of uncertainty resolution
is completely detached from the state of the epidemic itself. As such, we use it as a
null model to emphasise why it is important that our model of uncertainty resolution
is closely linked to the epidemic and represents as closely as possible the real-time
information that may be collected during an outbreak.
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Box 2: Abstract uncertainty resolution procedure
In this box we outline the abstract method of estimating an unknown trans-
mission rate ( ) from real-time information collected throughout the outbreak.
Prior distribution
The prior distribution of   is based on a Gamma distribution with shape and
scale (inverse rate) parameters k and ✓ (see Table 4.1 for values used):
  ⇠ Gamma(k, ✓) (k: shape, ✓: scale) (4.10)
Data
Between t0 and t⇤, we make n abstract observations of a process that occurs
at a constant rate  :
{xi : 0  i  n}
Likelihood
The process we are observing occurs at constant rate  , hence each data point
has likelihood:
xi |   ⇠ Poisson( ) (4.11)
Posterior
Using the conjugacy of the Gamma and Poisson distributions, we construct a
posterior distribution of   from the observed data:
  | {xi} ⇠ Gamma
 
k +
nX
i=1
xi,
✓
n✓ + 1
!
(4.12)
4.3.3 Mechanistic resolution
The final definition of uncertainty resolution we introduce aims to directly link the
information we might be getting from monitoring the outbreak and the uncertainty
around parameters in a mechanistic way. We summarise this method in Box 3. Here,
we explicitly define and model the collection of real-time information via a number of
cross-sectional samples of the population, identifying individuals in the samples who
are currently infectious. We assume that all infectious individuals are symptomatic
and will be correctly identified if contained within a sample, whereas exposed
individuals are asymptomatic and will be missed. There is also no misclassification
of healthy individuals as infected. The number of infectious individuals found
in each sample is used on day t⇤ to estimate the posterior distribution of disease
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parameters via a Bayesian fitting procedure. This is incorporated into steps 6 and 7 of
Algorithm 1. Since the occurrence of infectious individuals within a sample depends
on the total number of infections in the population, this method of uncertainty
resolution directly depends on the state of the epidemic.
When implementing this definition within the AM framework, it is necessary to
draw likely observations {di : 0  i  C} given a value of   (Algorithm 1; step 6).
Given our use of a continuous, deterministic SEIR model, it is possible that we may
observe infections in our samples, even if the number of infected individuals in the
population is below 1. To combat this, we assume that if R0 < 1, we will not observe
any infections in the population (i.e. if R0 < 1, di = 0 for all i).
Box 3: Mechanistic uncertainty resolution procedure
In this box we outline the mechanistic method of estimating an unknown
transmission rate ( ) from real-time information collected throughout the
outbreak.
Prior distribution
The prior distribution of   is based on a Gamma distribution with shape and
scale (inverse rate) parameters k and ✓ (see Table 4.1 for values used):
  ⇠ Gamma(k, ✓) (k: shape, ✓: scale) (4.13)
Data
The real-time information is made up of C data points {di : 0  i  C},
representing the number of infectious individuals detected from C cross-
sectional samples of the population taken at times {ti : t0  ti  t⇤} during
the outbreak. The size of each sample is denoted Mi.
Likelihood
The number of infectious individuals observed in each sample depends on the
prevalence of the disease in the population at that time and the size of the
sample:
di |   ⇠ Binom
✓
I(ti)
N(ti)
,Mi
◆
, (4.14)
where I, N are calculated via Eq 4.1 conditional on  .
Posterior
We implement a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) fitting procedure using
the Stan programming language (Section 2.3.2), interfacing with Python via
PyStan, to obtain posterior distributions of   and cost under di↵erent controls.
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Approximation
A major issue with this method is the computational complexity required: we must
draw many observations di, for many values of  , and perform a fitting process
on each set of observations to obtain a posterior and predict the optimal final
decision. Whilst this is plausible for a single set of parameters, if we are trying to
optimise control and monitoring, as we do in subsequent sections, it quickly becomes
intractable. However, we have found that we can accurately approximate this process
under some acceptable conditions.
The approximation arises from the observation that, for smaller sample sizes
(/ 8000), and 0 <   < 0.55 (0 < R0 < 2.75), we will only make a final decision
not to vaccinate if we do not detect any infectious individuals across all samples.
Hence, we approximate the expected cost of an initial decision by assuming that
we will make a final decision not to vaccinate if no infections are detected in all the
samples, otherwise we will make a final decision to vaccinate. The approximation
is summarised in Algorithm 3, replacing lines 7 - 18 in Algorithm 1 with a single
equation (line 6).
Algorithm 3 Approximate the expected cost of an initial decision (a0)
1: procedure ExpectedCost(a0)
2: repeat
3: Draw unknown parameters ( 0) from prior distributions
4: Simulate epidemic (X) using Equation 4.1 and  0
5: Calculate the expected cost of this initial decision, conditioned on the
parameter values drawn:
6: C(a0 |  0) = C(X | V0,0, 0)P (yi = 0¯) + C(X | Vt⇤,tend , 0)P (yi 6= 0¯)
7: until a su cient number of draws of parameters have been made
8: Calculate the expected cost of this initial decision:
9: C(a0) =
R
 0
C(a0 |  0)⇡( 0)d 0
10: end procedure
Finally, for an initial decision not to vaccinate, if   > 0.55 the optimal final
decision is to continue without vaccination, since the epidemic will have progressed
far enough that implementing a campaign at this stage is no longer worthwhile.
Given the sharp switch we see in the results using the full procedure (see Figure 4.4),
in the approximation we will assume that, for   > 0.55, we will behave as if we had
perfect information.
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This approximation is accurate under the following three conditions:
Maximum sample size Each sample must contain a maximum of 8000 indi-
viduals, else the assumption that only di = 0 for all i will lead to a final decision not
to vaccinate is no longer true.
Minimum sample sizeWhen calculating the expected cost of an initial decision
not to vaccinate, it is necessary that each sample contains at least 500 individuals,
else even obtaining di = 0 for all i is not enough to recommend no vaccination as
the final decision. For samples below this size (until the sample size drops below
approximately 10 per sample), the posterior will always lead to a final decision
to vaccinate, since a delayed campaign results in a lower expected cost than no
vaccination. At extremely low sample sizes (less than approximately 10), the posterior
is very similar to the prior, hence this will lead to a final decision not to vaccinate.
This condition also holds for an initial decision to vaccinate, however the minimum
sample size is higher at approximately 1500 individuals.
Minimum number of samples It is necessary to have at least 4 samples to
ensure a realistic fit from the fitting procedure. Fewer samples than this can lead to
convergence on a very high value of  , representing an epidemic that peaks and dies
out again within the sampling period.
To test this approximation, we use it to calculate the expected cost of an initial
decision not to vaccinate, across a range of sample sizes, and compare this to what
we obtain using the full procedure for three specific sample sizes (2000, 4000 and
6000 individuals per sample; Figure 4.3). We find an almost exact match between
the two methods.
4.4 Comparison of uncertainty resolution models
We compare how our view of the initial decisions and their outcomes change under
each model of uncertainty resolution (Figure 4.4). In the top row, we show the
expected cost of both initial decisions across a range of true values of   (Algorithm 1;
step 18, discretised into fixed intervals of  ), for each of our methods of uncertainty
resolution. The bottom row shows the expected cost of each campaign under the
prior distribution (bars) and the expected cost of both initial decisions (dashed lines),
for each method of uncertainty resolution.
Under all methods, we observe a similar result as in the previous chapter. Following
a non-AM or passive AM approach to management, we do not anticipate the resolution
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of full mechanistic method and approximation.
We compare the expected cost of an initial decision not to vaccinate using the
original definition of the mechanistic method of uncertainty resolution (Box 3) and
our approximation (Algorithm 3), for three specific sample sizes. We assume that
samples are taken on at equally spaced intervals between the time of detection t0
and t⇤: {ti} = {21, 28, 35, 42}. The transmission rate   is unknown with a Gamma
prior, all other parameters are given in Table 4.1.
of uncertainty in  , leading to an initial recommendation to vaccinate, since an
immediate, full campaign is optimal under the prior. However, following an active
AM approach, we would recommend not vaccinating until t⇤ before deciding whether
or not vaccinate. This allows us to avoid the cost of implementing a vaccination
campaign if   is likely to be low and therefore R0 < 1, since the outbreak will quickly
die out by itself, leading to a lower expected cost. Or if   is very high (  > 0.55), for
which a vaccination campaign no longer has a large enough impact to be considered
cost e↵ective. Thus, anticipating the future resolution of uncertainty can change our
initial decision even if uncertainty resolution does not rely on the implementation of
control.
Under the assumption of gaining perfect information by t⇤ (Figure 4.4 (A)), we
observe sharp changes in the expected cost across varying true values of  , where
the optimal campaign changes. For example, if we make an initial decision not
to vaccinate, our final decision will be between not vaccinating throughout, or
implementing a delayed, full vaccination campaign. When making this final decision,
we know exactly what the true value of   is (because we have perfect information):
if    0.2, then we will choose not to vaccinate, if 0.2 <    0.55, we will choose to
start vaccinating, and if   > 0.55, we will again choose not to vaccinate. There is no
uncertainty in our decision around these points, hence we will never make the wrong
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final decision (i.e. start vaccinating when we should not, or vice versa). We can make
similar assumptions for an initial decision to vaccinate. Overall, we find that waiting
until t⇤, rather than vaccinating immediately, leads to a 6% lower expected cost.
We calculate EVFPI = 11534 (Equation 4.9; same units as the objective function,
e.g. currency), here representing the di↵erence between the expected cost of the
decision made with only prior information (an immediate, full campaign) and the
expected cost of the decision made assuming perfect information at t⇤ (no immediate
vaccination, with vaccination starting at t⇤ only if 0.2 <    0.55). This is equivalent
to an 8% decrease in the expected cost.
Using the abstract definition of uncertainty resolution (Figure 4.4 (B)), assuming
50 observations of a process occurring at a constant rate  , we no longer have sharp
transitions between campaigns, due to the remaining uncertainty in   when we
make our final decision. For example, under an initial decision not to vaccinate, if
  ⇡ 0.2 (and hence R0 ⇡ 1), there remains significant uncertainty as to whether
starting a delayed campaign or continuing without vaccination is the optimal choice,
resulting in the possibility of making the wrong final decision. Under the assumption
of perfect information, this uncertainty does not exist. Hence, the expected cost of
both initial decisions is increased, with an initial decision not to vaccinate being
a↵ected the most, since the disparity between expected cost at low and high values
of   is much greater under this initial decision (which, conversely, also allows it to
provide larger benefits). However, the initial recommendation is unchanged: not
vaccinating immediately and making a final decision based on updated information
provides the lowest expected cost. We use the EVSI measure (Equation 2.5) to
calculate the value of partially resolving uncertainty. Under the abstract method, we
obtain EVSI = 6255, just over half of the benefit of resolving uncertainty completely.
Finally, under the mechanistic definition of uncertainty resolution with 4 samples
of 4000 individuals each (Figure 4.4 (C)), we see a similar result, with increased
expected costs compared to when we assume perfect information, but an initial
decision not to vaccinate remaining optimal. We also observe a very similar expected
cost for both initial decisions compared to the abstract definition, suggesting that 50
abstract ‘observations’ may in some way equate to the same amount of uncertainty
resolution as the four samples of 4000 individuals taken in the mechanistic method.
We explore this in further detail in later sections. In this case we calculated EVSI
= 6392, slightly greater than under the abstract method. We again see increased
uncertainty around points where the optimal campaign changes, compared to when
we assume perfect information, however, the magnitude and e↵ect of this uncertainty
is significantly di↵erent from what we observe under the abstract method. Under
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Figure 4.4: Expected cost of initial decisions using di↵erent methods of
modelling uncertainty resolution. Top row: solid blue and red lines show the
expected cost of initial decisions (not to vaccinate and to vaccinate respectively) for
a range of true values of the transmission rate   (Algorithm 1; step 18). Dotted lines
give the expected cost of the initial decision integrated over the prior distribution
of   (Algorithm 1; step 21). The method of incorporating uncertainty resolution
into predictions is split across columns: A) assuming perfect information at t⇤ (Box
1), B) using the abstract method of uncertainty resolution with n = 50 (Box 2),
and C) using the mechanistic method of uncertainty resolution with four samples
of 4000 individuals taken on days {21, 28, 35, 42} (Box 3). Bottom row: expected
cost of each two-phase campaign integrated over the prior distribution of   (bars),
alongside the expected cost of initial decisions (dotted lines). The possible two-phase
campaigns are 1) an immediate, full campaign (Vt0,tend ; blue bar), 2) an immediate
campaign that is stopped on say t⇤ (Vt0,t⇤ ; green bar), 3) a delayed, full campaign
(Vt⇤,tend ; brown bar), or 4) no vaccination throughout the outbreak (V0,0; black bar).
Values of parameters used are given in Table 4.1.
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the abstract method, the uncertainty changes smoothly around points where the
optimal campaign changes, increasing as we approach such a point and decreasing
to zero away from it. Under the mechanistic definition however, we see that the
uncertainty depends heavily on the value of  : leading up to   = 0.2, a point where
the optimal campaign changes, there is no uncertainty in our choice, since we know
we will not observe any cases and therefore will always choose not to vaccinate.
However, this quickly changes as we increase past this point, since there is now a
significant possibility of not observing any cases simply because our sample missed
them, hence resulting in a suboptimal decision not to vaccinate. As   increases
further, the probability of this occurring falls, since there will be more infections
in the population. For high values of  , we also see a sudden switch back to not
vaccinating, almost as if we had perfect information, whereas in an abstract setting
this change is gradual.
Hence, although the expected cost of each initial decision does not appear to
change significantly between the abstract and mechanistic methods of modelling
uncertainty resolution, there are substantial di↵erences in the behaviour of the
expected cost conditional on the true value of  . This is due to the fact that, whilst
the abstract method only depends on a constant   through the Poisson likelihood
(Eq 4.11), the mechanistic method takes into account the fact that the amount of
uncertainty resolved may depend on the state of the epidemic itself.
For the abstract method, we see increasing variance in the posterior at higher
values of   (Figure 4.5; left): since the variance of a Gamma(k, ✓) distribution is equal
to k✓2, and the posterior of   given observations {xi} is Gamma
⇣
k +
Pn
i=1 xi,
✓
n✓+1
⌘
(Equation 4.12), we expect the variance to increase at higher values of   via an
inflated sum
Pn
i=1 xi.
However, for the mechanistic method we see the opposite (Figure 4.5; right): if
  < 0.2, the outbreak dies out immediately and we will not observe any infections
in the samples, resulting in the same posterior for all such values of true  . As  
increases above 0.2, the outbreak will no longer die out quickly and we are likely
to observe some infections. The higher the true value of  , the more infections
we expect to observe and hence we obtain thinner posteriors. This highlights the
importance of having a clear link between the resolution of uncertainty and the state
of the epidemic itself.
Overall, we see that the method of incorporating uncertainty resolution into our
predictions of campaign performance can have a significant e↵ect on the expected
cost of the outbreak and therefore our initial decision. As such, we should aim to
87
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Estimated transmission rate
0
5
10
15
20
M
ea
n
p
os
te
ri
or
P
D
F
Abstract (50 observations)
True transmission rate ( ):
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Estimated transmission rate
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Mechanistic (samples: 4 x 4000)
Figure 4.5: Comparison of mean estimated posteriors under abstract and
mechanistic methods of uncertainty resolution. We simulate posterior distri-
butions of   using the abstract (Box 2; Eq 4.12) and mechanistic (Box 3) methods
of uncertainty resolution, for a large number of possible data points drawn from
likelihoods conditional on the true value of  . Here we show the mean posterior from
simulations for a number of values of true  . Values of parameters used are given in
Table 4.1.
model the relationship between real-time information and system uncertainty as
accurately as possible. Throughout the rest of this chapter, we show how active AM,
in conjunction with these methods, can be used to further optimise the delivery of
control and gathering of real-time information.
4.5 Optimising monitoring and control
In the following sections we show how active AM can be used to optimise monitoring
and control when the disease parameters are unknown. We focus on the situation
where only the transmission rate   is unknown and the incubation and recovery
rates (  and  ) are known and fixed, to clarify explanation. However, the final
section addresses the extension of these methods to more unknowns. We use all
three methods of uncertainty resolution where possible, using the perfect information
and abstract methods as null models to highlight the greater utility and accuracy
of the mechanistic method. We focus mainly on optimising the expected cost of
an initial decision not to vaccinate, since this is already the optimal initial decision
(Figure 4.4) and responds the most to real-time information.
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Figure 4.6: E↵ect of the amount of monitoring performed on the expected
cost of initial decisions. A) for the abstract method, we vary the number of
observations n of a process that occurs at a constant rate   (Box 2). A larger number
of observations results in a thinner posterior for  . B) for the mechanistic method,
we vary the sample size of four cross-sectional samples of the population, taken on
days {21, 28, 35, 42}. Larger samples will result in thinner posteriors of  . Dashed
lines show the expected cost obtained using the perfect information assumption.
Values of parameters used are given in Table 4.1.
4.5.1 Amount of monitoring
We begin by analysing the e↵ect of changing the amount of monitoring that is
performed, which directly relates to the amount of uncertainty that is resolved by
the time we make the final decision at t⇤ (Figure 4.6). A limitation of assuming
perfect information at time t⇤ is it does not allow us to consider this factor. However,
using the abstract and mechanistic methods of uncertainty resolution, we are able to
analyse the e↵ect of resolving more or less uncertainty on our ability to minimise
the expected outbreak cost.
Under the abstract method, this is achieved by changing the number of ob-
servations n (Box 2), and under the mechanistic definition by changing the size
of each sample Mi (Box 3). Note, here we assume a constant sample size across
samples (Mi = Mj , 8i, j). The expected cost under perfect information is given
as reference (Figure 4.6; dashed lines). We see that, as the amount of uncertainty
resolved increases under both definitions, the expected cost of both initial decisions
falls, although significantly more so for an initial decision not to vaccinate than to
vaccinate. This is due to the greater disparity in expected cost between low and high
values of   for the former. Both methods highlight the benefit of waiting until t⇤ to
vaccinate (or not), conditional on enough monitoring information being gathered
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Figure 4.7: E↵ect of an explicit monitoring cost on the expected cost of an
initial decision not to vaccinate. Using the mechanistic method of uncertainty
resolution, we assign an explicit cost to each individual sampled (!m), relative to the
cost of a single vaccination. We vary the value of !m and calculate the expected cost
of an initial decision not to vaccinate over a range of sample sizes. For each value
of !m, we identify the sample size which minimises the expected cost with a black
’x’. The expected cost assuming perfect information and prior information only are
shown by dashed and dotted lines respectively. The values of parameters used can
be found in Table 4.1.
(at least approximately 15 observations, n = 15, or 1000 individuals per sample,
Mi = 1000).
Both methods display a very similar relationship between the amount of uncer-
tainty resolved and the expected cost of the outbreak, with the rate of decrease in
expected cost falling as more uncertainty is resolved. Comparing the expected cost
between the two, it appears that our abstract idea of an observation resolves as
much uncertainty as 4 samples of 80 individuals. If we associated a cost with each
observation or individual in a sample, we could identify a clear optimal to minimise
the overall expected cost, with a higher monitoring cost leading to a lower optimal
sample size or number of observations (Figure 4.7). If the monitoring cost is very
high (e.g. !m = 0.2), the benefit of waiting until t⇤ to decide whether or not to
vaccinate may be outweighed by the cost of monitoring, causing immediate, full
vaccination, without monitoring, to become the optimal initial decision.
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4.5.2 Sample frequency
A limitation of the abstract method of uncertainty resolution is that the only factor
a↵ecting the resolution of uncertainty is the total number of observations n achieved
by t⇤. However, the mechanistic method allows us to go further and analyse the
e↵ect of sample timing, frequency and the distribution of sampling resources. Thus
far, for the mechanistic method, we have assumed that we have four sample points
(C = 4), taken at equally spaced intervals between the time of detection t0 and t⇤
(ti = {21, 28, 35, 42}), with the same number of individuals within each sample.
We vary the frequency of samples, whilst keeping the overall number of individuals
contained across all samples the same (Figure 4.8). We still assume that samples
are taken at equally spaced intervals between the time of detection and t⇤ and with
a constant sample size across samples. Overall, this does not greatly a↵ect the
expected cost of the outbreak. However, it is clear that fewer samples, with a larger
number of individuals in each sample, is preferred, due to there being a slightly
lower probability of not observing any cases in the population across all samples
for 1 < R0 < 2 (0.2 <   < 0.4). Note, however, that care needs to be taken at a
low number of samples, since this can cause the fitting procedure to not converge
or converge on a very high value for  . As a result, it is not feasible to use only 2
or 3 samples for such a fitting procedure, as it does not produce consistent results.
Hence, throughout our analyses we use at least 4 samples. In reality, it is likely we
will be restricted as to how many individuals can be tested for the disease at one
time, hence, this would also restrict our ability to perform a low number of very large
samples. Similarly, for a high number of samples, we must ensure that each sample
is large enough that the minimum sample size condition is met (Section 4.3.3).
4.5.3 Distribution of sampling resources
We find that removing the assumption that all four samples are of equal size, whilst
keeping a constant overall sample size
⇣PC
i=1Mi = 12000
⌘
, can have a significant
e↵ect on the expected cost of our initial decision (Figure 4.9). We do so by defining
a distribution of resources applied across the four sample points. We use a Beta(↵, ⇠)
distribution to split the total sample size between points, allocating x1 = F (0.25) ·PC
i=1Mi to the first sample, x2 = (F (0.5) F (0.25)) ·
PC
i=1Mi to the second sample
etc, where F is the CDF of the Beta distribution. We vary both the location of the
mode
⇣
↵ 1
↵+⇠ 2
⌘
and the concentration ↵+ ⇠, providing a measure of how clustered
around the mode the distribution is. Note that, for ↵+ ⇠ = 1, there are two modes
of the distribution at 0 and 1 (however one may be significantly more prominent
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Figure 4.8: E↵ect of the number of samples on the expected cost of an
initial decision not to vaccinate. Using the mechanistic method of uncertainty
resolution, we vary the number of samples C whilst keeping the total sample size
constant (
PC
i=1Mi = 10000). The left-hand plot shows the expected cost of an
initial decision not to vaccinate for di↵erent numbers of samples. The right-hand
plot shows the probability of observing no cases across all the samples, across a small
range of   for which cases will exist in the population (R0 > 1) but in low numbers.
The values of parameters used can be found in Table 4.1.
than the other), and for ↵+ ⇠ = 2, the sample size is constant across all samples, as
we have assumed so far. We also enforce a minimum sample size of 500 individuals
per sample, to allow us to use our approximation of the expected cost (Algorithm 3;
Section 4.3.3). We find that allocating as many resources as possible to the final
sample is optimal for minimising the expected cost, reducing it by a further 1%
compared to using a constant sample size. This is because, for this epidemic, we
expect the number of infections in the population to continue increasing past day
42, thus the number of infections will be greater on the last sample day (t = 42)
compared to earlier sample days. Therefore, taking a large sample on the last day
minimises the probability of not observing any infections across all our samples if
infections are in fact present in the population. Conversely, allocating most resources
to the first sample day (t = 21) has the opposite e↵ect for the same reason.
4.5.4 Timing of sampling and control
So far, we have assumed that the time of the final decision, t⇤, is fixed. We now
remove this assumption and analyse the benefits of optimising this parameter also.
If we ignore the e↵ect of uncertainty resolution when making our initial decision, as
we would in a passive AM context, we would always seek to make our final decision
as early as possible, since implementing a vaccination campaign earlier makes it
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Figure 4.9: E↵ect of sample size distribution on the expected cost of an
initial decision not to vaccinate. We vary the distribution of sampling resources
across four samples using a Beta(↵, ⇠) distribution to split the total sample size⇣PC
i=1Mi = 12000
⌘
unevenly across the samples. We allocate x1 = F (0.25)·
PC
i=1Mi
to the first sample, x2 = (F (0.5)   F (0.25)) ·
PC
i=1Mi to the second sample etc,
where F is the CDF of the Beta distribution. We vary both the location of the
mode
⇣
↵ 1
↵+⇠ 2
⌘
and the sum ↵+ ⇠, providing a measure of how clustered around the
mode the distribution is. The left-hand plot shows the expected cost of an initial
decision not to vaccinate for a range of distributions. The right-hand plots show
the allocation of sampling resources across the four samples for a selection of the
distributions tested. The values of parameters used are given in Table 4.1.
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Figure 4.10: Optimising the time of the final decision, t⇤, under di↵erent
rates of uncertainty resolution. We calculate the expected cost of an initial
decision not to vaccinate for a range of t⇤ and rates of uncertainty resolution. Left:
using the abstract method of uncertainty resolution with 1 - 50 observations per day.
Right: using the mechanistic method of uncertainty resolution with daily samples of
sizes 500 - 4000. The value of t⇤ that gives the lowest expected cost is shown with a
black ‘x’. The values of parameters used can be found in Table 4.1.
more e↵ective. However, this reduces the time we have to resolve uncertainty. When
viewed in an active AM context, we see that there is a balance between fast control
and waiting to learn more about the transmission parameters.
For both the abstract and mechanistic methods of uncertainty resolution, we
optimise the value of t⇤ for di↵erent rates of uncertainty resolution (Figure 4.10).
In both cases, we see that waiting at least a few days to gain information on
the transmission rate leads to an improved expected cost. The slower the rate of
resolution, the longer this optimal delay is. However, we also note that, under the
abstract method we tend to recommend a shorter optimal delay than under the
mechanistic method. This is again the result of the abstract method not taking
into account the state of the epidemic, hence it assumes that uncertainty is resolved
consistently over time. This is not the case, since monitoring resources may lead
to more uncertainty resolution later on in the outbreak, when it would be easier
to detect cases if there are any, compared to the very start of the outbreak. Using
the mechanistic method of uncertainty resolution, we are able to recognise this and
optimise monitoring accordingly, recommending longer delays between initial and
final decisions to allow for more e↵ective monitoring (Figure 4.10).
We take the analysis of sample timing further using the mechanistic method:
instead of assuming 4 samples equally spaced between t = 21 and 42, we vary the
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sample times ({ti : 0  i  4}) by taking all possible combinations of 4 sample
points spaced 2 days apart between t = 21 and 42 (Figure 4.11). We find the
timing of samples can have a significant e↵ect on the expected cost of an initial
decision not to vaccinate (Figure 4.12). We analysed the e↵ect of sample timing
under two di↵erent assumptions: first, that the final decision is always made on day
42, regardless of the sample times (t⇤ = 42; top row), and second, that the final
decision is made immediately after all four samples have been collected (t⇤ = t4;
bottom row). We see that the behaviour of the expected cost for di↵erent sample
times changes significantly under these assumptions.
If t⇤ is fixed at 42, we see that it is best to have all the samples as late as possible,
to maximise the probability of finding cases if there are any (since the number of
infections in the population, if there are any, will still be increasing at t = 42). The
sample size has little e↵ect on this behaviour (Figure 4.12; columns), although a
higher sample size reduces the expected cost under all timings, as we would expect
from Figure 4.6. A higher sample size also appears to reduce the e↵ect that sample
timing has on the expected cost, shown by a lower variation, which is intuitive since
we are less likely to miss any infections and thus depend less on the prevalence in
the population. By taking samples as late as possible, i.e. on days {35, 37, 39, 41},
as opposed to equally spaced between days 21 and 42 (inclusive), we reduce the
expected cost of an initial decision to wait by 1% for a sample size of 2000 and 0.8%
for a sample size of 5000.
If t⇤ is set to the final sample point, that is, we make the final decision as soon
as the four samples have been taken, we see very di↵erent, more complex dynamics.
This arises from the interplay between having an earlier final decision, which improves
the e cacy of vaccination campaigns, and the increased uncertainty resolution from
having later samples, discussed previously. As a result, in some cases, neither having
all the samples as late as possible nor as early as possible is optimal, but rather
we should balance the two. This is highly dependent on the sample size. For large
samples, having later samples has less of an e↵ect on our ability to resolve uncertainty,
since it can be well resolved by large samples even at early stages of the outbreak.
Hence, the improved e cacy of an early final decision largely outweighs the benefit
of later samples. Conversely, for smaller samples, we observe the opposite and the
optimal timing of samples is pushed later. However, it is still the case that all
the samples should be taken as close together as possible. We also see that larger
samples result in higher variance of expected cost between di↵erent sample times,
the opposite to what we observe if the final decision point is fixed, since delaying
control when uncertainty is already su ciently resolved has relatively more impact.
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Figure 4.11: Visualisation of method for varying the timing of four cross-
sectional samples. In order to analyse the e↵ect of sample timing on the outcome
of control and monitoring, we vary the timing of samples between t0 = 21 and
t⇤ = 42. Assuming four samples of equal size, we allow samples to be taken every
second day, starting at t0 = 21. We analyse every combination of four sample times
from these possible days, giving a total of 330 di↵erent sample timings. They are
ordered so that the final sample changes first, followed by the third sample, then the
second and finally the first.
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Figure 4.12: E↵ect of sample timing on the expected cost of each initial
decision not to vaccinate. We vary the timing of four equally sized samples by
taking all combinations of sample times on every second day for 21  t  41 (see
Figure 4.11 for a visual explanation). For each set of sample times, we calculate the
expected cost of an initial decision not to vaccinate. We do so under two assumptions:
1) the final decision point is fixed at t⇤ = 42 (top row), and 2) the final decision is
made immediately after the final sample is taken (t⇤ = t4; bottom row). We also test
two sample sizes: 2000 and 5000 individuals per sample (columns). The points at
which the first three sample times change are idenitified with dots: the later samples
change first and earlier samples last. The timing that gives the lowest expected cost
is identified in each plot. The parameter values used are given in Table 4.1.
For a sample size of 2000, by taking samples on days {27, 29, 31, 33} and making
a final decision immediately after the last sample, we reduce the expected cost of
an initial decision to wait by almost 2% compared to taking samples evenly spaced
between days 21 and 42. Similarly, with a sample size of 5000, taking samples on
days {23, 25, 27, 29} reduces the expected cost by over 2.5%.
Overall, we find that sample timing can play a significant role in the e cacy of
monitoring and our ability to resolve uncertainty, and hence significantly a↵ects the
expected cost of our decisions. From our three methods of uncertainty resolution,
the mechanistic method is the only one that can reliably take this into account and
optimise the timing of monitoring and control. Using this method in conjunction
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with active AM could lead to significant reductions in the expected cost of the
outbreak, up to 2.5% in the scenarios we tested.
Multiple decision points
We make one final adaptation to our procedure of monitoring and control, to further
improve the expected cost arising from an initial decision not to vaccinate. Whilst we
have shown that we can optimise the time of t⇤, we now include the e↵ect of allowing
multiple times at which we can start vaccination. We do so using the mechanistic
method of uncertainty resolution, based on the following observation: although we
require 4 sample points to obtain an accurate posterior, we know that, unless   is
very high, we will only make a final decision not to vaccinate if we do not observe
any infections across all samples. As a result, as soon as we observe a single infection
in the population, within any of the samples, it makes sense to begin vaccination
immediately, thereby maximising the e cacy of the campaign. Hence, we will allow
control decisions to be made on any of the sample days: after each sample, we can
choose to begin vaccination, if we observe at least one infection in that sample, else
continue without vaccination until the next sample is taken. We also assume that, if
vaccination is started on one of the earlier sample days, it will not be stopped again
after all samples have been taken even if it turns out that   is in fact very high,
as we believe this would be more easily justifiable in real life. We summarise this
method and detail the calculation of expected cost in Box 4.
By implementing multiple decision points, under our original conditions (4 samples
of 2000 individuals evenly spaced between t0 = 21 and t⇤ = 42), we find that we can
reduce the expected cost of an initial decision to wait by 4%. This shows that the
ability to start a campaign as soon as we know that   > 0.2 outweighs the benefit of
learning whether   > 0.55 and not vaccinating if it is.
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Box 4: Multiple decision points
In this box we summarise the method used to allow multiple decision points
during the monitoring portion of the outbreak. Following the mechanistic
method of uncertainty resolution, we take C cross-sectional samples of the
population at times {ti : t0  t  t⇤}, containing Mi individuals each. The
number of infections detected in each sample is denoted di. We only consider
the case where we have made an initial decision not to vaccinate. We then
allow a decision point immediately after each sample: if any infections are
detected (di > 0), begin vaccination and continue until the vaccine pool
is depleted (resulting in campaign Vti,tend), else (di = 0) continue without
vaccination until the next sample is taken, or the outbreak ends.
Calculation of expected cost
Given an initial decision (a0) not to vaccinate, and epidemiological parameters
 0, we know that the number of infections detected in each sample, di, follows
a Binomial distribution:
di |  0 ⇠ Binomial
✓
I(ti)
N(ti)
,Mi
◆
(4.15)
The probability of starting vaccination at each decision point, and finally not
vaccinating throughout, is calculated by the following set of equations:
P (d1 > 0) = 1  P (d1 = 0)
P (d1 = 0, d2 > 0) = P (d1 = 0)(1  P (d2 = 0))
...
P (d1 = d2 = · · · = dt⇤ = 0) = P (d1 = 0)P (d2 = 0) . . . P (dt⇤ = 0)
(4.16)
Hence, conditional on the parameter set  0, the expected cost of this initial
decision is:
C(a0 |  0) =P (d1 > 0)C(X | Vt1,tend , 0)+
P (d1 = 0, d2 > 0)C(X | Vt2,tend , 0)+
· · ·+ P (d1 = d2 = · · · = dt⇤ = 0)C(X | V0,0, 0)
(4.17)
Finally, as before, we integrate out the epidemiological parameters by their
prior distribution ⇡( 0), giving the expected cost of an initial decision not to
vaccinate:
C(a0) =
Z
 0
C(a0 |  0)⇡( 0)d 0 (4.18)
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Figure 4.13: Schematic of decision process allowing multiple opportunities
to begin vaccination. Under the mechanistic method of uncertainty resolution,
we take C cross-sectional samples of the population at times t1, t2, ... , tC  t⇤. The
number of infections detected in each sample is denoted di. When allowing multiple
opportunities to begin vaccination, we assume that the initial decision (at t0) is to
not vaccinate. After each sample, if at least one infection is detected (di   1), we
will choose to implement a vaccination campaign from that day, continuing until
the vaccine pool is depleted (resulting in vaccination campaign Vti,tend). Otherwise
(di = 0), continue without vaccination to the next decision point. If no infections
are detected from all samples, no vaccination campaign will be implemented for the
entirety of the outbreak (V0,0).
Allowing multiple decision points also has significant e↵ects on the optimisation
of monitoring and control. For sample timing (Figure 4.14), we now find that it is
beneficial to spread our samples out, having the first sample early and subsequent
samples much later. In fact, if we allow the final sample to extend past t = 42, we
find that it is optimal to push the final sample as late as t = 81, whilst keeping the
first as early as possible. Hence, having the samples spread over a very wide range
has become optimal, where before we chose to have them close together. For high
values of  , where prevalence may already be high at early decision points, this allows
us to take advantage of a quickly implemented campaign. However, when   is lower,
therefore making infections more di cult to detect at early stages, it also allows time
to resolve uncertainty and implement a campaign later on if necessary. Overall, for a
sample size of 2000, taking samples on days {21, 29, 51, 81} and allowing vaccination
to begin as soon as a single infection is detected, reduces the expected cost of an
initial decision to vaccinate by over 6%, compared to samples taken at evenly spaced
intervals and t⇤ = 42.
For the optimal distribution of resources across samples, with only a single future
decision point, we saw that having as much of the total sampling resources as possible
on the final sample point was optimal (Figure 4.9). If we allow multiple decision
points (Figure 4.15), whilst we should still assign the most resources to the final
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Figure 4.14: E↵ect of sample timing on the expected cost of an initial de-
cision not to vaccinate, allowing multiple opportunities begin vaccination.
We vary the timing of four equally sized samples of 2000 individuals each. Left: we
analyse all combinations of sample times on every second day for 21  t  41 (see
Figure 4.11 for a visual explanation). Right: we analyse all combinations of sample
times on every sixth day for 21  t  81. For each set of sample times, we calculate
the expected cost of an initial decision not to vaccinate, assuming that a decision to
start vaccinating can be made immediately after any sample is taken and the final
decision point is immediately after the last sample. The points at which the first
three sample times change are identified with dots: the later samples change first
and earlier samples last. The timing that gives the lowest expected cost is identified
in each plot. The parameter values used are given in Table 4.1.
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sample point, it is optimal to have more resources across the other samples compared
to previously, since they have significantly more e↵ect on our decisions, and to have
more on the earliest and latest samples than those between. Any allocation that gives
more resources to the two samples in the middle than the first and last samples will
worsen the e cacy of monitoring and control, even compared to a constant sample
size. However, where previously it was necessary to enforce a minimum sample size
in order to allocate enough resources to the earlier samples, this is no longer the case.
This emphasises the increased importance that is now placed on all samples, since
any sample alone can trigger a decision to begin vaccination. Given a total sample
size of 8000, to be split across 4 samples taken at evenly spaced intervals between
t0 = 21 and t⇤ = 42, if we allocate approximately 1700 (21.25%) to the first sample,
1250 (15.625%) to the second, 1400 (17.5%) to the third and 3650 (45.625%) to the
final sample, we achieve a 0.5% reduction in expected cost compared to a constant
sample size. The optimal distribution and its benefit is consistent across a range of
total sample sizes. However, we note that, as the samples become more spread out
in time, as with the optimal timing found above ({ti} = {21, 33, 51, 85}), this benefit
is reduced until a constant sample size becomes optimal, since the loss from making
the wrong decision at any sample point is magnified.
Overall, we have found that allowing vaccination to start as soon as an infection
is detected greatly improves the expected cost of an initial decision not to vaccinate,
up to 6% in the scenarios tested, even though we do not allow vaccination to be
stopped if   turns out to be very high. However, it also has a large e↵ect on the
optimal timing and distribution of monitoring resources, hence a decision to allow
multiple decision points must be made at the start of the outbreak, else we may be
in danger of making suboptimal recommendations.
4.6 Multiple uncertainties
Although we have focused on only a single source of uncertainty in the transmission
rate  , we can easily extend this methodology to include more than one uncertainty.
In this last section, we explore the e↵ect of having both the transmission rate   and
recovery rate   unknown.
4.6.1 Modelling uncertainty in  
We use similar methods to model the uncertainty in   and its resolution as we have
throughout this chapter.
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Figure 4.15: E↵ect of sample size distribution on the expected cost of an
initial decision not to vaccinate, allowing multiple opportunities to begin
vaccination. We vary the distribution of sampling resources across four samples
using a Beta(↵, ⇠) distribution to split the total sample size
⇣PC
i=1Mi = 8000
⌘
unevenly across the samples. We allocate x1 = F (0.25) ·
PC
i=1Mi to the first sample,
x2 = (F (0.5)  F (0.25)) ·
PC
i=1Mi to the second sample etc, where F is the CDF of
the Beta distribution. We vary both the location of the mode
⇣
↵ 1
↵+⇠ 2
⌘
and the sum
↵ + ⇠, providing a measure of how clustered around the mode the distribution is.
The left-hand plot shows the expected cost of an initial decision not to vaccinate for
a range of distributions, assuming that a decision to start vaccinating can be made
immediately after any sample is taken and the final decision point is immediately
after the last sample. The distribution that minimises the expected cost is identified
with a black ’x’. The right-hand plots show the allocation of sampling resources
across the four samples for the optimal distribution. The values of parameters used
are given in Table 4.1.
103
First, we define the prior information using a Beta(x, y) distribution, as described
in Section 4.2.4, with mode = 0.2 and variance = 0.1. We can then model the
resolution of uncertainty using each of our three methods:
Perfect information
We assume that all uncertainty in the recovery rate   is resolved by the time we
make our final decision at t⇤. We do not necessarily assume that the uncertainty in
  is resolved also. In order to quantify the benefit of resolving uncertainty in  , but
not   (or vice versa), we can use the Expected Value of Partial Perfect Information
(EVPXI; Section 2.2):
EVPXI =
Z
 
opta0,a1
✓Z
 
C(X | a0, a1, ,  )⇡( )d 
◆
⇡( )d 
  opta0,a1
✓Z
 , 
C(X | a0, a1, ,  )⇡( ,  )d d 
◆ (4.19)
Note, Eq 4.19 calculates the benefit of resolving uncertainty in   and not  ; we
can easily calculate the converse by switching the parameters. However, as before,
we edit this definition slightly to emphasise the fact that we are assuming perfect
information at t⇤, not immediately. We define the Expected Value of Future Perfect
Partial Information (EVFPXI) to reflect this:
EVFPXI = opta0
✓Z
 
opta1
✓Z
 
C(X | a0, a1, ,  )⇡( )d 
◆
⇡( )d 
◆
  opta0,a1
✓Z
 , 
C(X | a0, a1, ,  )⇡( ,  )d d 
◆ (4.20)
Abstract resolution
We again use a mathematically convenient definition of the data and likelihood, that
allows us to control the amount of uncertainty in   that is resolved but is not linked
to the state of the epidemic. We assume that real-time information is gathered via n
observations of a process that follows a Binomial(N,P ) distribution with N = 10
and P =  :
Data: {zi : 1  i  n}, Likelihood: zi ⇠ Binomial(10,  ) (4.21)
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Using the conjugacy of the Beta prior and Binomial likelihood, the posterior distri-
bution of   will be:
Posterior:   | {zi} ⇠ Beta
 
x+
nX
i=1
zi, y + 10n 
nX
i=1
zi
!
(4.22)
Mechanistic resolution
We can incorporate an unknown   into our existing fitting procedure without any
changes to the set-up. We simply pass   as an unknown parameter to be sampled
over, initialising it in the parameters block, along with its prior distribution, defined
in the model block, to our existing Stan programme.
4.6.2 Results
We perform the same procedure across all three definitions of uncertainty resolution
and find that, under the priors we have used (Table 4.1), there is an even greater
benefit obtained from performing active AM over a passive or non-AM approach
when we introduce another uncertainty (Figure 4.16). Using the perfect information
assumption, we can calculate the EVFPI metric (Equation 4.9), which increases to
EVFPI = 15770, an almost 40% increase compared to when we only had a single
source of uncertainty. These results are of course sensitive to the prior we place on
 : the kernel density plot in Figure 4.16 shows that there is significant uncertainty
as to which campaign is optimal under these priors, however, if the prior on   was
centered higher, we may find that this uncertainty is reduced and the benefit of
active AM over passive AM can become negligible.
The addition of further uncertainties will also a↵ect the optimal monitoring and
control parameters. For example, compared to the previous results, we may need to
allow more resources and time to resolve uncertainty before we can be sure of the
optimal final decision. This will a↵ect the optimal timing of monitoring and control,
causing an increase in optimal delays between initial and final decisions. However,
the mechanistic method of uncertainty resolution, in conjunction with active AM, is
already set up to handle such factors.
When we have multiple uncertainties, we may wish to analyse which are more
important to resolve for optimising control, so that limited monitoring resources
can be e↵ectively targeted. If we assume perfect information at t⇤, we can calculate
the EVFPXI (Equation 4.20) for both parameters, showing the maximum benefit
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Figure 4.16: Relative benefit of active AM over passive AM with both
transmission ( ) and recovery ( ) rates unknown. We calculate the expected
cost of the outbreak using active AM in conjunction with our three methods of
uncertainty resolution (Boxes 1-3) and compare this to the expected cost under a
passive AM approach, assuming that only   is unknown, as before, and both   and  
are unknown. Left: the relative benefit of an active AM approach compared to passive
AM, for both scenarios and all methods of uncertainty resolution. For the abstract
method, we assume 50 observations for each parameter. For the mechanistic method,
we assume four samples of 5000 individuals each, taken on days {21, 28, 35, 42}.
Right: optimal campaign for di↵erent true values of   and  . The colour of each
grid square represents the optimal campaign for that specific value of   and  . The
joint prior for   and   is shown in white. Parameters used are given in Table 4.1.
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obtainable from completely resolving   or   individually. In this case, the EVFPXI
from resolving   is 6953, whereas from   is only 231. This suggests that, if a choice
between resolving one or the other is necessary, resolving uncertainty in   is more
e↵ective for lowering the expected cost of the outbreak.
Using the abstract method of uncertainty resolution we can analyse the e↵ect
of partially resolving uncertainty in one or both of the parameters. If we vary the
number of data observations for both   and   and calculate the expected cost of
each initial decision (Figure 4.17), we see that resolving uncertainty in   has much
more of an e↵ect on the expected cost than resolving uncertainty in  , especially
if   remains highly uncertain. This is what we would expect given our analysis
of the EVFPXI. Translated into recommendations for an initial decision, resolving
uncertainty in   has almost no e↵ect. If we assume that the resources required for
observations of both parameters are equal, we can identify the optimal distribution
of monitoring resources between the two parameters. At low levels of monitoring,
we find it is better to allocate all monitoring resources to resolving uncertainty in  ,
as opposed to resolving both. For example, 20 data observations for   and none for
  results in a lower expected cost than 10 for each. At higher levels of monitoring, it
is worthwhile allocating resources to resolving uncertainty in both parameters, but
allocating more to   than   can still improve outcomes. This analysis can therefore
have a significant impact on recommendations for targeted monitoring. Although we
have emphasised throughout that the abstract method of resolving uncertainty does
not provide reliable recommendations, these results still provide important insight
into how much uncertainty in each parameter needs to be resolved for it to have an
e↵ect on initial decisions.
Finally, we are unable to perform such analysis using the mechanistic method of
uncertainty resolution, since we do not have specific monitoring for each unknown
parameter and are therefore unable to separate the resolution of uncertainty between
the two. However, this could easily be the situation we find in reality, therefore the
analysis provided by the perfect information and abstract methods would also be
rendered redundant in such contexts.
Overall, we have shown that the methods introduced in this chapter, especially
the mechanistic method, can easily be extended to incorporate more than one source
of uncertainty in the epidemiological parameters, and doing so may lead to even
greater benefits from active AM compared to passive or non-AM approaches. We can
also use the perfect information and abstract methods of uncertainty resolution to
gain insight into which uncertainties are the most important to resolve for informing
decisions, allowing targeted monitoring if necessary; however, any insights gained
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Figure 4.17: E↵ect of the number of observations of   and   on the expected
cost of each initial decision. We vary the number of observations of   and  
independently and calculate the expected cost of both initial decisions in each case
(Algorithm 1). Observations are drawn from their respective likelihood distributions
(Equations 4.11 and 4.21) and combined with their prior distributions to give
posteriors based on Equations 4.12 and 4.22. The parameters used are given in
Table 4.1.
from such methods should be interpreted carefully within the context of the outbreak.
4.7 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter, we have analysed our ability to make an initial control decision in the
face of uncertain epidemiological parameters. We followed an active AM approach
to management, both predicting the e↵ect of control actions and anticipating how
the collection of real-time information may a↵ect our future decisions. A major
focus of this chapter was the method of modelling uncertainty resolution used within
the active AM framework, that allows us to predict the e↵ect that new information
will have on the uncertainty in the system. We introduced three such methods:
1) assume that we have perfect information at future decision points, that is, all
uncertainty will be resolved, 2) an abstract method of resolving uncertainty that
relates to the unknown parameter but does not depend on the state of the epidemic,
and 3) a mechanistic method that aims to directly model the relationship between
the real-time information that is collected and the uncertainty in parameters. The
first two methods have acted primarily as null models, emphasising the utility and
necessity of the mechanistic method, but have also exhibited some functionality
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themselves.
The first method of modelling uncertainty resolution, assuming that we will
have perfect information when making the final decision, is unrealistic but also
computationally unintensive and well used in the Value of Information literature (as
EVPI; Section 2.2). As such, it is useful for quickly providing an upper bound on
the benefit we may see from resolving uncertainty. If, even with perfect information,
uncertainty resolution does not a↵ect our current and future decisions, this would
indicate that resources should not be allocated to monitoring if they can be used
for control instead. However, if the opposite is true, further analysis into the e↵ect
of partially resolving uncertainty is necessary. If there is more than one source of
uncertainty in the system, this method can also identify which of these lead to the
greatest benefits when resolved, allowing e↵ective targeting of monitoring and further
analyses.
The second abstract method of modelling the resolution of uncertainty provides a
convenient way to observe the e↵ects of having ‘more’ or ‘less’ information. However,
its detachment from the state of the epidemic itself makes it unreliable in accurately
optimising control and monitoring and hence unsuitable for providing important
insights. Whilst it is able to highlight the fact that a certain level of monitoring is
required before an initial decision not to vaccinate becomes optimal over vaccinating
immediately, the exact ‘amount’ required is not defined in real terms. Furthermore,
whether or not it is feasible to collect this amount from the outbreak is not considered.
Ignoring factors such as the di culty of gathering accurate real-time information
early on in an outbreak leads to underestimating the optimal delay between initial
and final decisions, which ultimately leads to inflated outbreak costs. Finally, since
this method does not involve a mechanistic model of the monitoring process, it does
not allow for the optimisation of monitoring itself.
The final, mechanistic method of modelling uncertainty resolution, used in con-
junction with the active AM framework, has proven to be an extremely useful tool in
this scenario for making optimal initial decisions and also informing improved control
and monitoring plans. By explicitly modelling the monitoring process and relating
the information gained to the uncertainty in parameters directly, we can specify, in
real terms, the amount of information required to properly inform decisions. We
are also able to determine the optimal timing of monitoring, recognising the fact
that monitoring resources may be relatively ine↵ective at the start of an outbreak
compared to later. Although this method may involve computationally intensive,
mathematically complex algorithms, it leads to significant reductions in the expected
cost of the outbreak.
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Using active AM and the mechanistic method of uncertainty resolution, we could
make the following observations and recommendations to decision makers for the
scenario we have used in this chapter: first, the amount of monitoring performed
throughout the outbreak will have a significant e↵ect on the expected cost of the
epidemic, allowing reductions of up to 8% compared to relying on prior information
alone. If we are able to test at least 4000 individuals in the population for the disease
(across 4 samples) in the three weeks after disease detection, we would recommend
not vaccinating until this monitoring has been performed. If any infections are
detected within these samples, a vaccination campaign should be employed.
Whilst a minimum monitoring e↵ort of 4000 individuals is necessary, the rela-
tionship between the amount of resources assigned to monitoring and the benefit
obtained follows the law of diminishing returns. As such, it is necessary to estimate
the cost of monitoring as accurately as possible, in order to avoid wasting resources
on too much monitoring when they could be better used elsewhere. If the cost
of monitoring is estimated to be very high, for example more than twice the cost
of a vaccination, it would be better to forego monitoring and begin vaccinating
immediately. However, if the monitoring cost is equal to the cost of vaccination, we
recommend testing up to 16000 individuals in the population for the disease (across
at least 4 samples). This capacity increases as the cost of monitoring falls.
If it is decided that we will not vaccinate immediately, but instead allow three
weeks to monitor the epidemic before making a final decision, we can make several
recommendations to maximise the benefit obtained. The monitoring resources should
be split between at least four samples. Fewer, large samples are preferred to many,
small samples, however, this will likely be restricted by the time taken to test a
large number of individuals. If the final decision time is fixed at three weeks after
detection, we would recommend taking all samples as close to the final decision as
possible and allocating the majority of resources to the final sample. However, if it
is plausible to have the final decision earlier, the samples should be taken earlier,
though how much earlier depends on the size of the samples, with larger samples
allowing for an earlier final decision.
If it is possible to start a vaccination campaign on any day in the three week
monitoring period, we would recommend starting vaccination immediately after any
sample that contains an infected individual and continuing until the vaccine pool
is depleted. To obtain the most benefit from such an approach, samples should
be spread out through the three week period, with the first occurring as early as
possible and the last as late as possible, with the majority of resources allocated to
the first and last samples. If it is acceptable to delay the final decision by more than
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three weeks, we would recommend doing so, up to approximately two months, whilst
keeping the first and last samples as early and late as possible, with other samples
spread out between. In such a scenario, monitoring resources should be allocated
equally to all samples.
As an example of the possible benefits, if we sample 8000 individuals in total across
4 samples on days {0, 12, 20, 60} after the disease is detected and begin vaccination
immediately if any infections are found (otherwise not vaccinating), we could reduce
the expected cost of the outbreak by over 7% compared to taking a non-AM or
passive AM approach. The recommended monitoring plan results in an almost 5%
lower expected cost compared to taking 4 samples equally spaced in the three weeks
after detection.
The analysis performed in this chapter highlights an important di↵erence between
active AM and experimentation. Although the control parameters themselves (e.g.
vaccine e cacy) are assumed to be known, the overall e↵ect of implementing that
control is not, since it depends on the uncertain epidemiology of the disease. As such,
even without experimentation, an active AM approach to management is highly
important, since the resolution of uncertainty, whilst detached from the control
itself, greatly a↵ects the optimality of initial decisions. With active AM, we are able
to recognise that some initial decisions enable us to make better use of real-time
information in the future than others, which, as shown, results in better management.
To avoid monotony, we have not included sensitivity on the fixed parameters we
used throughout this chapter. However, doing so reveals very similar results to the
sensitivity performed in the previous chapter: the relative costs of vaccines (fixed
and per vaccine) and infections can render the decision trivial, if one contributes
significantly more to the overall cost than the other. Similarly, if the vaccination
campaign is su ciently large or small such that the uncertainty in epidemilogical
parameters has little e↵ect, or if the time to and probability of immunity from a
vaccine is too low, initial decisions become trivial. Finally,if the R0 of the disease is
su ciently high, vaccination becomes the obvious choice.
It is likely that many of the fixed parameters will also be unknown. We have
shown in this chapter that including more uncertainties can strengthen the utility
of active AM over passive or non-AM approaches. However, this assumes that the
additional uncertainties can also be resolved to some extent through monitoring. In
the next chapter, we give an example of how an additional uncertainty, without the
possibility of resolving it, can diminish the benefits of resolving uncertainty in other
parameters. However, as previously mentioned, it is necessary to adopt an active AM
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approach even if it is to simply determine that monitoring and uncertainty resolution
will not be beneficial.
Alongside the use of fixed, non-specific parameters, there are other limitations
of this work that arise from using a highly simplified scenario. For example, we
assumed the existence of an immediate, perfectly accurate test for the infection,
used for monitoring the prevalence of the disease. In reality, such tests would not
be perfect, possibly resulting in both false positives and negatives. Hence, to more
accurately model the resolution of uncertainty, the sensitivity and specificity of such
tests should be taken into account. Furthermore, the time taken to obtain a result
from the test should also be incorporated.
Finally, we again assume that the disease follows a deterministic system of ODEs
(Equation 4.1) with fixed parameters. In reality, the dynamics of the disease may
be significantly more stochastic in nature, including the values of parameters such
as transmission. Since our objective centred around the expected cost, as opposed
to worst-case scenarios or time to elimination, we believe that the addition of such
stochasticity would not have a large e↵ect on the ranks of competing control measures.
However, it could significantly impede our ability to resolve uncertainty, slowing the
rate and restricting the total amount of uncertainty resolution. Thus, stochasticity
would play an important role in the optimisation of control and monitoring. Models
that capture stochasticity accurately are highly dependent on the context and require
significant resources in both formulation and computation. Once a model has
been developed, it can be incorporated into the AM framework in order to provide
insights similar to those we have demonstrated in this chapter. However, a stochastic
model requires many repeated runs, increasing the computational resources required
significantly. Since the computational complexity of AM is already a barrier to its
implementation, the benefits of including stochasticity would need to be carefully
weighed against the approximations required elsewhere in the model, such as a
discretised state space, limited control options and only few opportunities to adapt
control.
In spite of these limitations, we believe the analysis in this chapter provides
an important and relevant contribution to literature. The use of VoI measures
such as the EVPI have been demonstrated to be beneficial in the management of
epidemics [11, 126]. However, this work o↵ers a valuable extension, clarifying the
limitations of assumptions of perfect information and providing a mechanism to
improve on such methods. We have also exhibited the ability to identify important
uncertainties, those that, when resolved, provide the most significant improvements
in management, using active AM, an area of increasing focus [10, 124, 126]. Finally,
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we have shown how active AM can contribute to the e↵ective planning and allocation
of monitoring resources, an area that has been identified as extremely important for
the management of epidemics [7, 15, 27].
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Chapter 5
Risky behaviour and risk-averse
management
Abstract
We introduce a more complex, Ebola-like disease model, and analyse the use of mass
vaccination in the presence of ‘risky behaviour’: individuals that are vaccinated but
do not gain immunity are less likely to seek healthcare if they develop symptoms
than those that have not been vaccinated, thus making them more likely to spread
the disease to others and die. We show that such behaviour can greatly reduce the
e↵ectiveness of a mass vaccination campaign in controlling the outbreak and, in ex-
treme cases, cause an increase in the number of infections and deaths. We investigate
the use of active AM to provide recommendations regarding the implementation of
a mass vaccination campaign when both the vaccine e cacy and epidemiological
parameters determining disease spread are unknown. We introduce mechanistic
models to anticipate the resolution of uncertainty in these parameters and show
how active AM can be used to find time- and state-dependent thresholds for the
implementation of mass vaccination, restricting the probability of an undesirable
outcome below a specified level.
5.1 Introduction
So far, we have focused on relatively simple scenarios in order to analyse in detail some
of the elements of an AM approach to managing an epidemic. We have motivated the
use of active AM in conjunction with mechanistic models of uncertainty resolution. In
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this chapter we use these techniques in a more realistic setting and demonstrate our
ability to extract useful and understandable information in the face of uncertainty.
We define a new model for resolving uncertainty in vaccine e cacy, based on a
similar model for Ebola [144]. We stress here that, whilst this model is based on
Ebola dynamics and control, we analyse it in a simplified, hypothetical scenario.
Thus, we are not making recommendations regarding the control of Ebola outbreaks
in the future, or assessing the control of previous outbreaks. The model incorporates
the use of both a mass vaccination campaign and the establishment of healthcare
centres as possible forms of control. We introduce the idea of ‘risky behaviour’, by
assuming that people who are vaccinated are less likely seek healthcare if they present
with disease symptoms than those who are not vaccinated [145]. We show that this
can cause unexpected, and undesirable, outcomes from a mass vaccination campaign
if vaccine e cacy is low, increasing the number of deaths in extreme cases. We
incorporate multiple sources of uncertainty in both the control and epidemiological
parameters.
We propose a more realistic management objective that relates to the risk-averse
nature of decision makers. The primary objective of control is to minimise the total
number of deaths caused by the outbreak. However, in contrast to previous chapters,
we do not simply wish to minimise the expected number of deaths. Rather, given the
possibility of increasing the number of deaths through a mass vaccination campaign,
we require that the probability of increasing the total number of deaths remains below
a specified value, ✏. In order to do so, we use active AM to identify vaccine e cacy
‘thresholds’. If an estimate of e cacy is above the required threshold, this triggers
the implementation of a mass vaccination campaign. We show that active AM can
be used to identify: static thresholds at a fixed point in time, dynamic thresholds
that change with time and finally dynamic thresholds that depend on both time and
the state of the epidemic. This requires the formulation of mechanistic models of
uncertainty resolution, for both the vaccine e cacy and unknown epidemiological
parameters.
Finally, throughout this chapter we demonstrate how multiple uncertainties
can interact with each other, specifically the uncertainty in vaccine e cacy and
transmission rate. We observe that, in extreme cases, the existence of a large amount
of uncertainty in the transmission rate can render resolution of uncertainty in vaccine
e cacy redundant. Even if the uncertainty in the transmission rate is not so great, it
can significantly alter the amount of time required to su ciently reduce uncertainty in
the vaccine e cacy, a↵ecting control and monitoring recommendations. Furthermore,
if we also plan to resolve uncertainty in the transmission rate through monitoring,
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the resolution of uncertainty in vaccine e cacy is a↵ected by measurements of the
transmission rate, even if the real-time information regarding vaccine e cacy remains
the same. This highlights the necessity to understand and model the resolution of
uncertainty in both parameters together in order to optimise monitoring and control.
5.2 An Ebola-like disease model
5.2.1 Model specification
We introduce a model that combines a simple, deterministic SEIR model of Ebola
transmission (adapted from [144]) with two forms of control: the establishment of a
specialised healthcare centre for infected individuals (such as an Ebola Treatment
Centre [144]) and a mass vaccination campaign. We assume that the healthcare
centre is established immediately after the disease is detected in the population,
occurring once the outbreak reaches a certain level. A proportion of individuals
who develop symptoms will seek healthcare (with healthcare-seeking probability h),
whilst the remainder will not. If healthcare is sought, the individual remains in
the community before being admitted to the healthcare centre (at rate ), where
they are isolated from the community, preventing onwards transmission, and treated,
reducing the probability of dying from the disease. In the healthcare centre, they
either recover, or die (with probability cH) at rate  , after which they are no longer
infectious. If healthcare is not sought, the individual remains in the community,
transmitting the disease to others, until they recover, or die (with probability c   cH),
at the same rate  . After death, they remain infectious (possibly with increased
infectiousness, !) to the community until they have been buried (buried at rate ↵).
A mass vaccination campaign may also be implemented, however if and when
remain part of the decision to be made. If it is decided to implement a mass
vaccination campaign, individuals are vaccinated at a rate of ⌫r per day, until the
vaccine pool (⌫pool) is depleted. We assume imperfect targeting of the vaccine,
delivered proportionally to both susceptible (S) and exposed (E) individuals. If an
exposed individual is vaccinated, we assume it is completely ine↵ective and they
remain in the incubation phase (VE). If a susceptible individual is vaccinated, it will
be e↵ective with probability ve (V1). This leads to full, indefinite immunity, after a
delay ⌫d. Else, the vaccine is ine↵ective and the individual remains fully susceptible
(V0), however will not be considered for vaccination again. Finally, if an individual is
vaccinated but develops symptoms, they will seek healthcare with probability hv,
possibly lower compared to the probability h for unvaccinated individuals. This
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constitutes the ‘risky’ behaviour of vaccinated individuals.
The di↵erential equations for the system are stated in Equation 5.1 and a schematic
of the system can be found in Figure 5.1. The time dependence of state values has
been excluded for brevity.
dS
dt
=
  S
N
(IH + IC + !DC)  ⌫r
✓
S
S + E
◆
dE
dt
=
 S
N
(IH + IC + !DC)   E   ⌫r
✓
E
S + E
◆
dIH
dt
=  (hE + hvVE)  (+  )IH
dH
dt
= IH    H
dDH
dt
=  (cHH + cIH)
dIC
dt
=  ((1  h)E + (1  hv)VE)   IC
dDC
dt
=  cIC   ↵DC
dBC
dt
= ↵DC
dR
dt
=  
✓
(1  cH)H + (1  c)IH + (1  c)IC + V1
⌫d
◆
dV0
dt
= (1  ⌫e)⌫r
✓
S
S + E
◆
   V0
N
(IH + IC + !DC)
dV1
dt
= ⌫e⌫r
✓
S
S + E
◆
   V1
N
(IH + IC + !DC)  V1
⌫d
dVE
dt
= ⌫r
✓
E
S + E
◆
+
 (V0 + V1)
N
(IH + IC + !DC)   VE
(5.1)
We define a vaccination campaign in the same way as in the previous chapters:
Vti,tj representing a campaign that starts on day ti and ends on day tj . If ti  t  tj ,
the campaign is ongoing and
⌫r(t) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
⌫r, if S(t) + E(t)   ⌫r,
S(t) + E(t), if 0  S(t) + E(t) < ⌫r,
⌫pool  
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds, if ⌫pool  
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds < ⌫r,
0, if
R t
ti
⌫r(s)ds > ⌫pool.
(5.2)
If t < ti or t > tj , the campaign is not currently ongoing and ⌫r(t) = 0. If no
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vaccination occurs throughout the epidemic, we denote this by V0,0.
We assume that the outbreak occurs in a population of 500,000 individuals, starting
with a single infected individual and is detected (t = t0) once a total of 5 individuals
have become symptomatic. The outbreak ends once the number of exposed (both
vaccinated and unvaccinated) and infectious individuals (within the community and
healthcare centres) together falls below 1 (E(t)+VE(t)+ IH(t)+ IC(t)+DC(t) < 1),
denoted tend.
5.2.2 Model behaviour
We explore the behaviour of this model for a range of di↵erent epidemiological and
control parameters, before applying it within the AM framework. We focus on how
these parameters a↵ect the total number of deaths and infections caused by the
disease outbreak. Parameters are varied unilaterally, with all other parameters fixed
at their default values, given in Table 5.1.
Epidemiological parameters
Unsurprisingly, the epidemiological parameters have a significant e↵ect on the
outcome of the epidemic, due to their e↵ect on R0 (Figure 5.2). The R0 of the
epidemic without vaccination is estimated using Equation 5.3, adapted from [144]:
R0 = h
✓
 
  + 
◆
+ (1  h)
✓
 
 
+ c
! 
↵
◆
. (5.3)
The first term in the sum represents the R0 of individuals who seek healthcare and
the second term those who do not.
Intuitively, an increase in the transmission rate   and length of infectious period
1/  will lead to an increased R0 and thus increased infections and deaths and a
faster epidemic (Figure 5.2). We also see that an increased case fatality ratio in the
community, c, causes an increase in both the total number of deaths and infections,
since individuals remain infectious between death and burial, rather than becoming
immediately immune in the case of recovery. Similarly, an increase in the delay
between death and burial 1/↵ or the relative increase in post-mortem transmission,
!, will also increase the total number of deaths and infections.
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Figure 5.1: Model of system behaviour. We use a modified non-spatial, ho-
mogeneously mixing, deterministic Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR)
model with vaccination and the establishment of healthcare centres as controls. The
transmission ( ), incubation ( ) and recovery ( ) rates are constant throughout the
epidemic. A proportion of individuals who develop symptoms will seek healthcare
(h and hv for unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals respectively; move to IH).
If healthcare is sought, individuals are admitted to a healthcare centre at rate 
(move to H), where they are isolated from the community and treated. In the
healthcare centre, they either recover (R), or die (with probability cH ; DH) at rate  ,
after which they are no longer infectious. If healthcare is not sought, the individual
remains in the community until they recover (R) or die (with probability c; DC).
After death, they remain infectious (possibly with increased infectiousness, !) until
they have been buried at rate ↵ (BC). If vaccination campaign is active, individuals
are vaccinated at a rate of ⌫r per day, until the vaccine pool (⌫pool) is depleted.
We assume imperfect targeting of the vaccine, delivered proportionally to both
susceptible (S) and exposed (E) individuals. If an exposed individual is vaccinated,
we assume it is completely ine↵ective and they remain in the incubation phase (VE).
If a susceptible individual is vaccinated, it will be e↵ective with probability ve (V1).
This leads to full, indefinite immunity (R), after a delay ⌫d. Else, the vaccine is
ine↵ective and the individual remains fully susceptible (V0), however will not be
considered for vaccination again.
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Table 5.1: Summary of parameters and notation used. Default values apply
throughout the chapter unless otherwise stated. Values left blank depend on the
vaccination campaign and are calculated as required during the optimisation process.
Where applicable, references for parameters are given in Ref. column. Parameters
marked * have been chosen to give a realistic R0 value [144] whilst allowing for
non-trivial e↵ects from a mass vaccination campaign.
Not. Description Value Ref.
  Transmission rate of disease 0.4 *
  Incubation rate of disease 1/9.4 [144]
  Removal rate from disease 1/7.8 [144]
 Hospital admission rate 1/2 [144]
↵ Burial rate 1/7 [144]
h Healthcare seeking rate 75% *
hv Healthcare seeking rate if vaccinated 15% *
c Case fatality rate in community 70% [146]
cH Case fatality rate in healthcare centre 35% [146]
! Relative increase in transmission following death 1.5 *
⌫r Daily vaccination rate (number of individuals) 1000 [33, 147]
⌫e Vaccine e cacy - -
⌫pool Total number of vaccines available 300000 [148]
⌫d Delay between vaccination and immunity (days) 7 [147]
t0 Detection and initial decision point (days after initial
infection). Assumed to be the point at which a total
of 5 individuals have become symptomatic
- -
t⇤ Final decision point (days after detection) Various -
tend Day on which outbreak ends (duration of the outbreak) - -
Vti,tj Denotes a vaccination campaign that starts on day ti
and ends on day tj . We require t0  ti  tj  tend
- -
✏ Maximum allowable probability of increasing the num-
ber of deaths through vaccination
Various -
N Total population size 500000 -
R0 Basic reproductive number of the outbreak, without
vaccination, calculated via Equation 5.3
2 [36]
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Figure 5.2: Sensitivity to epidemiological parameters. We vary the epidemi-
ological parameters in the model, one at a time keeping other parameters fixed at
their default values in Table 5.1. We do not include a mass vaccination campaign.
We record the total number of infections and deaths (red and black; 1st column), the
R0 (blue; 2nd column) and resulting epidemic curves (multi-coloured; 3rd column).
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivity to healthcare parameters. We vary the parameters in
the model relating to the healthcare centres, one at a time keeping other parameters
fixed at their default values in Table 5.1. We do not include a mass vaccination
campaign. We record the total number of infections and deaths (red and black; 1st
column), the R0 (blue; 2nd column) and resulting epidemic curves (multi-coloured;
3rd column).
Healthcare-seeking parameters
The healthcare-seeking probability h is also a primary component in the R0 of the
epidemic (Equation 5.3). Infected individuals that are admitted into healthcare
centres can no longer infect others, and are guaranteed to have a safe burial. Thus,
an increase in the healthcare-seeking probability will decrease the R0 and the total
number of infections and deaths (Figure 5.3). The time taken to be admitted into
a healthcare centre after developing symptoms, 1/, reduces the e↵ectiveness of
the centres to reduce infections. Hence, a longer delay leads to a higher R0, more
infections and more deaths. Finally, whilst the case fatality ratio cH for individuals
within healthcare centres does not a↵ect the R0 (since such individuals will not
contribute to post-mortem transmission), a higher case fatality ratio will of course
lead to more deaths, although the number of infections remains the same.
122
200 400 600 800 1000
Vaccination rate ( r)
200
400
Total infections Total deaths
500 1000
1.5
2.0
2.5
R0 (no vaccination)
0 100 200
t
0
50
Low High
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Vaccine pool ( pool)
200
400
0 200000 400000
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 100 200
t
0
50
0 10 20 30 40 50
Delay to immunity ( d)
200
400
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(0
00
s)
0 20 40
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 100 200
t
0
50
C
urrently
infectious
(000s)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Vaccine e cacy ( e)
200
400
0.0 0.5 1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 100 200
t
0
50
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Relative decrease in healthcare-seeking probability (1   hhv )
200
400
0.0 0.5 1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 100 200
t
0
50
Figure 5.4: Sensitivity to vaccination parameters. We vary the parameters in
the model relating to a mass vaccination campaign, one at a time keeping other
parameters fixed at their default values in Table 5.1. We record the total number of
infections and deaths (red and black; 1st column), the R0 (blue; 2nd column) and
resulting epidemic curves (multi-coloured; 3rd column).
Vaccination parameters
Finally, the e↵ect of implementing a mass vaccination campaign depends heavily
on the vaccination parameters (Figure 5.4). The larger and faster the campaign,
the more e↵ect it will have (both positive or negative - next section). A higher
e cacy leads to fewer deaths and infections, however a lower healthcare seeking rate
in vaccinated individuals can negate this if the vaccine is not 100% e↵ective.
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Figure 5.5: Outcome of a mass vaccination campaign. We record the total
infections (red) and deaths (black) from the outbreak for a range of vaccine e cacy
values, with (solid) and without (dashed) the implementaion of a mass vaccination
campaign. Parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1. The mass
vaccination campaign is implemented on the day the disease is detected.
5.2.3 E↵ectiveness of mass vaccination
We saw in Figure 5.4 that the value of vaccine e cacy ⌫e has a significant impact
on the total number of infections and deaths caused by the disease. In fact, if
the e cacy of the vaccine is low, we find that implementing a mass vaccination
campaign can lead to an increased number of infections and deaths compared to not
implementing the campaign (Figure 5.5). A low vaccine e cacy leads to an increased
number of individuals who are vaccinated but become infected with the disease,
resulting in more infections in the community due to a lower healthcare-seeking
probability for such individuals. This is exacerbated by a higher case fatality ratio
in the community compared to within healthcare centres and increased post-mortem
transmission due to unsafe burials. In this example (Figure 5.5), if the vaccine is
less than approximately 55% e↵ective, a mass vaccination campaign will result in
an increased number of deaths from the outbreak. The worst case scenario, if the
vaccine is 0% e↵ective, would be an almost 50% increase in the number of deaths.
However, if the vaccine is highly e↵ective, it could also reduce the number of deaths
by up to 60%.
The possible negative e↵ect of a mass vaccination campaign with low vaccine
e cacy will depend on the other model parameters, especially the transmission and
recovery rates (  and  ; Figure 5.6), the rate of healthcare-seeking in unvaccinated
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Figure 5.6: E↵ect of epidemiological parameters on outcome of mass vac-
cination campaign. We record the total number of deaths from the outbreak, for
a range of   and   values, assuming no vaccination (left) and the worst case scenario
under a mass vaccination campaign (centre). The di↵erence between the two is also
shown (right). We highlight parameter values for which R0 = 1 (dashed) and R0 = 2
(dotted). All other parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
The mass vaccination campaign is implemented on the day the disease is detected.
and vaccinated individuals (h and hv; Figure 5.7) and the speed, timing and size of
the vaccination campaign (⌫r, t⇤ and ⌫pool).
We find that the worst case scenario, from an ine↵ective vaccine, is most pro-
nounced when 1 < R0 < 2, as within this range the vaccination campaign has the
most e↵ect on the transmission of the disease. Below this range, the disease quickly
dies out with or without vaccination. As the R0 increases above this range, the
spread of the disease becomes so rapid that the vaccination campaign has relatively
less e↵ect, both in the best and worst case, due to the relatively slow roll out of
the campaign (1000 per day) and delay to immunity. Whilst the transmission and
recovery rates are major drivers of R0 (Equation 5.3), other parameters in the
model such as healthcare centre admission rate (), burial rate (↵), post-mortem
transmission (!) and case fatality ratios (c and cH) can also have a significant e↵ect.
As the healthcare seeking rate for both unvaccinated (h) and vaccinated (hv)
individuals falls, the number of infections and deaths will increase (Figures 5.3
and 5.4). However, it is most detrimental to the outcome of a vaccination campaign
if the healthcare seeking rate is high in unvaccinated individuals and low in vaccinated
individuals (Figure 5.7). If the unvaccinated rate is low, the reduction caused by
vaccination does not have a large e↵ect on the total number of deaths. The sharp
change in behaviour for h ⇡ 0.9 is caused by the e↵ect of h on the R0 of the
epidemic (Equation 5.3), lowering it to below 1 without vaccination. However, the
implementation of an ine↵ective vaccination campaign, with a significantly lowered
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Figure 5.7: E↵ect of healthcare-seeking behaviour on outcome of mass
vaccination campaign. We record the total number of deaths from the outbreak,
for a range of h and hv (represented as the relative reduction in healthcare-seeking:
1  h/hv) values, assuming no vaccination (left) and the worst case scenario under a
mass vaccination campaign (centre). The di↵erence between the two is also shown
(right). All other parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1. The
mass vaccination campaign is implemented on the day the disease is detected.
healthcare-seeking probability for vaccinated individuals, will reduce the proportion
of infectious people seeking healthcare and thus raise the R0 back above 1, causing a
significant contrast in the outcome of the epidemic with and without vaccination.
Finally, the campaign itself has a significant, but intuitive, e↵ect. The larger and
faster the campaign (higher values of ⌫pool and ⌫r respectively), the more extreme
the worst case scenario. Of course, the possible benefits of mass vaccination are also
maximised, so there is greater disparity between the two. The later the start day
of the campaign (t⇤), the less e↵ect the campaign has on the outcome. Hence, the
worst case scenario is less extreme, but the benefits will also be less.
5.3 Estimating vaccine e cacy
We showed in the previous section that implementing a mass vaccination campaign
can increase the total number of deaths from the outbreak, if vaccine e cacy is
low and vaccinated individuals are less inclined to seek healthcare once symptoms
develop. Part of our management objective is to keep the probability of this occuring
below a specified value ✏. Unless we have strong prior information regarding the
e cacy of the vaccine, this may not be possible at the start of the outbreak. As such,
under a non-AM approach to managing the outbreak, the use of a mass vaccination
campaign would not be recommended. However, in this section, we introduce a
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model for resolving uncertainty in the vaccine e cacy via a vaccine trial, performed
on a small, isolated subset of the population during the early stages of the outbreak.
Using the AM framework, we can optimise the vaccine trial and provide state- and
time-dependent recommendations for the implementation of a mass vaccination
campaign in the future, based on the estimate(s) of vaccine e cacy obtained from
the trial.
5.3.1 Vaccine trial model
We assume that uncertainty in vaccine e cacy is resolved via a randomised controlled
vaccine trial [149]. We model this using a simplified version of the disease model:
disease dynamics follow an SEIR model with the same  ,   and   parameters. We
remove healthcare-seeking behaviour on the assumption that all individuals in the
trial will be closely monitored and provided with healthcare if necessary [149]. We
assume an isolated subsection of the population for the trial, in which disease levels
are representative of the main population. From the trial population, 50% are
immediately recruited into the vaccination group and 50% into the control group,
although initial symptomatic infections are removed. Since individuals may already
be exposed but asymptotic at the start of the trial, we do not include infections
that occur within the first time period of incubation, in both control and vaccinated
groups, in the estimates of e cacy.
An estimate of vaccine e cacy at time t is obtained by [145, 150]:
⌫ˆe(t) = 1  rv(t)
rc(t)
, where rv(t) =
cases in vaccinated group at t
total number vaccinated at t
rc(t) =
cases in control group at t
total number of control at t
.
(5.4)
In order to introduce uncertainty into these estimates, we simulate the vaccine
trial model using the Gillespie algorithm. By doing so, we can obtain an empirical
distribution of estimates we would expect to obtain from a trial, conditioned on the
true value of vaccine e cacy and other epidemiological parameters: f(⌫ˆe | ⌫e, , ,  ).
We expect this distribution to converge on the true value of vaccine e cacy at later
stages in the trial (Figure 5.8). We explore the accuracy of estimates in more detail
in the next section.
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Figure 5.8: Vaccine e cacy estimates from a vaccine trial. We simulate the
vaccine trial model 1000 times and calculate the estimate of vaccine e cacy each
day for 150 days. Heatmaps show the density of estimates over time, for 3 true
values of vaccine e cacy 20%, 50% and 80%. In each plot, histograms highlight the
distribution of estimates at 3 points in time: t = 50, 90, 130 (days after detection).
The trial is performed on a population of 2000 people. All other parameters are set
to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.9: Distributions of vaccine e cacy estimates. We simulate the vaccine
trial 100 times for a range of true vaccine e cacies, trial sizes,   and   values. We
present the distribution of vaccine estimates obtained on day 100 of each trial.
Parameters are varied one at a time, with other parameters set to their default
values, given in Table 5.1. The default vaccine e cacy is 50% and trial size 2000.
Black crosses mark the true value of e cacy.
5.3.2 Behaviour of estimates
The distribution of estimates of vaccine e cacy (f(⌫ˆe | ⌫e, , ,  )) that we obtain
from a vaccine trial are highly dependent on a number of factors, including the true
value of e cacy, the length and size of the trial and the value of epidemiological
parameters (Figure 5.9).
First, whether or not the mode of the distribution is centred around the correct
value depends on the true value of e cacy (Figure 5.9; top row). As the true
value of e cacy increases, the results from the vaccine trial begin to significantly
underestimate the e cacy, due to the imperfect targeting of vaccines (that is, vac-
cinating already exposed individuals) and the lag between vaccination and immunity.
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At lower levels of true e cacy, where the number of infections in both vaccinated
and control groups is large, this will have little e↵ect on the overall distribution of
estimates. However, when the true e cacy is high, we expect very few infections in
the vaccinated group and hence the e↵ect is much greater. Whilst it is important
to understand such sources of error, this will not impede our ability to use these
estimates for posterior predictions of e cacy and control outcomes.
The timing and size of the trial also have a clear e↵ect on the distribution
of estimates. As the size (Figure 5.9; second row) or length (Figure 5.8) of the
trial increases, the variance of the distribution decreases significantly. Note these
parameters also interact with each other: a larger sample will resolve uncertainty
faster than a smaller sample.
Finally, the epidemiological parameters a↵ect the distribution of estimates through
the R0 of the epidemic (Figure 5.9; rows 3 and 4). As the R0 increases, through an
increased transmission rate ( ) or infection length (1/ ), the disease will be more
prominent in the trial populations and thus estimates will generally exhibit less
variation. However, note that at high values of  , estimates will be more a↵ected by
the treatment of early infections mentioned previously. Hence, the distribution of
estimates may become more skewed and begin to exhibit more variation.
5.3.3 Identifying threshold estimates
We first focus on our ability to inform management decisions based on the results of
the vaccine trial, assuming that the transmission rate   is known. This allows us to
clearly portray the mechanics behind the decision process, and how factors such as
the length of the trial and the acceptable probability of increasing deaths (✏) a↵ect
the results.
True thresholds, estimated thresholds and opportunity cost
The minimum value of vaccine e cacy required to reduce the total number of deaths
through a mass vaccination campaign, given all other parameter values, can be found
using Equations 5.1. We name this value the true threshold. In order to recommend
a mass vaccination campaign, we must be (1  ✏)% confident that the vaccine e cacy
is above this value. The true threshold is highly dependent on the model parameters:
in general, a lower R0 or weaker vaccination campaign (slower or smaller) will result
in a higher true threshold.
Given an estimate of e cacy ⌫ˆe, we can obtain a posterior distribution for the
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Figure 5.10: Example outcome of decision process. Left: the total number of
deaths from no vaccination (black dashed) and a delayed, mass vaccination campaign
(brown solid) for a range of true vaccine e cacy values. The blue dotted line shows
the expected number of deaths under our active AM decision process, with ✏ = 0.05
and t⇤ = 50. Right: the probability of increasing the total number of deaths through
a mass vaccination campaign, for a range of vaccine e cacy estimates (solid blue
line). Dotted green and red lines show the true and estimated thresholds respectively.
Other parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
true e cacy ⌫e using Bayes Theorem:
f(⌫e | ⌫ˆe) = f(⌫ˆe | ⌫e)⇡(⌫e)R
⌫e
f(⌫ˆe | ⌫e)⇡(⌫e)d⌫e , (5.5)
with prior ⇡(⌫e) and likelihood f(⌫ˆe | ⌫e). We approximate the likelihood by
simulating an empirical distribution for ⌫ˆe, using many observations of the vaccine
trial process described previously and a discretized range of estimates. The integral
in the denominator is approximated using Monte Carlo methods.
Using the posterior distribution for the true vaccine e cacy, f(⌫e | ⌫ˆe), we are
able to calculate the probability of a mass vaccination campaign increasing the
total number of deaths as the proportion of the posterior distribution that is below
the true threshold (the minimum e cacy required to decrease the total number of
deaths through vaccination). We can then choose a threshold for the estimated
e cacy, such that the probability of increasing the number of deaths is less than a
chosen value ✏ (Figure 5.10; right-hand plot). We call this the estimated threshold.
The estimated threshold will clearly be higher than the true threshold, given the
remaining uncertainty in the posterior distribution. If we increase the size or length
of the vaccine trial, we obtain thinner posteriors and hence the etimated threshold
will decrease towards the true threshold.
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By only implementing a mass vaccination campaign if the estimate of e cacy
gained from the vaccine trial exceeds the estimated threshold, we guarantee that
the probability of implementing an ine↵ective campaign, ultimately increasing the
number of deaths, remains below ✏. This means that, if the vaccine e cacy is below
the true threshold, we will almost always make the correct decision not to implement
a vaccination campaign (Figure 5.10; left-hand plot - dotted blue line agrees with
dashed black line for low vaccine e cacy). However, on the other hand, if vaccine
e cacy is above the true threshold, there is a significant chance of not vaccinating
when it would in fact be optimal . This is most probable for values of e cacy that lie
between the true and estimated thresholds, for which the estimate from the vaccine
trial is likely to be lower than the estimated threshold, thus leading to a conclusion
not to vaccinate (Figure 5.10; left-hand plot - dotted blue line disagrees with brown
line for 0.55 < ⌫e < 0.7). This may result in missing out on the opportunity to
drastically reduce the number of deaths through an e↵ective vaccination campaign.
We refer to this as the opportunity cost. Throughout the remainder of this section,
we focus on providing estimated thresholds to keep the probability of increasing
deaths below ✏, whilst also providing guidance on how to minimise the opportunity
cost of not vaccinating, thus satisfying both aspects of the management objective.
Predetermined trial length
First, we assume that a single estimate of e cacy will be obtained from the vaccine
trial, on a predetermined day in the future (t⇤). However, determining t⇤, the
length of the vaccine trial, is part of our analysis and can be used to minimise the
opportunity cost associated with the decision.
The maximum probability of increasing deaths allowed by decision makers, ✏, will
dictate if and when we should implement a mass vaccination campaign (Figure 5.11).
The lower we require this probability to be, the more cautious we must be in
implementing a campaign. As such, the threshold for the estimate of vaccine e cacy,
above which we will vaccinate and below we will not, will increase as we decrease
this probability. This has more of an e↵ect for short vaccine trials, for which the
estimates of e cacy are significantly less precise. Having a lower ✏ will also lead to a
higher overall expected number of deaths, due to an increased opportunity cost of
not vaccinating when a campaign is in fact e↵ective. Again, this has a significantly
greater e↵ect for short vaccine trials compared to long.
The length of the vaccine trial itself plays a large part in determining the estimated
threshold. Since longer trials provide more precise posterior estimates of vaccine
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Figure 5.11: E↵ect of vaccine trial length and ✏ on outcome and thresholds.
We calculate the expected number of deaths (left) and true and estimated vaccine
e cacy thresholds (right; dotted and solid respectively) for a range of vaccine trial
lengths (x-axis) and values of ✏ (colours). In the left-hand plot, the dotted line
shows the expected number of deaths achievable with perfect information. Other
parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
e cacy, the estimated threshold will decrease towards the true threshold as the trial
length increases and the expected number of deaths overall approaches what we
would achieve with perfect information (Figure 5.11). Therefore, a longer trial will
also decrease the opportunity cost. However, note that the true threshold e cacy
also changes as we increase the length of the trial. Hence, if the vaccine trial is too
long, the estimate of e cacy required to implement a campaign will begin to increase
again. This is because a campaign that is implemented later in the outbreak requires
a higher e cacy to reduce the number of deaths. Furthermore, such a campaign
will have less of an impact on the outcome of the epidemic. As a result, there is a
conflict between giving ourselves time to resolve uncertainty and not waiting too
long to implement a campaign. If the vaccine trial is very short, the high variance
of the posterior for vaccine e cacy demands a very high estimate to implement a
campaign, therefore we will likely miss out on the opportunity to reduce the number
of deaths with an e↵ective campaign, even if vaccine e cacy is reasonably high.
However, if the trial is too long, whilst the posterior for vaccine e cacy will be very
precise, we will have missed out on the chance to implement an e↵ective campaign
earlier. Hence, there is an optimal vaccine trial length. The optimal length also
depends on ✏: if ✏ is very low, we require a longer trial than for larger ✏, since we
need more precise estimates to allow a vaccination campaign to be implemented. In
the example shown in Figure 5.11, the optimal trial length ranges from 35 days for
✏ = 10% to 55 days for ✏ = 0.5%.
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The vaccine trial size has a similar e↵ect to the length of the trial: a larger trial
provides more precise estimates of vaccine e cacy, hence the estimate required to
allow vaccination will be closer to the true threshold and the opportunity cost will
decrease. As such, it is best to have as large a trial as possible. However, this comes
with nontrivial considerations, such as the ability to follow up and provide care for all
individuals involved in the trial, or the constraints on administering a large number
of vaccines in a short period of time.
Time-dependent threshold
Next, we assume that we have the ability to take multiple estimates of e cacy from
the vaccine trial over time. The value of each estimate can trigger the implementation
of a mass vaccination campaign if it exceeds the time-dependent estimated threshold.
We analyse a scenario in which estimates are obtained from the vaccine trials every
ten days between day 30 and 80, inclusive (Figure 5.12). We find that, providing a
time-dependent estimated threshold and implementing a mass vaccination campaign
as soon as an estimate of e cacy exceeds this threshold further improves the expected
outcome of the epidemic, compared to any vaccine trial with a predetermined length.
This is because it encourages early implementation of campaigns when vaccine
e cacy is very high, whilst allowing for a longer trial and thus further resolution
of uncertainty if e cacy is lower, reducing the opportunity cost. The probability
of starting a campaign after each estimate is taken depends on the value of ✏
(Figure 5.13). If ✏ = 10%, we are most likely to begin a campaign after the first
estimate compared to subsequent estimates. However, if we decrease ✏ to 1%, we
are unlikely to begin vaccination until the second estimate has been taken. This can
help to inform how long we should keep taking estimates without implementing a
campaign. For higher ✏, it is very unlikely that we will obtain any estimates high
enough to warrant implementing a campaign after 80 days into the vaccine trial.
However, for lower ✏, it may be worth continuing taking estimates after 80 days.
If the vaccine trial itself has significant ongoing costs, it may be worth including
another threshold at low estimates of e cacy, that could be used to prematurely
stop a vaccine trial.
5.4 Estimating epidemiological parameters
We now consider a scenario in which both the vaccination and epidemiological para-
meters are unknown. We first introduce an unknown transmission rate and explore
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Figure 5.12: Dynamic, time-dependent thresholds. We calculate the expected
number of deaths (left) and true and estimated vaccine e cacy thresholds (right;
dotted and solid respectively) assuming multiple estimates of vaccine e cacy from
a single trial, taken at 10 day intervals from 30 to 80 days after disease detection,
for a range of values of ✏ (colours). In the left-hand plot, the expected number of
deaths using a single estimate at di↵erent points in time is compared to the expected
number of deaths using multiple estimates (‘All’). Other parameters are set to their
default values, given in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.13: Probability of implementing mass vaccination campaign over
time. Using the dynamic, time-dependent thresholds calculated in Figure 5.12, we
calculate the probability of implementing a mass vaccination campaign after each
estimate, for estimates taken every 10 days between 30 and 80 days after disease
detection. We do so for a range of values of ✏. Other parameters are set to their
default values, given in Table 5.1.
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the e↵ect it has on our estimated threshold. We then incorporate a ‘measurement’ of
the transmission rate taken during the early stages of the outbreak that can be used
to resolve uncertainty in this parameter. We show how this interacts with estimates
of vaccine e cacy and use it to formulate state- and time-dependent estimated
thresholds for the implementation of a mass vaccination campaign. We extend this
to cover uncertainty in multiple epidemiological parameters in a mechanistic way.
5.4.1 E↵ect of unknown transmission rate
We incorporate uncertainty in the transmission rate   using a Gamma(k, ✓) prior,
as described in the previous chapter (Section 4.2.4). If we do not gather real-time
information relating to  , as we are with vaccine e cacy through the vaccine trial,
the distribution of   remains unchanged throughout, regardless of the result of the
vaccine trial. As such, the variance of the prior distribution has a significant e↵ect
on out recommendations regarding thresholds and vaccine trial timing (Figure 5.14).
If the variance is large, we find that it is best to act as early as possible. This may
seem unintuitive, since it does not allow us time to reduce uncertainty in vaccine
e cacy. However, it results from the fact that, at higher values of  , the delay until
a campaign is started has significantly more e↵ect on the outcome of the campaign
(Figure 5.15). For example, if   = 0.9 (R0 = 4.5), a delay of over 70 days will render
a vaccination campaign ine↵ective, regardless of the vaccine e cacy. In contrast,
for low values of   or R0, the delay has little e↵ect on the outcome of a vaccination
campaign. Therefore, as the variance increases and both low and high values of
  become more probable, the sensitivity to the delay at high values of   begins
to dominate, causing the benefits of a quickly implemented campaign to outweigh
the benefits of learning. Note, however, that we are also less likely to implement
a campaign at all, given the higher e cacy required to ensure a low probability of
increasing deaths through vaccination. As a result, the expected number of deaths
remains close to what we would expect from not vaccinating at all and far from what
we could achieve with perfect information, regardless of trial length or the value of ✏.
As the variance of the prior on   decreases (Figure 5.14), the resolution of
uncertainty in vaccine e cacy becomes more important, hence a longer trial would
be recommended. For very low variances, we require less time to resolve uncertainty,
hence the optimal trial length decreases again, approaching what we observed with
a fixed  . The lower the variance in  , the more likely we are to vaccinate overall
and the closer we come to achieving what we could with perfect information.
Overall, the incorporation and definition of uncertainty in the transmission rate
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Figure 5.14: E↵ect of unknown transmission rate on outcome and
thresholds. We calculate the expected number of deaths (left) and true and
estimated vaccine e cacy thresholds (right; dotted and solid respectively) for a
range of vaccine trial lengths (x-axis) and values of ✏ (colours), using di↵erent prior
distributions of   (rows). The priors are contrasted by their variance (decreasing
down rows), and are all centred at 0.4. In the left-hand plots, the dotted line
shows the expected number of deaths achievable with perfect information. Other
parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
137
0100
200
300
400
t 
40
50
60
70
80
100
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
150
200
250
T
ot
al
de
at
hs
(0
00
s)
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
T
ru
e
th
re
sh
ol
d
e 
ca
cy
220
240
260
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Vaccine e cacy
230
240
250
260
40 50 60 70 80 100
t 
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
=
0.3
(1.5)
 
=
0.5
(2.5)
 
=
0.7
(3.5)
 
=
0.9
(4.5)
Figure 5.15: Outcome of mass vaccination campaign for di↵erent values
of transmission rate. Left: total number of deaths from the outbreak, under a
mass vaccination campaign implemented after a range of delays (t⇤; colours), for a
range of values of vaccine e cacy (x-axis) and   (rows). Corresponding values of
R0, calculated via Equation 5.3, are given in brackets. The dashed black line shows
the total number of deaths in the absence of vaccination. Right: the true value of
e cacy required to decrease the number of deaths through mass vaccination, for a
range of delays (x-axis) and values of   (rows). Other parameters are set to their
default values, given in Table 5.1.
significantly alters if and when we should implement a vaccination campaign. If
the level of uncertainty is very high, it can render the resolution of uncertainty in
vaccine e cacy redundant, or have the opposite e↵ect and require us to spend more
time resolving uncertainty in vaccine e cacy before making a decision whether or
not to vaccinate.
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Figure 5.16: Posterior distributions of transmission rate. We display the
Gamma posterior for  , for a range of modes (columns) and variances (rows).
5.4.2 Abstract measurement of transmission rate
Given the significant e↵ect that an unknown transmission rate has on our control
and monitoring recommendations, it would be beneficial to resolve uncertainty in
this parameter at the same time as resolving uncertainty in vaccine e cacy. We
first assume that we are able to measure the transmission rate and obtain a well-
defined posterior distribution. We assume that the measurement of   results in a
Gamma(k, ✓) posterior distribution with an observable mode and variance. The mode
and variance can be varied to represent di↵erent levels of uncertainty for di↵erent
true values of   (Figure 5.16).
We assume that the measurement of  , and the resulting posterior, is obtained at
the same time that a measurement of ⌫e is obtained from a vaccine trial (t⇤ days after
disease detection). Note that it is important to incorporate the posterior distribution
of   when calculating the posterior distribution of ⌫e. As shown in Figure 5.9, a
higher value of   generally leads to a less variable distribution of estimates. Hence, as
the location of our distribution around   increases, we find the posterior distribution
around vaccine e cacy, obtained from the same estimate, will become more precise
(Figure 5.17). However, since vaccination has not taken place in the population from
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Figure 5.17: Posterior distributions of vaccine e cacy. We display the em-
pirical posterior distributions for ⌫e, obtained via Equation 5.5, dependent on the
posterior mode of   (columns).
which we measure the transmission rate, this e↵ect only occurs in one direction:
our estimate of vaccine e cacy does not change the resulting posterior distribution
around  .
By varying the mode and variance of the   posterior distribution and calculating
the posterior distribution obtained for vaccine e cacy from a range of estimates,
we are able to identify the estimated threshold required to implement a vaccination
campaign conditioned on the observed transmission rate. We do so for estimates
taken at a range of time points during the outbreak (Figure 5.18). As expected, the
posterior distribution we obtain for   has a significant impact on the recommended
thresholds for implementing a mass vaccination campaign. If the posterior has a
low variance, the true and estimated thresholds will be closer, hence the estimated
threshold is generally lower than for posteriors with high variance. If the mode of
the posterior is below 0.3, we require a higher estimate of vaccine e cacy than if it
is between 0.3 and 0.6, due to the interaction between posteriors seen in Figure 5.17.
Over time, the thresholds can change significantly, generally increasing as time
passes, due to the longer delay before implementing a campaign. The estimated
threshold values for higher modes are more sensitive, since the outbreak progresses
more quickly for such values, exacerbating the decreased e↵ectiveness of a delayed
campaign. The thresholds are most stable over this timeframe for   posteriors with
modes close to 0.4 and with low variance.
5.4.3 Mechanistic measurement of transmission rate
Whilst we have provided a state- and time-dependent recommendation for the
implementation of a mass vaccination campaign in Figure 5.18, our reliance on an
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Figure 5.18: Multidimensional, time-dependent estimated e cacy
thresholds, using abstract measurement of transmission rate. We calcu-
late the estimated e cacy threshold required for ✏ = 0.05, for a range of modes
(y-axis) and variances (x-axis) of the   posterior distribution, for estimates taken
at di↵erent points in time during a vaccine trial (columns). We assume an abstract
measurement of  , which provides a Gamma posterior with observable mode and
variance. Other parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
abstract definition of the measurement of   has its restrictions. For example, if it
is necessary to have a vaccine trial with a predetermined length, thus allowing us
only a single decision point, we are unable to use this definition to recommend an
optimal trial length, since it does not include a mechanism of how uncertainty in
  may change over time. Furthermore, we are unable to give an indication of the
expected outcome of the epidemic, since we are not able to specify the probability of
a posterior with a specified mode and variance occurring. In this final section, we
develop a mechanistic measurement of   to address these limitations.
We define and resolve uncertainty in   using a Bayesian fitting procedure. We
use an uninformative prior distribution for  , given by a Gamma distribution with
mode 0.4 and variance 0.1. Whilst we focus on the resolution of uncertainty in the
transmission rate  , to increase the level of uncertainty we also assume that the
incubation   and recovery   rates are unknown, although with informative priors
based on our knowledge of these parameters (Beta distributions with modes 19.4 and
1
7.4 respectively and variance 5 ⇥ 10 4). Real-time information is collected in the
form of daily reported cases, assuming that all individuals who seek healthcare will
be reported as infectious, without delay. We use a Negative Binomial distribution to
define the likelihood of reported cases, parameterised by the mean rate (given by the
movement from E and VE to IH in Equation 5.1) and an unknown overdispersion
parameter. We use the latter to incorporate a higher level of variability in the
simulated data. Details of the priors, real-time data, likelihood function and fitting
procedure are given in Box 5.
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Box 5: Mechanistic measurement of  
In this box we outline a mechanistic method of estimating unknown epi-
demiological parameters (transmission  , incubation   and recovery  ) from
real-time information collected throughout the outbreak.
Data
The real-time information is made up of daily reported casesRep(t), t0  t  t⇤.
We assume that all infectious individuals who seek healthcare are reported at
the time of symptom onset.
Likelihood
The daily number of reported cases, Rep(t), depends on the number of individu-
als currently exposed to the disease, both unvaccinated E(t) and vaccinated
VE(t), the incubation rate   and the healthcare-seeking probabilities h and
hv.
We use a Negative Binomial distribution, with unknown overdispersion para-
meter  , to define the likelihood:
Rep(t) | ✓ ⇠ NegBinom ( (hE(t) + hvVE(t)), ) , (5.6)
where ✓ = { , ,  , } are the unknown parameters to be fitted.
Prior distributions
We use an uninformative prior distribution for  , based on a Gamma distri-
bution with mode 0.4 and variance 0.1.
We use informative priors for   and  , represented by Beta distributions with
modes 19.4 and
1
7.4 respectively and variance 5⇥ 10 4.
We use an uninformative prior for the overdispersion parameter  , given by a
Gamma(3, 4) distribution (hyperparameters: shape, rate).
Posterior
We implement a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) fitting procedure using
the Stan programming language (Section 2.3.2), interfacing with Python via
PyStan, to obtain posterior distributions of  ,  ,   and  .
We simulate the process of gathering real-time information and calculating pos-
teriors for the unknown epidemiological parameters over a range of true   values
and time frames (Figure 5.19). Each simulation of the resolution in epidemiological
parameter uncertainty is combined with a range of estimates of vaccine e cacy, ⌫ˆe,
giving a joint posterior for both epidemiological and control parameters. Given the
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Figure 5.19: Multidimensional, time-dependent estimated e cacy
thresholds, using mechanistic measurement of transmission rate. We calcu-
late the estimated e cacy threshold required for ✏ = 0.05, using multiple simulations
of the mechanistic model for measuring   outlined in Box 4, for estimates taken at
di↵erent points in time during a vaccine trial (columns). True values for  ,   and  
are drawn from their respective prior distributions within each simulation. Other
parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
e↵ect that   measurements have on the posterior of ⌫e, observed in Figure 5.17,
it is essential that the posteriors are calculated conditionally. The posteriors are
then used to simulate forward the epidemic with and without the implementation
of a mass vaccination campaign, giving a distribution of total deaths for each. As
before, we identify the minimum estimate of e cacy that results in a probability of
increasing the number of deaths through vaccination of less than 5% (Figure 5.19).
We find that the variance of the posterior for   is strongly related to both the
mean of the posterior and the length of the monitoring period (Figure 5.19). In
general, posteriors with a larger mean will also have a larger variance, however
this decreases the longer we spend on monitoring, with posteriors located at lower
values of   responding the most to lengthened monitoring periods (Figure 5.20). The
estimate of e cacy required to implement a mass vaccination campaign behaves
similarly to what we observed under an abstract measurement of   (Figure 5.18):
at higher values of  , we are more likely to implement a campaign after a short
monitoring period compared to long, however this is the opposite at low values of  .
In Figure 5.20, 3rd panel, we see that, for high values of  , the estimated threshold
starts low but quickly increases towards 1. This is due to the epidemic taking o↵ very
quickly, allowing for faster resolution of   but requiring a highly e↵ective vaccine to
have a worthwhile impact. However, at lower values of  , the slower epidemic results
in slower resolution of uncertainty, but we also have more time to resolve uncertainty.
Overall, we find the optimal length of the monitoring period to be 30 days, in order
to minimise the expected number of deaths (Figure 5.21). Stopping the monitoring
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Figure 5.20: E↵ect of length of monitoring period on transmission rate
posteriors and estimated thresholds. We select three specific simulations from
those performed in Figure 5.19, defined by true values of   = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and record
the posterior mean (left), posterior standard deviation (centre) and estimated vaccine
e cacy threshold (right) for a range of lengths of the monitoring period. Other
parameters are set to their default values, given in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.21: E↵ect of length of monitoring period on outcome and probab-
ility of vaccination. Left: we calculate the expected number of deaths, using the
state-dependent thresholds identified in Figure 5.19, for a range of lengths of the
monitoring period. Right: we calculate the probability that a mass vaccination cam-
paign is implemented, using the state-dependent thresholds identified in Figure 5.19,
for a range of lengths of the monitoring period. Other parameters are set to their
default values, given in Table 5.1.
before this results in a very low probability of implementing a vaccination campaign,
given the high level of uncertainty remaining in the parameters. The probability of
vaccinating increases for lengths up to approximately 60 days, however this does not
reduce the overall expected cost due to the increased delay to implementation. For
monitoring periods longer than 60 days, the delay necessitates an increasingly high
vaccine e cacy, resulting in a decreasing probability of implementing a campaign.
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5.5 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter, we have used AM in a more realistic, human-disease scenario to both
exhibit the type of useful information than AM can provide in complex situations
and how di↵erent uncertainties can interact with each other. We introduced a disease
model based on a model in the literature describing Ebola [144], observing that
the establishment of healthcare centres to treat and isolate infectious individuals
can dramatically reduce the number of deaths from an outbreak. However, with
the incorporation of a mass vaccination campaign, we found that an increase in
risky behaviour from vaccinated individuals, incoporated as a reduced probability of
seeking healthcare, can give rise to an increase in the number of deaths if the e cacy
of the vaccine is low. In light of such information, it is clearly beneficial to adopt an
adaptive approach to the use of such a campaign, allowing implementation to be
delayed until the uncertainty in vaccine e cacy is reduced. We can then formulate a
monitoring plan to target this uncertainty, in this case using a vaccine trial. We used
a stochastic model of the trial population to describe the resolution of uncertainty
mechanistically, enabling us to predict the amount of uncertainty resolution over
time and thus plan the possible implementation of a mass vaccination campaign in
the future in response to the results from the trial.
We incorporated a di↵erent perspective on the management objective compared
to previous chapters, requiring that the probability of increasing the number of
deaths through mass vaccination be bounded by a specified value ✏. Thus, we will
only implement a mass vaccination campaign if we are reasonably sure that it will be
e↵ective in reducing the number of deaths. We showed that, using the components
of the AM framework, including a stochastic vaccine trial model, we are able to
formulate state- and time-dependent thresholds for the implementation of a mass
vaccination campaign, that meet this requirement.
Whilst following these thresholds enables us to largely avoid any possible negative
outcomes from a mass vaccination campaign, it can also result in a significant
opportunity cost caused by foregoing vaccination when the true e cacy is high
enough to reduce the number of deaths, but the estimated e cacy is lower than
the identified threshold. This inaction can lead to thousands more deaths than
necessary. However, we are able to use our framework to optimise the length of time
spent monitoring before control is implemented, balancing the worth of uncertainty
resolution and early action. Furthermore, to make the most of both increased
knowledge where necessary and prompt action where possible, we are able to provide
dynamic, time-dependent thresholds relying on multiple estimates taken over time
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during the trial. Doing so results in fewer deaths compared to relying on only a single
measurement, even when the timing is optimised, whilst keeping the probability of
increasing deaths through mass vaccination constant.
The analysis of the opportunity cost also highlighted the significant e↵ect of
the parameter ✏. This parameter represents how comfortable decision makers are
with taking risks. If ✏ is high, greater risks are taken, which reduces the number of
deaths on average, but increases the chance of an even larger outbreak. If ✏ is low,
it is highly unlikely that we will cause a larger outbreak, however we are also less
likely to see the rewards from a successful campaign. Using AM in this way, we can
clearly show the e↵ect of increasing or decreasing ✏ to decision makers, aiding them
in setting it at an appropriate value.
If the epidemiological parameters, such as transmission, are also uncertain, this
can have a significant impact on recommendations, especially if the uncertainty in
epidemiological parameters can not be resolved through monitoring. If this uncer-
tainty is very large, it can render learning about vaccine e cacy almost irrelevant.
In such a case, it is recommended to perform only a very short vaccine trial, followed
by either quick implementation of mass vaccination or none at all. If the uncertainty
in epidemiological parameters is significant, but resolving uncertainty in vaccine
e cacy is still relatively important, then longer vaccine trials would be recommended
compared to when epidemiological parameters were known. This is due to the
greater variation in vaccine trial estimates that arises from uncertain epidemiological
parameters, requiring longer to resolve uncertainty. As the uncertainty decreases, so
does the recommended length of trial. Thus, additional uncertainties in the system
can significantly change the recommended timing and implementation of control and
monitoring, even if they can not be resolved themselves.
We can incorporate a measurement of   to provide multidimensional state- and
time- dependent thresholds. Doing so in an abstract way, by assuming the posterior
of   will follow approximately a Gamma distribution with observable mode and
variance, allows for convenient calculation of estimated e cacy thresholds conditioned
on the observed posterior and time of estimate. We were also able to observe how
measurements of   could a↵ect our posterior belief regarding vaccine e cacy, even
if the estimate of e cacy from a vaccine trial remained the same. This highlights
the need to consider both measurements together and account for this interaction.
However, this abstract method does not explicitly model the relationship between
the posterior variance, posterior mean and time, thus does not allow us to optimise
timing or provide an accurate indication of the expected number of deaths from
the outbreak. These limitations were explored in detail in the previous chapter.
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Instead, we must define the measurement of  , and resulting posterior distribution,
in a mechanistic way.
Using daily reported cases from the healthcare centres within a Bayesian frame-
work, we were able to predict the resolution of uncertainty in   over time. We
identified a strong relationship between the posterior variance and posterior mean,
with higher means generally leading to higher variance, and posteriors with lower
means becoming more precise faster. Using this, we were able to identify an optimal
monitoring length of approximately 30 days.
This chapter has seen the use of AM in a di↵erent context to previous chapters,
focusing on providing useful information to decision makers in a more complex setting.
However, there remain limitations in the scenario and models we have used. For
example, we have again used a deterministic model to describe the system. In reality,
the dynamics would exhibit significant stochasticity. This is especially true for the
transmission rate  , which, for Ebola, has been shown to exhibit significant variation
throughout an outbreak [32, 36]. This would reduce our ability to resolve uncertainty
in this parameter over time and significantly alter how we perform forecasts and
thus assess the use of controls in the future. However, this also highlights the need
for specific, mechanistic models of uncertainty resolution that can be used within
the AM framework.
The stochasticity in epidemiological parameters would also a↵ect the estimates
from the vaccine trial model. Although we simulated the vaccine trial stochastically
via the Gillespie algorithm, the parameters themselves were assumed fixed throughout.
Hence, the amount of variation in the estimates would be significantly greater in real
life. This would result in requiring significantly larger and longer trials to resolve
uncertainty than we have suggested in this chapter. The context of the trial itself
was not completely realistic, as we assumed an identical, isolated population. In
reality, the trial itself can have a significant e↵ect on the disease dynamics within the
population [145, 151]. We believe active AM could be extremely beneficial in such a
scenario also, where the experimentation of an unknown control and the benefit of
uncertainty resolution must be weighed against the possible negative outcomes of
that control.
The relevance of the set-up used in this chapter is also not explicitly supported
in the literature. For example, it is not clear whether individuals would be less
likely to seek healthcare if vaccinated. Furthermore, such an e↵ect may depreciate
over time as people lose faith in a vaccine that is clearly not e↵ective. There are
also non-trivial considerations surrounding the ethics of the management procedure
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implemented. For example, we have assumed that there is little prior knowledge
regarding the vaccine e cacy (a wide prior distribution on ⌫e), however, it may
be that a trial could only be undertaken if there was significant evidence that the
vaccine is highly e↵ective. This could greatly reduce the utility of an active AM
procedure in a real-world context.
Finally, we fixed various parameters within the model that could have a significant
e↵ect. As shown in this chapter, the inclusion of uncertainty within these parameters
can have a significant e↵ect on the recommendations regarding control and monitoring.
However, a high number of uncertainties makes it di cult to clearly portray state-
dependent recommendations, a di culty recognised in the literature [14], thus are
often investigated independently. In the next chapter, we address the e↵ect of the
healthcare-seeking behaviour of the population, which was fixed in this chapter, in a
new scenario. We also discuss how the results from these two chapters could interact
with each other.
Although there are limitations to this work, we believe it makes a valuable
contribution to the literature. We have shown that active AM can be used to
identify thresholds for triggering the implementation of a mass vaccination campaign,
that are both dynamic and state-dependent. Such triggers are highly relevant and
often analysed outside of AM [25, 28, 29, 152]. Furthermore, the identification of
interacting uncertainties and measurements has implications for the appropriate
application of AM in real-world scenarios, motivating active AM and mechanistic
models of uncertainty resolution that can incorporate such e↵ects.
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Chapter 6
Managing healthcare-seeking
behaviour to avoid overloading
the healthcare system
Abstract
We use our Ebola-like disease model to analyse the e↵ect of overloading the healthcare
system. We demonstrate that an increased probability of seeking healthcare can
greatly reduce the severity of the outbreak, by isolating infectious individuals from
the community and stopping further spread. However, this may put pressure on the
healthcare system due to greater numbers of patients, which can lead to increased
loss of life if the system is not equipped to deal with this pressure. We introduce
a decision making problem surrounding the targeting of the healthcare-seeking
behaviour of the population: di↵erent levels of intervention can be used to raise the
healthcare-seeking probability of symptomatic individuals. We use a multi-phase
AM procedure to guide the use of such interventions, greatly improving the outcome
of the epidemic compared to both no intervention or static intervention. Finally, we
show how anticipating uncertainty resolution under an active AM approach to this
problem can change initial recommendations, greatly reduce the size of the epidemic
and provide vital information to decision makers regarding the value of resolving
uncertainty in specific parameters.
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6.1 Introduction
In this final chapter we analyse the e↵ect that the healthcare-seeking behaviour
of the population can have on the outcome of an epidemic and recommendations
for control. We use the same Ebola-like disease model from the previous chapter
(Section 5.2.1), assuming the establishment of healthcare centres that aim to isolate
and treat infectious individuals. We make a simple addition to this model, allowing
a small proportion of non-infected individuals to also be admitted into healthcare.
This is based on the assumption that during an outbreak, there may be people who
present with similar symptoms as the disease in question, but who do not actually
have the disease. This is applicable for a disease such as Ebola, which presents with
symptoms similar to malaria or other commonly circulating, less infectious, diseases
during the early stages of infection.
We use this model to analyse how a di↵erent healthcare-seeking probability, h,
can a↵ect the overall burden on the healthcare system. We incorporate the idea
of a capacity on the healthcare system and a penalty for exceeding this capacity.
Whilst an increase in the healthcare-seeking probability can significantly improve
the outcome of the epidemic, we find that it can also increase the burden on the
healthcare system. This is especially true in the presence of a high proportion of
non-infected healthcare-seekers. As a result, if an increase in the healthcare-seeking
probability causes the burden on the healthcare system to exceed capacity, this can
have undesirable e↵ects on the outcome of the epidemic, resulting in a higher number
of deaths.
We incorporate the use of the AM framework into a management scenario in
which we target the healthcare-seeking rate h to control the outbreak. We assume
that, through interventions such as community engagement, it is possible to increase
the probability that someone will seek healthcare when symptoms appear. We
allow three levels of targeted intervention: none, low and high. We assume that
these interventions cause a gradual increase in the healthcare-seeking probability,
with high level targeting resulting in a steeper gradient, and without intervention
the behaviour of the population does not change. We allow the intervention to
be changed at multiple points throughout the outbreak, resulting in a multi-phase
decision process. We assume that there are several sources of uncertainty: in
the normal, pre-intervention healthcare-seeking behaviour of the population, the
proportion of healthy individuals who present with similar symptoms from a di↵erent
disease and the e↵ect that interventions have on the healthcare-seeking behaviour.
We approach the decision making process from both a passive standpoint, using
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only prior information to make our initial decisions, and an active standpoint,
aniticipating the resolution of uncertainty in the future. This provides another
example of a scenario in which passive and active AM lead to di↵erent decisions.
Within the active AM approach, we use the EVFPI measure introduced in Chapter
4 (Section 4.3.1; Equation 4.9) to quantify the value of resolving uncertainty in
the future. Thus, we assume that we will obtain perfect information regarding the
unknown parameters. We also use this measure to clearly portray the cost of delaying
uncertainty resolution, or the benefit of prioritizing it, and how decisions made early
on in the outbreak can e↵ect this. Finally, we analyse the importance of di↵erent
sources of uncertainty using the EVPXI measure (Section 2.2; Equation 2.4) and the
benefit of experimentation of interventions with unknown e↵ect.
Overall, we show that targeting the healthcare-seeking behaviour of the population
through community-based interventions can significantly reduce the expected number
of deaths from an outbreak. However, the use of an active AM approach can improve
outcomes further, maximising benefit and reducing the probability of overloading
the healthcare system. Furthermore, anticipating the resolution of uncertainty in
the future can alter the recommended course of action at the start of the outbreak,
as well as provide clear information regarding the benefit of uncertainty resolution
and the cost of delaying such resolution.
6.2 Burden on the healthcare system
First, we make some simple additions to the Ebola-like disease model introduced in
the previous chapter and define the ‘burden’ on the healthcare system.
6.2.1 Healthcare-seeking probability and peak burden
We have already seen that increasing the healthcare-seeking probability within the
current Ebola-like disease model will decrease the total number of deaths, through a
decreased R0 (Figure 5.3). However, the healthcare system may be shouldering a
larger burden because of it. We define the burden on the healthcare system to be
the maximum number of people within healthcare at any one time. We find that the
relationship between h and the burden on the healthcare system is less obvious than
that with the total number of deaths (Figure 6.1). For low h, a small increase will
lead to a higher peak number of infectious individuals seeking healthcare. However,
for larger values of h, further increases will result in a lower peak. This is due
to a greatly reduced R0 during the early stages of the outbreak, which result in
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Figure 6.1: E↵ect of the healthcare-seeking probability. We vary the
healthcare-seeking probability h and record the total number of deaths (left) and
maximum number of people within healthcare (right) for a range of transmission
rates (colours). The value of h is assumed to take e↵ect on the day that the outbreak
is detected and remains constant throughout the outbreak. Other parameters are
set to their default values given in Table 5.1 in the previous chapter.
significantly fewer infections overall.
6.2.2 Existence of non-infected healthcare-seekers
In the previous chapter we assumed that all individuals who seek healthcare will be
infectious. However, this may not be the case. For many diseases, including Ebola,
early symptoms can resemble those of much more common, less serious diseases or
health issues, such as a common cold or flu. Hence, during an outbreak, there may be
a significant number of ‘healthy’ (not infected with the disease in question) individuals
seeking healthcare. This can add to the burden on the healthcare system. We include
this in the model by assuming that a fixed proportion hs of healthy, susceptible
individuals (S) will have a minor health issue that presents will similar symptoms.
These individuals are equally likely to seek healthcare as infected individuals (i.e.
seek healthcare with probability h), however will only remain in healthcare for a
single day before being discharged back into the community. We assume that such
individuals will not be infected during this period.
The existence of healthy healthcare-seekers will increase the burden on the
healthcare system and can significantly alter the relationship between h and the peak
burden (Figure 6.2). If hs is large enough, the increased number of healthy healthcare
seekers for large h can outweigh the reduced number of infected healthcare-seekers,
causing an overall increase in the peak burden on the system.
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Figure 6.2: E↵ect of healthy healthcare-seekers. We show the relationship
between h and the maximum number of people within healthcare (y-axis) for di↵erent
levels of healthy healthcare-seeking behaviour (hs; colours). The parameter hs
represents the proportion of people in the population who have similar symptoms,
but are not infected with the disease in question. The values of h and hs are
assumed to take e↵ect on the day that the outbreak is detected and remain constant
throughout the outbreak. We let   = 0.3. Other parameters are set to their default
values given in Table 5.1 in the previous chapter.
6.2.3 Exceeding the capacity of the healthcare system
An increased burden on the healthcare system can become an issue if there are
limited resources which may be exceeded, such as space, equipment and medicines.
We introduce a penalty for exceeding the capacity of the healthcare system, incurred
if the number of individuals currently in healthcare exceeds a given limit (Hcap). We
implement this penalty by not allowing any further admissions for a fixed period of
time (⌧). By doing so, the e↵ect that h has on the peak number of healthcare-seekers
can now also have a significant e↵ect on the total number of deaths (Figure 6.3).
Where before a higher healthcare-seeking probability always lead to a reduced number
of deaths (Figure 6.1), we now find that keeping the number of healthcare-seekers
just below the maximum capacity is more optimal. Once capacity is reached, this
can cause a sharp resurgence in the number of deaths.
6.3 Healthcare-seeking probability as control
Given the significant e↵ect that the healthcare-seeking behaviour of the population
has on the outcome of the epidemic, it makes sense to try to exploit it as a form of
control. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we assume that the healthcare-
seeking probability h can be increased through some form of community engagement.
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Figure 6.3: E↵ect of healthcare system capacity. We show the relationship
between h and the total number of deaths resulting from the outbreak (y-axis)
for di↵erent limits on the capacity of the healthcare sytem (Hcap; colours). The
parameter Hcap represents the maximum number of people that can be within
healthcare at any time. If this is exceeded, the healthcare system is overloaded and
will not accept new patients for a period of 14 days (⌧ = 14). The values of h and
Hcap are assumed to take e↵ect on the day that the outbreak is detected and remain
constant throughout the outbreak. Other parameters are set to their default values
given in Table 5.1 in the previous chapter.
We assume that the probability without intervention is h0 and increases towards 1
during intervention. This is defined assuming that the di↵erence between the current
probability and 1 decreases by a constant proportion  h:
dh(t)
dt
= (1  h(t)) h.
Letting x be the time since the intervention began and assuming h(0) = h0, we can
solve this to obtain
h(x) = (h0   1)e  hx + 1. (6.1)
This results in a variable h, which responds quickly to intervention at first but slows
down as it approaches 1 (Figure 6.4). We assume that h0 is fixed, but unknown, and
we are able to control the rate of change  h through the intensity of our intervention.
The outcome of such an intervention is heavily dependent on both the initial
probability of seeking healthcare, h0, and the proportion of the healthy population
expected to present with similar symptoms, hs (Figure 6.5). We find that the same
intervention (same  h) can result in as low as 50,000 deaths, or as high as 300,000
deaths, for very small changes in either h0 or hs. For the remainder of this chapter,
we analyse how adaptive management can be used to inform interventions targeting
h under these uncertainties.
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Figure 6.4: E↵ect of intervention targeting healthcare-seeking behaviour.
We calculate the value of the healthcare-seeking probability h over time, assuming
it follows Equation 6.1, for a range of  h (colours), representing di↵erent levels of
intervention (more intervention ! greater  h). We assume that the intervention
causing h to increase starts as soon as the outbreak is detected and the healthcare-
seeking probability without intervention (h0) is 0.
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Figure 6.5: E↵ect of increasing h on outcome of epidemic. We vary the rate
of increase in h ( h; x-axis), the healthcare-seeking probability without intervention
(h0; y-axis) and the proportion of healthy healthcare-seekers within the population
(hs; left-to-right) and record the total number of deaths resulting from the outbreak
(colour). We assume that the intervention causing h to increase starts as soon as the
outbreak is detected and continues for 90 days. Other parameters are set to their
default values given in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Summary of parameters and notation used. Default values apply
throughout the chapter unless otherwise stated. Values left blank depend on the
vaccination campaign and are calculated as required during the optimisation process.
Values have been selected based on Figures 6.1 - 6.5 to reveal non-trivial dynamics:
healthcare-seeking probability h can be increased without exceeding the capacity of
the healthcare system, however if increased too much the system will be overloaded.
Notation Description Default value
hs Proportion of the healthy population with similar
symptoms from a di↵erent disease, who may also
seek healthcare
5%
Hcap Maximum number of people the healthcare system
can accommodate at one time, before becoming
overloaded and not operating as it should
20,000
h0 Healthcare-seeking probability of individuals
without intervention
0.2
 h Rate of increase in h as a result of intervention,
applied according to Equation 6.1
Low level: 0.01
High level: 0.03
⌧ Length of time taken for healthcare system to re-
cover from overloading
14 days
M Number of decision points allowed during adaptive
intervention process
5
{ti} Times of decision points during adaptive interven-
tion process, represented as the number of days
since outbreak detection
{0, 90, 180,
270, 360}
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6.3.1 Adaptive interventions
We assume a multiphase intervention, with 5 decision points at times {ti} =
{0, 90, 180, 270, 360}. We consider three options for control at each decision point:
1) do not target the healthcare-seeking probability h, 2) low level targeting of h,
and 3) high level targeting of h. The low and high level targeting result in di↵erent
values for  h (0.01 and 0.03 respectively), whilst no targeting results in a constant
h ( h = 0). We also assume that a lower level of intervention targeted towards
h will allow more resources to be utilised elsewhere, in this case to increase the
maximum capacity of the healthcare system. We assume that the maximum capacity
of the healthcare system is 20,000 (4% of the population). If there is no targeted
intervention on h, we can increase the capacity by 2000 (10%), or by 1000 (5%) if
there is only low level targeting of h. A summary of the control parameters and
values used in this chapter are given in Table 6.1.
Assuming h0 ⇠ Normal(0.2, 0.05), hs ⇠ Normal(0.05, 0.01), and the control and
default parameter values in Table 6.1, we are able to construct a decision tree of
expected outcomes given di↵erent decisions (Figure 6.6). In this scenario, we find
that the optimal intervention plan to minimise the expected number of deaths overall
is high level targeting of h for the first 90 days, followed by no targeting for the rest
of the outbreak, choosing instead to commit the extra resources to increasing the
capacity of the healthcare system. This leads to more than a 40% decrease in the
expected number of deaths compared to not targeting h at all. We could achieve
a similar, though slightly worse, expected outcome from low level targeting of h in
the first 90 days, followed by another period of low level targeting either between
days 90-180 or 360-450. In general, we see that it is best to target h before the
peak of the outbreak, helping to reduce the spread of the disease early and lower the
peak number of infections and thus burden on the healthcare system. Whilst the
outbreak is peaking, it is best to stop targeting h and reinvest the extra resources
into increasing the capacity of the healthcare system. Finally, after the peak, it can
be beneficial to again target h, however this depends on the amount it has been
targeted already and the extent to which the disease has spread throughout the
population. Later decisions also have much less of an e↵ect overall than earlier
decisions.
The timing and number of decision points plays a significant role in how well we
are able to control the outbreak. In Figure 6.6, we have allowed 5 decision points,
spaced at 90 day intervals throughout the outbreak. We now analyse the e↵ect of
having only a subset of these decision points (Figure 6.7). First, if we only have a
157
0 90 180 270 360 450
Time since initial decision point (days)
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
M
in
im
um
ex
p
ec
te
d
de
at
hs
(0
00
s)
Targeting of h
None
Low level
High level
Figure 6.6: Expected number of deaths for di↵erent multi-phase interven-
tions. We show all possible multi-phase interventions, assuming 5 decision points
and a choice of high level targeting of h (yellow;  h = 0.03), low level targeting
(maroon;  h = 0.01) or no targeting (black;  h = 0) at each decision point. Decision
points are spaced at 90 day intervals, beginning on the day the outbreak is detected.
At each branch of the tree, we record the minimum expected number of deaths, taken
from all possible future paths that can be taken, conditioned on the decisions already
made. Interventions chosen at the final decision point are assumed to continue
for the remainder of the outbreak. We assume that h0 and hs are unknown, with
priors h0 ⇠ Normal(0.2, 0.05) and hs ⇠ Normal(0.05, 0.01). All other parameters are
assumed known with values given in Table 6.1.
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Figure 6.7: E↵ect of timing and number of decision points on the outcome
of interventions. We vary the number of decision points (n; left-to-right) and
the timing of decision points (x-axis) and record the minimum expected number of
deaths achievable through interventions targeting h. We vary the timing of decision
points in the same way as in Chapter 3, Figure 4.11: we allow 5 points at which
decisions can be made, spaced at 90 day intervals throughout the outbreak, and take
all possible combinations of n decision points. The first timing combination will
have n decision points during the first n 90 day intervals. The last combination will
have n decision points during the final n 90 day intervals. Interventions chosen at
the final decision point are assumed to continue for the remainder of the outbreak.
We assume that h0 and hs are unknown, with priors h0 ⇠ Normal(0.2, 0.05) and
hs ⇠ Normal(0.05, 0.01). All other parameters are assumed known with values given
in Table 6.1.
single decision point (n = 1), resulting in a static policy, the best outcome would be
obtained from low level targeting of h throughout the outbreak. However, this results
in an increase in the expected number of deaths of approximately 15% compared to
the adaptive policy identified earlier. If we have at least one opportunity to adapt
control (n   2), we can obtain the same expected outcome as with 5 decision points,
as long as the first two decisions are made on days 0 and 90. Decisions that are
made later or are more spread out lead to a worse expected outcome.
6.3.2 EVFPI
Based on the analysis of Figure 6.6 in the previous section, the optimal recommenda-
tion appears to be an initial 90 period of high level targeting, followed by no targeting
throughout the remainder of the outbreak. However, this represents a passive view of
control, as it does not consider the possibility of resolving uncertainty before future
decision points occur. We use the EVFPI measure, introduced in Chapter 4 (Section
4.3.1; Equation 4.9), to analyse how the possibility of resolving uncertainty in the
future can change which decisions appear optimal at early stages of the outbreak.
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We calculate the EVFPI, assuming that perfect information is achieved at di↵erent
points throughout the outbreak (Figure 6.8). We also show the e↵ect that di↵erent
decisions made up to the point of uncertainty resolution have on the EVFPI. Following
the optimal recommendation based on prior information alone (high level targeting
for h for the first 90 days only), we see that the EVFPI falls to 0 after the first
decision point. This suggests that, even in light of new information, there is no
way of improving control in the future if we raise h to a very high level initially.
Taking no action initially results in the EVFPI falling below 0 after the first decision
point, showing that the lost opportunity to stem the spread of the outbreak early on
outweighs the benefit from any future information and delayed control intervention.
The most important result is that low level targeting of h in the initial phase
of control leads to a significantly slower depreciation of the EVFPI. By not raising
h too much before gaining perfect information, we are able to avoid overloading
the healthcare system by stopping targeting of h if hs and h0 prove to be higher
than expected, or continuing targeting of h if the unknown parameters are equal or
lower than expected. Hence, if we expect to gain accurate information regarding
these parameters before the end of the outbreak, targeting h at a low level is the
optimal initial decision, in contrast to our previous conclusion when ignoring future
information.
Using the EVFPI measure, assuming that uncertainty is resolved at di↵erent
points throughout the outbreak (Figure 6.8), we can clearly visualise the cost of
delaying such resolution, or conversely, the benefit of prioritizing it. If uncertainty was
resolved instantly, we could reduce the expected number of deaths by almost 100,000
people, a reduction of almost 60% compared to relying only on prior information.
This is likely to be impossible, since it takes time to gather information and resolve
uncertainty. Taking 90 days to do so reduces the benefit of resolving uncertainty by
approximately 10,000 deaths (10%), but only if we implement low level targeting of
h during this time. Implementing other intervention strategies will cause the value
of new information to be lost completely. Taking an extra 90 days, thus resolving
uncertainty 180 days from now, would result in a further loss of EVFPI of 20,000
deaths, on top of the previous loss. This requires stopping the targeting the h for this
period. A delay of another 90 days would be even more serious, resulting in a further
loss of of EVFPI of 40,000 deaths. Overall, delaying uncertainty resolution by 270
days would reduce the value of this information by 70%. If we expect this resolution
to require longer than 270 days, this again changes the recommended interventions
during this time. Instead of only a single period of low level intervention, we would
recommend two consecutive periods of low level targeting. Hence, whilst there may
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Figure 6.8: Expected value of future perfect information (EVFPI) for dif-
ferent decisions. We calculate the EVFPI over time. We assume that the value
on the x-axis is the point in time at which perfect information is gained (hence truly
optimal decisions are made thereafter) and the EVFPI on the y-axis is conditional
on the decisions that were made before this point. Colours represent the di↵erent
interventions that can be chosen at each decision point. The final point along the
x-axis represents a situation where perfect information is obtained after the final
decision point, hence it can not be used to inform decisions and thus we rely only on
prior information. Before we obtain perfect information, we assume that h0 and hs
are unknown, with priors h0 ⇠ Normal(0.2, 0.05) and hs ⇠ Normal(0.05, 0.01). All
other parameters are assumed known with values given in Table 6.1.
be some flexibility in the time taken to resolve uncertainty, it is necessary to estimate
this delay to within certain intervals in order to make optimal decisions during early
stages of the outbreak.
6.3.3 Unknown e↵ect of interventions
We incorporate uncertainty regarding the e↵ect of our targeted interventions on
h and demonstrate how this can be used to portray further, useful information to
decision makers in an interpretable way. So far, we have assumed that targeting the
healthcare-seeking probability results in an increase in h via Equation 6.1. The rate
of increase depends on  h, which we have set at 0.01 for low level targeting and 0.03
for high level targeting. We introduce uncertainty into this parameter, by assuming
that both levels of intervention could be between 50% less e↵ective up to 50% more
e↵ective than expected. In order to clearly portray the e↵ect of such uncertainty,
we discretise it into three models: 50% e↵ective, 100% e↵ective and 150% e↵ective.
Depending on the weight we place on each model, representing our prior belief as to
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which model is most likely, the optimal course of action may change (Figure 6.9).
We first assume a passive AM approach, relying solely on prior information to make
initial decisions.
If we place all the weight on the 100% model (Figure 6.9; top corner), we are
completely confident that  h is equal to what we have defined it to be, which is
equivalent to previous sections. In this case, high level targeting of h from the start
appears optimal, as this area of the graph is shaded yellow. If the majority of the
weight is placed on either the 50% or 100% models, that is, close to the top or left
corners of the graph, we see a similar result. However, if there is a significant chance
that interventions will be more e↵ective than expected, represented by the 150%
model and right corner of the graph, then taking a more conservative approach,
targeting h at a low level initially, would be recommended. Furthermore, we find
that the penalty from making the ‘wrong’ initial decision is not symmetric. Choosing
to target h at a low level, when high level targeting would be recommended under
the prior, results in approximately 25% less of an increase in the expected number of
deaths compared to the opposite scenario (Figure 6.9; right-hand panel). Hence, low
level targeting of h may be a more appropriate option under such uncertainty. This
is reinforced by the fact that, if we place equal weight across all three models (centre
of the graphs), the optimal initial decision is to implement low level targeting of h.
Finally, we use an active AM approach to aniticipate the resolution of uncertainty
in the e↵ect of interventions on h. We assume that uncertainty is resolved after 90
days, however only if an intervention is implemented. Hence, this represents the
use of experimentation: we can only resolve uncertainty in the e↵ect of a control
by implementing that control and monitoring it. We analyse the EVFPXI for the
uncertainty in interventions (that is, h0 and hs remain uncertain). We find that
resolving uncertainty in the e↵ect interventions through experimentation can reduce
the expected number of deaths by up to approximately 14,000 (Figure 6.10; left-hand
plot). The benefit of experimentation is most pronounced when we have a polarised
belief regarding the e cacy of interventions (strong belief for 50% and 150% models),
with a slightly higher probability of interventions being over-e↵ective than under-
e↵ective. If we place all the weight on a single model (corners of the plot), we are
essentially assuming no uncertainty, thus the benefit falls to zeros. Similarly, if there
is very little chance of the interventions being over-e↵ective (left-hand edge), the
benefit of resolving uncertainty is very low, since it is less likely we will overload the
healthcare system.
We also calculated the EVPXI measure assuming resolution in h0 and hs only
(Figure 6.10; right-hand plot). We found that benefit of resolving uncertainty in
162
020
40
60
80
100
100
80
60
40
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
150% e ective !
 
100%
e ective
 
50
%
e 
ec
tiv
e
No targeting
Low level
High level
0
20
40
60
80
100
100
80
60
40
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
150% e ective !
 
100%
e ective
 
50
%
e 
ec
tiv
e
 20
 10
0
10
20
D
i 
eren
ce
in
exp
ected
d
eath
s
(In
itial
low
level
-
h
igh
level)
Figure 6.9: E↵ect of uncertain intervention e cacy on optimal initial de-
cisions. We assume that interventions targeting h are either 50% less e↵ective than
expected, the same as expected or 50% more e↵ective that expected (defined by the
value of  h). We vary the weight we place on each model (the strength of our belief
in each model), specified by the value on each axis, summing to 100%. Thus, the
top corner represents 100% weight on the 100% e↵ective model, the left corner 100%
on the 50% model and the right corner 100% weight on the 150% model. Away
from the corners, the weights are split between multiple models, with the centre
of the graph representing equal weight on all three models. We record the initial
action that leads to the lowest expected number of deaths (left) and the di↵erence
in the expected number of deaths between implementing low level and high level
targeting of h in the initial intervention phase (right). Expectations are calculated
based on prior information only. We assume that h0 and hs are also unknown, with
priors h0 ⇠ Normal(0.2, 0.05) and hs ⇠ Normal(0.05, 0.01). All other parameters are
assumed known with values given in Table 6.1.
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Figure 6.10: EVFPXI for resolution of uncertainty in e↵ect of interventions
and current healthcare-seeking behaviour. We assume that interventions
targeting h are either 50% less e↵ective than expected, the same as expected or 50%
more e↵ective that expected (defined by the value of  h). We vary the weight we
place on each model (the strength of our prior belief in each model, summing to
100%). We calculate the EVFPXI assuming that uncerainty is resolved after 90 days.
Left: uncertainty in e↵ect of interventions ( h) is resolved. Right: uncertainty in h0
and hs is resolved. All other parameters are assumed known with values given in
Table 6.1.
these parameters is significantly greater than the benefit of resolving uncertainty in
the e↵ect of interventions on h, reducing the expected number of deaths by between
40,000 to 80,000. In this case, the greatest benefits are obtained when we are more
certain about the e↵ect of interventions (corners of the plot), since this allows for
the most e↵ective adaptation.
6.4 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter, we have emphasised the importance of the healthcare-seeking beha-
viour of the population on the outcome of the epidemic. We have shown that changes
in the healthcare-seeking probability of individuals with symptoms will a↵ect the
peak number of individuals requiring healthcare during the outbreak. For increases
from low levels of healthcare-seeking to medium levels (0  h  0.5), we end up
with a greater burden on the healthcare system. However, if the system has the
capacity to accommodate this increase, the outcome of the epidemic will be greatly
improved. For further increases in h (0.5  h  1), we find that the burden on
the healthcare system can decrease, due to a significantly reduced R0 early on in
the outbreak. However, this depends on the proportion of ‘healthy’ individuals also
seeking healthcare, due to having similar symptoms from a di↵erent, less serious
condition. In extreme cases, the increased number of healthy healthcare-seekers
may outweigh the decrease in the number of infected healthcare-seekers. Overall,
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non-infected healthcare-seekers can be a significant contribution to the burden on the
healthcare system, a fact that supports investment into early detection and accurate
triage systems (e.g. [35]).
Changes in the tendency of individuals to seek healthcare, and the resulting change
in the burden on the healthcare system, can become a serious issue if the capacity
of the system is exceeded. Whilst operating at capacity allows for the most people
to be admitted into healthcare, it is possible that a significant excess in demand
for healthcare may cause the system to become overloaded and operate ine ciently.
Hence, whilst increasing the healthcare-seeking probability of the population through
community engagement can be a highly successful form of control, the amount
by which it is increased is very important. Increasing h too much can lead to
overloading the healthcare system, which in turn causes a sharp resurgence in the
expected number of deaths.
Adaptive management can help to target h e↵ectively, reducing the probability
of overloading the healthcare system when the healthcare-seeking behaviour of
individuals and e↵ect of interventions is uncertain. From a passive AM perspective,
not anticipating the resolution of uncertainty, we found that an adaptive decision
process with 5 decision points at 90 day intervals reduced the expected number of
deaths from the outbreak by at least 15% compared to a static approach (only a
single decision point) and over 40% compared to not targeting h at all. We were
also able to optimise the timing of decision points, with the best results obtained
from at least two decision points during the first 180 days of the outbreak. The
overall recommended policy, under passive AM, was high level targeting of h for the
first 90 days, followed by reinvesting those resources into increasing the capacity of
the healthcare system for the remainder of the outbreak. The early targeting of h
results in a significantly reduced outbreak early on. On average, this results in a
lower burden on the healthcare system and thus fewer deaths overall. However, in
some cases the high level targeting of h will cause the healthcare system to become
overloaded and thus result in a less desirable outcome. This occurs if the original
healthcare-seeking probability of the population (h0) is higher than expected, the
proportion of non-infected individuals in the population with similar symptoms
(hs) is higher than expected or if the e↵ect of targeted interventions ( h) is more
than expected. However, if we do not expect to resolve the uncertainty in these
parameters, the benefit of increasing h quickly at the start of the outbreak outweighs
the possible negative e↵ects of overloading the system.
We obtain very di↵erent results when using an active AM approach, anticip-
ating uncertainty resolution. Using the EVFPI measure introduced in Chapter 4
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(Equation 4.9), we were able to analyse the e↵ect that resolving uncertainty in the
parameters at some point in the future will have on the optimality of di↵erent initial
decisions. We found that low level targeting of h early on in the outbreak allows for
significantly greater improvements of control in light of new information compared
to high level targeting. This is because, once the healthcare-seeking rate has been
increased through targeted intervention, it can not be reduced again. Using high
level targeting, we achieve a high healthcare-seeking probability after a single phase
of intervention. Even with new information after this phase, we can not optimise
the value of h further. However, using low level targeting, the healthcare-seeking
probability is not increased so dramatically during the first control phase. Hence,
in subsequent phases, both continued targeting or no targeting is an option. This
allows greater adaptation in light of new information. Hence, if we are expecting to
resolve uncertainty during the outbreak, an initial stage of low level targeting is the
recommended course of action. Following this active AM approach, we could reduce
the expected number of deaths by almost 100,000 individuals (60%), if uncertainty
is resolved within the first 90 days.
The use of the EVFPI measure also allowed for a clear portrayal of the cost
of delaying the resolution of uncertainty, or equivalently, the benefit of resolving
uncertainty earlier. Over the first 90 days, implementing low level targeting of h
allows for a slow depreciation of the value of monitoring, of approximately 10,000
deaths. However, as time progresses the value of monitoring depreciates faster.
Between 90 to 180 days after detection, not targeting h allows for the best adaptation
in light of new information, but we increase expected deaths by another 20,000. In
the subsequent 90 days, this increases by another 40,000. If we do not expect to
resolve uncertainty within the first 270 days of the outbreak, the value of monitoring
becomes negligible, since uncertainty resolution occurs too late in the outbreak for
control adaption to have a significant e↵ect. If this is the case, raising h to a high
level quickly, as recommended by the prior information, is the optimal decision. This
is important information for decision makers, who may be need to allocate limited
resources during the early stages of an outbreak to either monitoring or control.
We were able to incorporate uncertainty in both the current healthcare-seeking
behaviour (h0 and hs) and the e↵ect of control interventions ( h) into our AM
approach. We found that doing so also encourages implementing low level targeting of
h as opposed to high level, unless we have a strong belief that the e↵ects of intervention
will not be more than expected. This is due to the fact that the cost of over-targeting
h, causing an overloaded healthcare system, is greater than the cost of under-targeting
h and not reaching capacity. We also assessed the importance of resolving uncertainty
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in the e↵ect of interventions, in comparison to resolving uncertainty in h0 and hs,
using the EVFPXI measure. If the e↵ectiveness of interventions is between 50%
to 150% of what we expect, resolution of uncertainty in h0 and hs is significantly
more important than resolving uncertainty in e↵ectiveness. The exact values depend
heavily on our prior belief regarding the e cacy of interventions. If we think it is
unlikely that the e↵ect of interventions will be greater than expected (low weight on
150% e cacy model), there is very little value to resolving uncertainty in the e↵ect
of interventions, since we will likely opt for high level targeting of h. However, if
there is a significant probability that the e↵ect will be greater than expected, the
benefit of resolving this uncertainty is increased. Overall, in this scenario we would
recommend allocating more resources to ascertaining the current healthcare-seeking
behaviour of the population than the e↵ect of control interventions. However, this
does provide another example of how experimentation of control with an unknown
e↵ect can improve the outcome of management overall.
There are a number of limitations of this work. First, the definitions of the
healthcare system capacity and penalty for overloading the healthcare system are
overly simplistic. We have defined the capacity of the healthcare system in terms of
the maximum number of people that can be within healthcare at one time. This
applies well to bed capacity, however does not take into account the capacities of
resources, such as protective gear, or medicines, which would depend on the total
number of patients over time. The penalty for overloading is implemented as a closure
of the healthcare centres for a fixed period of time. In reality, it is unlikely that this
would occur. This could be implemented in a number of other ways, including a
reduced admission rate, increased fatality rate or increased nosocomial infection rate.
The penalty for overloading the healthcare has a significant e↵ect on the optimisation
of control, thus should be carefully formulated for specific problems.
The e↵ect of targeted interventions on h could also be defined in a number of
di↵erent ways. We assume that the e↵ect is greatest immediately after intervention,
then levels o↵ over time. However, it may be that interventions take some time
to have an e↵ect, thus leading to a slower increase in h at first. In this case, a
sigmoid function may be more appropriate [144]. We have also assumed that the
healthcare-seeking rate remains the same after interventions are lifted. However,
as the outbreak progresses, it may be that the healthcare-seeking rate increases
without intervention due to increased awareness of the disease [144]. Finally, we have
assumed that the healthcare-seeking rate can not be decreased, thus interventions are
not reversible. However, once community engagement is ceased, it is possible that
healthcare-seeking falls again. Whilst we have not explored these e↵ects here, they
167
could be included in the AM framework as di↵erent models of system behaviour.
Finally, we have not considered the e↵ect of an unknown transmission rate or
vaccination with an unknown e cacy, as explored in the previous chapter. Since the
transmission rate has a significant e↵ect on the number of infections, we would expect
this play an important role in the level of burden on the healthcare system. If this
parameter is uncertain, it should be included and averaged over in the calculation
of expectations within the AM framework. The resolution of uncertainty in   may
also be beneficial, something we could assess using the same EVFPXI analysis we
have used here. The implementation of a mass vaccination campaign with unknown
e cacy has already proven to be non-trivial decision in the previous chapter. The
addition of a changing healthcare-seeking probability h would add to that complexity,
since it significantly changes the vaccine e cacy required to have a positive e↵ect.
Hence, an intervention that targets h would e↵ect the optimal monitoring and
thresholds for vaccine e cacy that we calculated in the previous chapter. As such, it
is necessary to model such interventions together to account for these interactions.
Whilst the analyses in this chapter have been based on a simplified system,
we believe the methods used are highly relevant to the management of real-world
outbreaks. For example, in the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak in the UK, it may
be necessary to implement an incremental strategy relaxing the restrictions of the
lockdown. However, the exact e↵ect of such relaxation on contacts within the
population and thus the transmission of the disease may be unknown until such
measures have been tried. Furthermore, the burden on the UK healthcare system,
including hospital capacities and the availability of equipment, is an important
factor to consider before relaxing current lockdown measures. We believe that active
AM could be an extremely helpful tool in a scenario such as this. Furthermore,
these results contribute to analyses in the literature regarding the use of AM to
provide easily interpretable information to decision makers [139], identify important
uncertainties (those that, when resolved, lead to the most benefits) [10, 123, 126]
and highlight the time sensitivity of monitoring and control actions at the start of
an outbreak [10, 23].
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
The aim of this thesis has been to motivate the use of the AM framework in the
management of epidemics. Although AM has been widely studied in the context
of ecology and resource management for several decades [44, 46], applications in
epidemiology are extremely rare [11, 51]. Whilst not all management contexts are
appropriate for AM [42, 67], we believe that the management of epidemics is. First,
there is a high level of uncertainty involved, especially at early stages of an epidemic.
Furthermore, much of this uncertainty is epistemic, relating to unknown dynamics of
spread and e↵ects of control. Second, we often have access to real-time information
collected from monitoring the outbreak, such as daily reported cases or deaths,
which can be used to reduce uncertainty in the system as the outbreak progresses.
Finally, the impact of the outbreak, whether it be represented as a financial cost
or the number of lives lost, is highly sensitive to the control interventions that are
implemented throughout. We have supported this with an exploration of AM applied
to epidemic control, covering a range of scenarios that involve di↵erent sources of
uncertainty, objectives of management and forms of control. We have analysed
in detail the contribution of certain components of the AM framework, such as
the optimisation approach used and how we model the resolution of uncertainty
obtained from monitoring. We have demonstrated the utility of AM in providing
important information to decision makers that can be used to lessen the fallout from
an epidemic.
Throughout this work we have largely focused on the use of active AM. In Chapter
3, we clarified the meaning of the term active AM: referring to the explicit anticipation
of uncertainty resolution during the optimisation process. This di↵ers to passive
AM, under which we make decisions assuming that uncertainty will remain the same
in the future. Similar analyses exist in the literature [58, 137], but not applied to
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epidemiological interventions. We showed that actively anticipating the resolution of
uncertainty in the future can lead to di↵erent decisions now, ultimately improving the
outcome of control. In this case, we assessed the ability of a vaccination campaign,
with unknown vaccine e cacy, to reduce the cost or duration of an outbreak. We
assumed that, if a campaign was implemented, it could be monitored in order to
resolve uncertainty regarding vaccine e cacy. This constitutes the experimentation
[48] of control in order to resolve uncertainty. Using active AM, we observed that
implementing a vaccination campaign immediately and monitoring the e cacy of
the vaccine allowed for improved management overall. Using a passive or non-AM
approach, we are unable to recognise this, opting for a suboptimal policy of not
vaccinating immediately, thus removing our ability to resolve uncertainty. Finally,
an active AM approach allowed us to analyse other factors that could be extremely
useful to decision makers and further improve outcomes, such as the length of time
to wait between decisions and characteristics of the vaccination campaign.
An essential component of active AM is the ability to predict how monitoring
will result in the resolution of uncertainty in the future. In Chapter 4, we analysed
the e↵ect of this component in detail. We introduced and analysed three methods
of predicting uncertainty resolution: a perfect information method, which assumes
complete resolution of uncertainty, an abstract method, which assumes partial
resolution but does not depend on the state of the epidemic, and a mechanistic
method, which aims to model the monitoring process directly. We used these methods
in conjunction with active AM, to assess the use of a vaccination campaign to minimise
the cost of an epidemic with unknown epidemiological parameters. We observed
that, under all three methods, an initial phase of monitoring before implementing
a vaccination campaign was recommended. Using a passive or non-AM approach,
we would make the suboptimal decision to vaccinate immediately. Whilst all three
methods of predicting uncertainty resolution led to the same initial decision, they
provided varying degrees of information regarding the optimisation of monitoring
and control. The perfect information method is useful for providing an upper bound
for the benefit obtained from resolving uncertainty, however is unable to advise on
the optimal use of monitoring resources or timing of control. It is also useful for
identifying which uncertainties are most valuable to resolve, if there is more than one,
allowing for targeted monitoring. The abstract method can provide useful insight
into ‘how much’ uncertainty resolution is required in order for monitoring to be
beneficial, however lacks a basis in the real world. Its detachment from the state
of the epidemic also makes it unreliable for optimising the allocation of monitoring
resources and timing of control. The mechanistic method, whilst computationally
demanding, provides the most useful information for decision makers. Using this
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method we were able to assess the amount of monitoring required, as a number and
size of cross-sectional samples of the population, testing for infection. Furthermore,
we were able to optimise the timing and allocation of resources to each sample and
recommend if and when a vaccination campaign should be implemented. Overall,
developing a mechanistic model of uncertainty resolution to be used within the AM
framework can help to significantly improve the management of an epidemic.
The analysis from Chapter 4 also highlighted that even without experimentation,
an active AM approach is incredibly important. In this scenario, monitoring and
resolving uncertainty in the epidemiological parameters can occur with or without the
implementation of a vaccination campaign. Furthermore, the e cacy of the vaccine
was assumed to be known, hence experimentation was not required to resolve this.
However, an active approach to uncertainty resolution still resulted in a di↵erent
initial decision compared to a passive approach. This is because some decisions
transition us into states from which we are better able to adapt to new information
than other states. For example, an initial decision not to vaccinate transitions us
into a state where we have not committed to a vaccination campaign, but have
allowed the epidemic to spread unhindered for a short amount of time. Conversely,
an initial decision to vaccinate transitions us into a state where we have committed
to a vaccination campaign, but the epidemic will have spread slightly less during
this time. In light of new information, the former allows us to avoid a vaccination
campaign and the costs it incurs altogether, whilst the latter does not, since a
vaccination campaign has already been started. Only using an active AM approach
can we recognise such e↵ects. Finally, an active AM approach is also necessary to
further optimise the implementation of monitoring and control. Thus, even without
explicit experimentation, active AM is a useful tool.
A significant barrier to the use of AM, especially active AM, is the inherent
complexity of both the implementation of such methods and the results we obtain
from them. The latter makes it extremely di cult for decision makers to make use
of the information AM can provide. In Chapters 3 and 4 we used highly simplified
models to exhibit some of the useful information that can be obtained from an active
AM analysis. In Chapters 5 and 6 we used a more complex scenario, approaching a
real-world context, to demonstrate how the ideas and methods we have introduced
can be used to extract easily understandable, but important, information for decision
makers.
We introduced the new scenario in Chapter 5: we wish to analyse an Ebola-like
disease, based on models used in the literature [144], incorporating the use of both
mass vaccination and the establishment of healthcare centres. We introduced the idea
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of ‘risky behaviour’, exhibited by those who have been vaccinated. We found that
such behaviour can reduce the e↵ectiveness of a mass vaccination campaign, even
resulting in an increased number of deaths through vaccination if vaccine e cacy is
low. In light of this, we introduced a new objective that can reflect the risk-averse
nature of decision makers: we assume that a mass vaccination campaign will only be
implemented if the probability of increasing the number of deaths through vaccination
is below a specified level ✏. By formulating a mechanistic model of a vaccine trial,
we used active AM to develop time-dependent thresholds for the estimates of e cacy
obtained from the trial. These thresholds can be used to trigger the implementation
of a mass vaccination campaign if the estimate of e cacy is above the threshold.
We also showed the e↵ect of having uncertainty in both the epidemiological and
control parameters: uncertainty in the transmission rate can significantly e↵ect
the requirements for monitoring vaccine e cacy, possibly rendering it irrelevant.
Furthermore, the results of monitoring and resolving uncertainty in the transmission
rate can a↵ect the resolution of uncertainty in the vaccine e cacy, even if results
from the vaccine trial have not changed. We used both an abstract and mechanistic
model of uncertainty resolution for the transmission rate, to develop state- and
time-dependent thresholds for the estimates of vaccine e cacy. This also highlighted
the limitations of using a convenient, abstract model of uncertainty resolution as
opposed to a computationally intensive, mechanistic model.
In Chapter 6 we analysed the e↵ect that the healthcare-seeking behaviour of
the population has on our Ebola-like disease model. We introduced a capacity on
the healthcare system and a penalty for exceeding that capacity, in the form of a
temporary shut down of healthcare centres. We introduced a new control intervention:
community engagement, resulting in an increase in the healthcare-seeking probability
of the population. We found that implementing such an intervention can significantly
reduce the number of deaths from the outbreak. However, if there is uncertainty
surrounding the current healthcare-seeking behaviour, existence of non-infectious
healthcare-seekers and e↵ect of control, such interventions can result in overloading
the healthcare system, leading to more deaths. We applied AM to this scenario and
showed that it can help to optimise the implementation of interventions targeting
the healthcare-seeking probability, maximising the benefit and reducing the chance
of overloading the healthcare system. We again showed that a passive AM approach,
whilst superior to a static, non-AM approach, can lead to suboptimal decisions
compared to an active AM approach. Under active AM, we recognise that a more
conservative intervention initially allows for better adaptation of control in the future.
We also exhibited the use of the EVFPI measure to clearly portray the benefit of
resolving uncertainty quickly, or the cost of delaying, to decision makers. In addition,
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we used the EVPXI measure to identify which uncertainties are most beneficial to
resolve, allowing for e cient allocation of monitoring resources if necessary. Finally,
the incorporation of uncertainty in the e↵ect of these interventions, which can only
be resolved if the intervention is implemented, provides a realistic example of active
experimentation that is relevant to real-world outbreaks.
This work has provided motivation and a foundation for the use of AM in the
management of epidemics. We have demonstrated the ability of AM to address
several areas of interest that are often considered in the literature: the balance of
monitoring and control [141, 143, 153], the optimal allocation of resources [29, 139],
e cient, targeted monitoring plans [7, 15, 27], the identification of control ‘triggers’
[25, 28, 29, 152] and resolving uncertainty in selected parameters to improve control
[10, 56, 123, 124]. A framework that allows analysis of all these factors would be a
great asset to decision makers.
Future directions for this work are wide ranging, however we believe a significant
focus should be on the application of this framework to specific scenarios. This is
highly non-trivial, especially in three areas: first, the development of accurate, disease-
specific models of system behaviour and uncertainty resolution. This embodies much
of the work already performed by mathematical epidemiologists, providing a wealth
of knowledge to make use of. However, selecting which models to use, or developing
new models, can be a daunting task. We propose a possible solution to this through
the combination of ensemble modelling with AM. Ensemble modelling is a modelling
approach in which multiple models are used to make predictions that are then
combined, according to some weighting process, into a single aggregated prediction
(e.g. [16, 154]). It has been shown to provide better predictions overall than individual
models alone [32, 37]. This could be incorporated into the AM framework, allowing
the weights to be assigned and updated iteratively as the outbreak progresses.
Second, implementing AM in realistic settings is computationally extremely
di cult. Standard methods, such as those used throughout this thesis, involve the
use of Markov decision processes (MDPs) and stochastic dynamic programming
(SDP). However, such methods require a discretised state space and set of possible
actions. In the context of epidemic control, the space of possible epidemics that
could occur, as well as the controls that could be implemented, is e↵ectively infinite
and requires incredibly fine discretisation in order to provide relevant results. This
quickly becomes computationally intractable using traditional methods [14, 155].
The development of more e cient solutions to such problems is ongoing, with a
recent move into areas of reinforcement learning [14, 156]. We propose the use of
such methods in conjunction with AM to allow for application to more complex
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systems.
Third, interpreting the results obtained through an AM procedure is a specialised
task. In this work, we have restricted ourselves to two sources of uncertainty to
allow visualisation of results and state-dependent recommendations. However, in the
case of multiple sources of uncertainty and separate rates of uncertainty resolution,
this becomes a di cult task. This is an issue, since results need to be translated
into a form that decision makers can easily understand and make use of. This has
begun to be addressed in some areas [14], though not yet in conjunction with the
AM framework.
Overcoming these di culties should be a focus of future work involving the AM
framework, especially in peace-time. However, in spite of these barriers, we believe
that the methods we have used in this thesis are immediately implementable and
useful for the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. We hope to use already developed models
that accurately represent and predict the dynamics of spread to assess the benefit
of adaptive relaxation of lockdown measures that are currently in place across the
UK. Using measures such as the EVFPI and EVPXI within an active AM approach,
we can quantify the benefit of experimental, staged relaxation, inform optimal
timing, identify important sources of uncertainty and provide triggers for lockdown
reinstation based on observable quantities such as hospital or ICU admissions.
In summary, this thesis has provided an in depth analysis of the use of the AM
framework in the context of epidemiological interventions. We have explored several
di↵erent components, including the use of active or passive optimisation and the
method of predicting uncertainty resolution, providing valuable insight into the
e↵ects and benefits of di↵erent methods within the framework. We have motivated
the use of active AM, explicitly incorporating the future resolution of uncertainty
through mechanistic models of monitoring, in the control of epidemics. We believe
the practical implementation of such an approach could greatly improve the outcome
of epidemics in the future.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
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Figure A.1: Example e↵ect of prior information on the expected cost of
the outbreak given an initial decision to vaccinate or not. We set x0+y0 = 4
and vary the estimate of vaccine e cacy (the mode of the distribution x0x0+y0 ) across
columns. Rows 1-3: predicted outbreak cost over vaccine e cacy, given an initial
decision to vaccinate (red) or not (blue), for di↵erent prior estimates of e cacy, as
viewed under a non-AM, passive AM or active AM approach respectively. Bottom
row: initial decision made under each approach, for di↵erent prior estimates of
e cacy: vaccinate (red) or don’t (blue). Epidemiological and vaccination parameters
are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 1.
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Figure A.2: Scenario 1: Initial decision made under each approach given
di↵erent prior information. We define prior information using a Beta(x0+1, y0+1)
distribution and vary the estimated e cacy (the mode of the distribution; x0x0+y0 ) and
the amount of information supporting this estimate (x0 + y0). Top row: di↵erence
in expected cost between vaccinating initially or not, as viewed under each approach.
Bottom row: initial decision made under each approach: vaccinate (red) or not
(blue). Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1:
Scenario 1.
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Figure A.3: Scenario 1: Comparison of initial decision made between active
and passive AM given di↵erent prior information. We define prior informa-
tion using a Beta(x0 + 1, y0 + 1) distribution and vary the estimated e cacy (the
mode of the distribution; x0x0+y0 ) and the amount of information supporting this
estimate (x0+y0). Left panel: di↵erence in expected cost under active AM compared
to passive AM. Right panel: agreement in initial decision between passive AM and
active AM. Epidemiological and vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1:
Scenario 1.
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Figure A.4: Scenario 1: e↵ect of monitoring proportion on the predicted
outbreak cost given an initial decision to vaccinate or not. Predicted out-
break cost over vaccine e cacy, given an initial decision to vaccinate (red) or not
(blue), for di↵erent monitoring proportions (⇢; Table 3.1). The number of monitored
vaccinations is given in brackets beside the proportion. The required number of
successful vaccinations from the total number monitored in order to make a decision
to vaccinate is shown in the lower left corner of each panel. The far right panel
assumes perfect information is obtained after day t⇤, that is, we will know the
true vaccine e cacy exactly when making the final decision. Epidemiological and
vaccination parameters are set to those in Table 3.1: Scenario 1.
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Figure A.5: E↵ect of vaccine pool size on campaign performance - Scenarios
1 and 2. All other parameters are fixed to the values given in Table 3.1. Asterisks
identify the default value for the vaccine pool size used in each scenario.
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Figure A.6: E↵ect of the daily vaccine rate on campaign performance -
Scenarios 1 and 2. All other parameters are fixed to the values given in Table 3.1.
Asterisks identify the default value for the daily rate used in each scenario.
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S7 Fig. E↵ect of the value of t⇤ on campaign performance - Scenarios 1
and 2. All other parameters are fixed to the values given in Table 3.1. Asterisks
identify the default value for t⇤ used in each scenario.
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Figure A.7: Scenario 1: Initial decision made under each approach, varying
epidemiological parameters. We vary the epidemiological parameters describing
transmission ( ) and recovery/removal ( ). Top row: di↵erence in expected cost
between vaccinating initially or not, as viewed under each approach. Bottom row:
initial decision made under each approach: vaccinate (red) or not (blue). Black
crosses represent the default values used in scenario 1 (Table 3.1). Lines of constant
R0 are identified with black lines.
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Figure A.8: Scenario 1: Comparison of initial decision made between active
and passive AM given di↵erent epidemiological parameters. We vary the
epidemiological parameters describing transmission ( ) and recovery/removal ( ).
Left panel: di↵erence in expected cost under active AM compared to passive AM.
Right panel: agreement in initial decision between passive AM and active AM. Black
crosses represent the default values used in scenario 1 (Table 3.1). Lines of constant
R0 are identified with black lines.
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Figure A.9: E↵ect of epidemiological transmission and recovery rates on
campaign performance - Scenario 2. All other parameters are fixed to the values
given in Table 3.1. The asterisk identifies the default combination of transmission
and recovery rates used in scenario 2.
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